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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
Public policy is the means govanment uses to intervene in a society to bring about 
change that is perceived to be for the common good of that society. The formulation and 
implemoitation of public policy has played an increasingly important role in modem society 
as the power and influence of government, particularly the federal government, has increased 
in response to a more complex and differentiated society. The state has assumed greater 
"responsibility for the functioning of the economy, for the social welfare of the population 
and for the provision of all services not adequately supplied by the private enterprise system" 
(Schaipf 1977:340). Public policy may be implemented through such means as taxes, 
laws, regulations, programs, and projects. Public policy generally calls for change in the 
behavior of some target groiq) and may entail the construction of physical structures which 
complement the desired personal change or in other ways promote the general welfare. For 
instance, the state has been particularly active in providing infiiastructure facilities needed by 
profit-making enteaprises when the facilities themselves can not be profitably provided 
(Scharpf 1977:340). Examples of such facilities include roads, irrigation systems, and flood 
control devices. 
The involvement of the federal government in many of these projects is conditional 
on the active participation of local people and groups. This requirement is consistent with 
our dominant societal values of individualism and democracy. Individualism supports the 
belief that people and communities should be able to choose how they are to live their lives 
and what their communities will be like. The democratic tradition requires that people should 
have a voice in shaping the programs and policies that affect them. 
Thus, many of the infrastructure facilities built by federal agencies have been 
constructed with the agreement that local sponsors would retain responsibility for the 
operation and maintenance of the structures and, ultimately, for their replacement if needed 
(Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:468). Federal money was used as seed money to initiate 
projects and to quickly solve immediate problems which were too big and expensive for local 
capabilities. Once through the initial phase, however, local groups were expected to 
continue the project and to maintain the facilities which had been built with public money. 
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Fedoal agencies assumed that once their involvement was completed, the project and its 
stated objectives would continue without government assistance. 
Because the concretization of policy continues long after the formal policy-making 
process is complete, the ultimate effects of policy initiatives may not be what was originally 
intended (Ham and Hill 1984:105). As a result, many policies do not achieved their stated 
objectives. The responsible federal agency is then caught in a dilemma: it is unable to 
directly intervaie to "fix" the problem and to get the policy back on track, but it retains an 
interest in the project to oisure that the original intent of the policy is not severely 
compromised. 
The Little Sioux Watershed in Western Iowa is a case in point Less than SO miles 
wide, the area stretches some 135 miles along the lowa-N^raska border beginning in 
Southern Minnesota and extending approximately half-way between Sioux City and Council 
Bluffs, Iowa. The area is characterized by rugged hills and fragile loess soils. By the early 
1940s, it was recognized that commercial agricultural activity through the past half-century 
had caused severe soil erosion and flooding which was destroying the social and economic 
viability of the area. In response, the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) in 1946 initiated the 
little Sioux Rivo* Basin WatKshed and Flood Prevention Project (the Little Sioux 
Watershed Project). The program provided fon 
1. the treatment of farm lands in the loess-covered portion of the watershed to 
reduce runoff at its source, and minimize erosion; 
2. the building of structures.to control major gullies; that is, gullies so large they 
cannot be stopped by individual action (House Document No. 268,78th 
Congress 1943:1). 
Actual construction of flood control and grade stabilization structures began in 1948. 
In implementing these projects, agreements were entered into by SCS and local sponsors. 
The respective sponsors acquired or othaivise provided for land rights permitting 
construction of various types of dams and spillways. The SCS provided funds and 
supervised construction of these structures. Local sponsors agreed with SCS to continue the 
integrity of the structures by providing maintenance, repairs, and r^lacement as necessary 
(Joint Agreement 1988). 
In large part, the objectives of flood control and soil conservation have been 
achieved. A current inventory of project structures, however, indicates variation in 
conditions of maintenance of the structures and perhaps varying awareness, understanding. 
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or interpretation of expectations between SCS and local sponsors for maintenance of the 
structures (Joint Agreemait 1988). Over time, the codified agreement of local responsibility 
for maintenance has eroded to the point where now, at least from the perspective of SCS, 
many of the structures are inadequately maintained, threatening the continued int^ty of the 
project 
The Research Problem 
As described above, it is common for the federal govemmoit, which has assumed 
increasingly greater responsibility for the public welfare (Hamlin 1986), to be forced by 
cultural convoition and law to give responsibility for long-term implementation of public 
projects to local sponsors. For their part, local sponsors may redefine the policy and 
implementation strategy in ways which are consistent with their percq)tion of the problem 
and their available resources. Local solutions may be inadequate to address the larger 
societal need which was the goal of the original policy. Hence, the policy does not achieve 
its stated objectives and the societal good may be compromised. 
The problem is further complicated for the federal government It retains an intaest 
in the projects to safeguard the public's original investment and to fulfill its responsibility of 
promoting policies and programs which serve the common good. Should the pxyects fail, 
the federal government would be called upon again to resolve the problem. The government, 
understandably, would prefer that the projects not fail so that it can use its limited resources 
to address new yet unresolved problems. 
The research problem for this dissertation, then, is: 
1. to learn how implementation strat^ies can be better devised to increase local 
compliance with policy objectives and to minimize policy drift; 
2. to learn how an outside agency, the federal government for example, can retain 
influence on the direction and integrity of a policy over which it 1^ no formal 
contirol. 
The little Sioux Watershed program provides the empirical base for this research. 
The study examines the operation and maintenance of the watershed structures in selected 
counties of the watershed area to derive a grounded theory of how local actors implemaited 
policy objectives delegated to them by the original project agreement The derived theory is 
then compared with extant implementation theory and literature to determine how it might be 
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generalized to otha" situations. Recommendations for improving policy implementation 
strategies and for retaining influence with local sponsors are suggested. 
The Research Perspective 
The study is conducted within a traditional sociological framework which assumes 
that change is a constant fact of sodal life; that the direction and influence of change must be 
accounted for in explaining sodal phenomena; that social interaction and sodal process are at 
the core of sodological investigations; and that it is necessary to grasp actors' viewpoints to 
understand interaction, process, and social change (Strauss 1987:6). Implementation 
literature and theory is used within this framework to structure the inquiry process and to 
expand the explanatory power of the derived theory from the Little Sioux Watershed Project 
to other like situations. -
Conventional studies of the policy implementation process have been concerned with 
the nature of policy, the inter- and intra-organizational context within which it is 
implemented, and the external world on which it is expected to have impact (Ham and Hill 
1984:1(X)). These studies have generally assumed a predictable social world controlled in 
hierarchical fashion by policy makers and public officials who by various incentive 
mechanisms shape the behavior of target actors to conform to some preconceived notion of 
the common good (Hjem and Hull 1982:107). 
If, however, change is assumed as a constant of the social world, policy 
implementation may thai be viewed as a continuous process of interaction with a changing 
and changeable policy situation and intentions (Ham and Hill 1984:108). From this 
perspective, implementation studies must in some way speak to the dynamic quality of this 
world (Wittrock and deLeon 1986). The linkages between the various actors and thdr 
relation to the policy through the various stages of the policy implementation process 
provides a beginning point in trying to understand any dynamic implementation experience 
(Kiviniemi 1986:260). 
The dynamic approach includes an examination of the interests and perspectives of 
the target groups (Hjem and Hull 1982:105, Kiviniemi 1986:253). This perspective 
challenges the researcher to understand the unique activities of individuals from a local 
perspective without preconceived notions of what that behavior should be. The assumption 
is made that policy is not the only or even the major influence on the behavior of people. By 
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studying policy implementation from a local perspective, the researcher is able to better 
understand the impact other influoices have on the point where private choice and 
administrative action intersect (Elmore 1979-80:604). 
A local perspective is particularly useful for this study. The Soil Conservation 
Service has given the local sponsors leqwnsibility for the operation and maintenance of the 
watershed structures. Other than legal sanctions, which it is reluctant to use, and informal 
persuasion, SCS is powerless to influence the behavior of the local sponsors relative to the 
maintœance of the structures. It is a fluid, indeterminate world in which SCS and the local 
sponsors interact for the purpose of maintaining and operating the structures. 
Another level of analysis for the study of policy implementation is to examine socio-
cultural influences. Policy is a reflection of the larger dominant society which is the source 
of acceptable definitions of the common good and of the parameters within which solutions 
may be sought (Guba 1985, Ham and Hill 1984). These influences color both how a policy 
is designed and put into practice as well as how it is or is not accepted by target actors. The 
contradictions inherait in our social and economic system may lead to contradictions in the 
implementation of policy. As a result, many policies do not achieve their stated purpose. 
Social order is an ongoing human production and exists only as a product of human 
activity (Berger and Luckmann 1966). To successfully implement policy, one must 
acknowledge this dynamic and understand its operation within the specific domain of the 
policy. The investigator must understand the meanings which actors bring to their ? Ion, 
the processes they use to define and impose meaning on various elements of their world, and 
ultimately, the meanings and understandings they take from their world to guide their day-to­
day living relative to the policy in question. The definitions and meanings which local actors 
place on elemœts of the policy world structure their behavior in a way which is consistent 
with these definitions. Such definitions may well conflict with the definitions and 
understandings of the actors who make and implement the policy. 
The definition and meaning which relevant actors give to conservation and to 
conservation practices and how these meanings differ between groups of actors is another 
important avenue of investigation. The little Sioux Watershed program is premised on 
specific assumptions regarding the importance of conservation: what it is, and how it is to be 
practiced. The degree of congruence between the norms expressed in the policy and the 
norms and practices of those charged with implementing the policy may account for 
divergence in implementation of the policy. Another issue which turns on understanding 
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definitions and meanings has to do with who owns the watershed structures. If the local 
perception is that the structures are owned by the federal government because they were built 
with federal funds, then local actors may be less committed to caring for them. 
The above perspectives are used to develop research questions to guide the 
investigation of the littie Sioux Watershed program. These questions are: 
1. What understanding, knowledge, and percutions do local actors have of their 
obligations for the maintenance and operation of tiie watershW structures? 
2. What are the links among the various actors, and how do these linkages 
support or deter implementation of the staled policy? 
3. How do the various actors understand soil cons^ation, and how does this 
understanding shape their behavior and their assignment of responsibility 
for maintenance of the watershed structures? 
4. What does private property mean to the various actors, and how does this 
understanding sh^ their accq)tance and cooperation relative to the 
maintenance of the wato^hed structures as well as attendant soil 
conservation activities? 
5. What factors in the broader environment impede or support appropriate 
maintenance activities? 
Objectives of the Study 
To accomplish the purpose of this study, the following objectives will be completed. 
1. to gather data from primary and secondary sources to be used to derive a 
substantive implementatim theory; 
2. to derive a grounded theory explaining local actor behavior relative to the 
maintaiance of the Littie Sioux wateiShed structures; 
3. to derive a general theory of policy implementation and to compare this 
derived theory with other implementation theories; 
4. to make recommendations for improving implementation strategies. 
Methods 
Research for tiie dissertation was completed in conjunction with a study undertaken 
by Iowa State University's Department of Sociology and Anthropology for the Soil 
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Conservation Service (SCS). The purpose of tiiis study was to examine watershed structure 
maintenance issues in Western Iowa. Data were obtained from personal interviews with 
current and past decision mako^, public ofGcials, and other individuals who have 
knowledge about the watershed structure program in the Western Iowa counties of 
Cherokee, Ida, Monona, Plymouth, and Woodbury. The dissertation, however, focuses 
only on the counties of Ida, Monona, and Woodbury. Data from the other two counties, 
thus, is not included as part of the dissatation analysis. 
Sixty-five state, area, and local SCS officials, local sponsors (district commissioners 
and county boards of supervisors), and landowners were intaviewed for the dissertation. 
Intaviews were based on a prepared questionnaire which consisted of both closed- and 
open-aided questions. Because the interview protocol was sufficiently flexible to allow for 
additional questions, questioning was not limited to the questionnaire. 
Because subjects had to be knowledgeable about the operation and maintenance 
aspects of the watershed program, a key informant strategy was used to select interviewees. 
In this way, limited time and resources wee used most efficiently to obtain quality 
information (Moede-Lex 1986). 
Historical data were gathered finom the archives of the Little Sioux Watershed Project. 
While not a comply record, the archives provide data on the early history of the project, the 
organizational agreements, and the project's early successes and problems. The archives 
also provide information about people's initial understanding of the project and the value and 
importance they saw in it This information is used to complemait more recent data to 
provide a perspective on the continuity and change that has taken place within the project and 
within the littie Sioux area. 
A grounded theory methodology is used to analyze the data and to generate theory. 
Grounded theory is defined "as theory generated fix>m data systematically obtained and 
analyzed through the constant comparative method" (Conrad 1978:102). 
Using the research questions as a guide, situations and factors that influenced the 
implementation process in the Little Sioux area are identified and analyzed by systematically 
examining similarities and differences among the groins which are the focus of the study 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967:36). Key concepts and their properties are defined and integrated 
into a substantive theory to explain local implementation of the operation and maintenance of 
the watershed structures in the Littie Sioux Watershed. The derived theory is then compared 
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to conventional implementation theories to see how it might be gaieralized to other 
situations. 
Conclusion 
The following chapter reviews implementation literature and theory from the various 
perspectives described earlier in the present chapter. The puipose of this review is to 
develop a gaieral implemoitation framework to aid in the analysis of the data and to provide 
a comparative basis for the derived implementation theory, as well as to provide a basis from 
which to generalize the derived theory. 
Chapter 3 first describes the grounded theory methodology. Then it describes how 
the data were collected and analyzed. Finally, the chapter describes how the theory is 
derived. 
Chapter 4 provides background information for the study. The Little Sioux 
watershed area is described along with the watershed program and the key actors. Historical 
as well as macro-social and economic factors that have impacted the area are included as part 
of the discussion. 
Because case studies are an effective means to relate what has happened in a 
particular situation, th^ are the prevailing mode of empirical inquiry for implemaitation 
studies (Montjoy and OToole 1979:467). In Chapter 5, three case studies, one for each 
target county, are presented to describe the implementation of the watershed program within 
the respective county. 
Chapter 6 presents the derived theory and discusses its relevance for the Little Sioux 
Watershed area. 
Chapter 7 compares the derived theory with other implementation theories to see how 
insights gained finom the examination of the Little Sioux Watershed might be applied to other 
similar situations. 
Chapter 8 offers recommendations for designing better implementation strategies and 
for ways an outside agency can continue to influence a policy situation in which it is no 
longer formally involved. The initial discussion focuses on the Little Sioux area. A follow-
up section makes recommendations of a more gaieral nature. 
The concluding chapter offers a summary of learnings and makes suggestions for 
further research in this area. 
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CHAPTERn 
PUBLIC POUCY AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter reviews literature pertaining to the implemoitation of public policy, 
discusses issues raised in the literature, and develops a core set of assumptions which guide 
the study. Matoial discussed in this chapter will be used later to examine the policy 
implementation theory daived finom the experience of the Little Sioux Watershed program. 
This analysis will assess the usefulness of the derived theory for describing policy 
implementation failures in other situations. The chapter begins with a brief description of 
public policy. 
Public Policy 
The formulation of public policy "is a complex process reflecting the infiuaice of 
multiple actors, existing societal conditions, conceptual paradigms that prevail in the minds 
of both the pq)ulace and elites, estimates of the resources available - physical and 
institutional - and perceived costs and benefits of proposed courses of action" (Mann 
1981:5). 
Public policy is a normative activity. It is a process charged with the responsibility 
of bridging the gap between the currmit reality of a social problem and some better future 
state which resolves the issue of concern. The detinitiw of the problem and the negotiated 
solutions to it ate socially-constructed realities which reflect the values and i(kologies of 
individual actors as well as those of the larger sodo-cultural milieu within which the problem 
and policy are defined (Shadish 1984:725). The definition of the problem, its solution, and 
who is doing the defining are thus key issues to understand. For example, the values and 
norms around issues relating to soil conservation can be very different for an urban 
bureaucrat and a Western Iowa farmer. Each, therefore, would in all probability formulate a 
very different soil conservation policy. 
One way to view public policy is as the means government uses to intervene in a 
society to bring about change that is perceived to be for the common good of that society. 
The core assumption of this perspective reflects a liberal-democratic bias that policy is a 
prescriptive mechanism designed by elected lepresaitatives and implemented in a 
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subordinate manna- by public officials (Ham and Hill 1984:108). In other words, 
govemmoit knows what is best for society and, because it has political power and the 
control of resources, it has the responsibility to translate its notion of the good into action to 
benefit all of society. 
From this perspective, public policy is imposed and maintained through some 
coercive mechanism and has the following characteristics: 
1. an overt intent, or an official expression of intentions concerning the end state 
of affairs; 
2. a provision for inducements, either positive or n^ative, or both; 
3. programmed resource flows; 
4. actual resource flows; and 
5. some actual impact on society (Gustavsson 1980:136). 
This perspective assumes that a policy will unfold to its prescribed ends once the 
implementation process has been initiated. 
Policy decisions are thus equated with policy actions. This perspective assumes that 
if management structures and processes, channels of communication, and clarity of 
communication are right, then effective action will be assured (Barrett and Fudge 1981:9). 
Control and compliance are key conc^ts for understanding policy from this perspective. 
The policy-equals-action equation does not hold in reality. Governments at all levels 
are "adq)t at making statements of intention, but what happens on the ground often falls a 
long way short of the original aspirations" (Barrett and Fudge 1981:3). The littie Sioux 
Watershed program provides an example of this discrqxmcy. The policy which originally 
formulated the program stipulated that the maintmance and operation of the structures were 
to be the responsibility of the local sponsors. Today, however, the continuing viability of 
that arrangement is being called into question. In this instance, policy and action have not 
been synonymous. 
An alternative approach to public policy describes it as a continuous process of 
interaction between govœiment and local actors for the purpose of defining social problems 
and negotiating the means to solve these problems. What is "good" for society is worked 
out through a complex process of bargaining and negotiation (Ham and Hill 1984:109). The 
policy is never settled. It is in a constant state of flux as it responds to an ever-changing 
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world (Elmore 1978). Policy from this perspective is maintained through the voluntary 
acceptance of the policy's prescriptions (Barrett and Fudge 1981). 
Both perspectives are important in considering public policy. The normative view of 
policy maintains that thee are fundamental values that need to be reflected in how peq)le 
interact with one another and with the institutions that make up our society. Further, tins 
perspective acknowledges the legitimate role of government to ensure that these values are 
actually reflected in interactions and that all citizens have access to the goods and benefits 
produced by our society. The action perspective draws attention to a changing and 
changeable world and to the forces that shape that world and, in the process, reshape the 
policy that seeks to alter it Failure to understand public policy at this level may well lead to 
the developmait of inappropriate and ultimately ineffective policy (Elmore 1978:226). 
Regardless of how they are contrived, if policies are to have an impact, they must be 
successfully implemented, which means humans must design action solutions to concrete 
situations (Argyris et al. 1985:19). Hence, for a policy to actually exist, it must be 
implemented and produce outcomes which, ultimately, become the measure of that policy 
(Guba 1985:11). 
In practice, policy and implemaitation are linked in a symbiotic relationship. The 
purpose and design of the policy set parameters to be translated into action. At the same 
time, even as the policy becomes action, it is changed and modified to better "fit" with local 
conditions and concerns (Pressman and "Mldavsky 1984:170). For die purposes of 
analysis, however, policy and implementation are generally separated. Thus, the focus of 
the present study is on the implementation aspects of public policy. 
Under and Peters (1987) provide a dissenting view to tiie importance of 
implementation studies. They believe that too much importance has been placed on 
implementation at the expense of good policy design. Their concern is that implementation 
studies will limit policy and program development to only those solutions which policy-
makes know can be implemented. From this limited perspective, implementation studies are 
nothing more than feasibility studies used to inform the policy-making process for ensuring 
its success. By concentrating on the mechanics of implementation, one ignores the larger 
issues raised by the policy in question. It is their contention that policy implementation must 
be informed by political, economic, and ethical criteria as well. 
In contrast to Under and Peters, Ham and Hill (1984:108) discuss the power of the 
implementation process to shape extant policy and, in effect, to create new policy irrespective 
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of the policy's original intent. For this reason, understanding how policy is ultimately 
implemented in the Held is crucial to understanding public policy and to understanding the 
resolution of social problems. Hence, the focus of this study is on the implementation of 
policy and only incidentally on its design. The issues raised by Under aiid Peters will be 
addressed lata- in this chapter. 
One's perspective on how policy is designed shapes one's perspective on how policy 
should be implemented and ultimately on how best to study the subject This stu^ will 
adopt an interaction perspective to examine the implementation of the Little Sioux Watershed 
program. Thus, for the purposes of this study implementation is viewed as "a process of 
interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into 
effect and those upon whom action depaids" (Barrett and Fudge 1981:4). 
The balance of this chapter reviews some of the important policy implementation 
litoature and presaits alternative ways to study and understand the implementation of public 
policy. 
Public Policy Implementation 
The study of implementation has received much attrition over the years, particularly 
since the mid-1970s when public officials began to be increasingly concerned that the large 
number of programs initiated during the 1960s to solve social problems were not achieving 
their intended results (Hogwood and Gunn 1984:196). Policy-makers wanted to know why 
these programs were having limited impact on the problems they were intoided to alleviate. 
As a result, the study of policy and program implementation became an integral part of policy 
analysis and of policy evaluation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984:182-184). The importance 
of implementation analysis was indicated by Hargrove (1985), who described it as the 
missing link in policy analysis. 
The study of implementation begins by looking at elements of the policy development 
process that influaice the implemaitadon process. These elements are: 
1. an environmental system, from which demands and needs arise, and upon 
which policy seeks to have an effect; 
2. a political system in which policy decisions are made; and 
3. an organizational system through which policy is mediated and executed 
(Barrett and Fudge 1981:8). 
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The challenge for implementation studies is to understand and explain how these systems 
operate and interact over time to influence policy development, and how they impede or 
support implementation activities. Furtho*, because there is a difference between policy and 
action, a second challenge for implementation studies is to examine the process that actually 
translates policy into action and to understand and describe the Actors that influaice that 
process. 
Policy implementation is simply defined as "those actions by public and private 
individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior 
policy decisions" (Van Meta- and Van Horn 1975:445). Implemaitation analysis "examines 
those factors that contribute to the realization or non-realization of policy objectives" (Ham 
and Hill 1984:448). Two general perspectives are considered as a means to examine policy 
implementation. 
From a top-down, policy-as-prescription perspective, implementation analysis takes 
a "policy-centered" approach. This approach assumes that policy is the starting point for 
action, and implementation is a logical st^by-stq> progression from policy intention to 
action. This ^proach may be considered as the policy-maker's perspective, since it 
represents how policy-makers are implementing policy (Barrett and Fudge 1981:12). 
On the otha- hand, if policy is considered as intaaction, implemoitation analysis 
uses an "action-centered" approach. This approach takes as its starting point what actually 
happens or is accomplished and seeks to understand how and why. The action centered 
approach focuses attention on the behavior or action of groups and individuals and the 
detaminants of that behavior. It seeks to examine the degree to which action relates to 
policy, rather than assuming that action follows from policy. "From this perspective, 
implemaitation (or action) is regarded as a series of responses to ideological commitment, to 
environmental pressures, or to pressures from other agencies (groups) seeking to influence 
or control action" (Barrett and Fudge 1981:12-13). These two approaches are discussed 
below. 
The Dolicv-centered or top-down approach 
Traditional studies of the implementation process have been concerned with the 
nature of policy, the inter- and intra-organizational context within which it is implemented, 
and the external world on which it is expected to have impact (Ham and Hill 1984:100). 
These studies have generally assumed a predictable social world controlled in hierarchical 
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fashion by policy makers and other public officials who by various incentive mechanisms 
shape the behavior of target actors to conform to some preconceived notion of the common 
good (Hjem and Hull 1982:107). It is a world defined by the printed word and binding 
contracts, in contrast to the everyday world which is defined by the spoken word and open-
ended negotiation (Hmore 1978). A common theme in many of these studies is that 
implementation strategies can be programmed or plarmed in advance (Wittrock and deLeon 
1986:46). 
One approach is to describe implementation in terms of perfect administration (Hood 
1976). The assumption of this approach is that the more nearly real-world implementation 
schemes approximate the ideal structure, the more likely it is that policy objectives will be 
realized. 
Gunn (1978) follows a similar approach by describing criteria that, if met, will 
increase the possibility for successful implementation. His approach epitomizes the 
bureaucratic, top-down approach to policy implementation. His preconditions are: 
1. that circumstances external to the implementing agaicy do not impose crippling 
constraints; 
2. that adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the prograrrmie; 
3. that not only are there no constraints in terms of overall resources but also that, at 
each stage in the implementation process, the required combination of resources 
is actually available; 
4. that the policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect; 
5. that the relationship between cause and e^ect is direct and there are few, if any, 
intervening links; 
6. that there is a single implementing agency which need not depend upon oUier 
agencies for success or, if other agencies must be involved, that the dependency 
relationships are minimal in number and importance; 
7. that there is complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be 
achieved; and that these conditions persist throughout the implementation 
process; 
8. that in moving towards agreed objectives it is possible to specify, in complete 
detail and perfect sequence, the tasks to be performed by each participant; 
9. that there is perfect communication among, and coordination of, the various 
elements involved in the programme; and 
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10. that those in authority can demand and obtain perfect obedience. 
Gunn makes no claim that the conditions described by these criteria actually exist or 
are achievable in the real world. Rather, it was his intent to present a series of ideal types 
which policy in^lementers could seek to maximize to better achieve the policy's objectives 
(Gunn 1978:176). 
Continuing within the control tradition, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) develop a 
more complex model of implementation that addresses "macro-level legal and political 
variables that structure the entire process" (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981:3). The model 
includes both independent and dq)endent variables. The indq>endent variables describe the 
tractability of the problem and the ability of the statutes to structure the implementation 
process. The dependent variables correspond to the actual stages of the implementation 
process, which are: policy ou^uts, compliance by target groups, actual impacts, perceived 
impacts, and major revision in the statue (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981:7). Sabatier and 
Mazmanian identify five conditions which must be met if implementation is to be effective: 
1. that the program is based on a sound theory relating changes in target group 
bdiavior to the achievement of the desired aid state (objectives); 
2. that the statute (or other basic policy decisions) contains unambiguous policy 
directives and structures the implementation process so as to maximize the 
likelihood that target groups will perform as desired; 
3. that the leaders of the implementation agencies possess substantial managerial and 
political skill and are committed to statutory goals; 
4. that the pro^am is actively supported by organized constituency groups and by a 
few key legislators throughout Uie implemoitation process, with courts being 
neutral or supportive; and 
5. that the relative priority of statutory objectives is not significantly undermined 
over time by the emergence of conflicting public policies or by change in relevant 
socio-economic conditions that undermine the statue's technical theory or political 
support (Sd)atier and Mazmanian 1981:10-24). 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) provide a somewhat different approach to 
implementation analysis. They continue to focus primarily on policy, but they expand their 
area of analysis to include environmental factors and the multiplicity and complexity of 
linkages between oiganizations. Their dynamic model of implementation includes 
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environmental and organizational variables that influence the delivery of public services. 
Their six clusters of variables are: 
1. relevance of policy standards 
2. policy resources 
3. inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities 
4. the characteristics of the implemoiting agaicies 
5. the economic, social, and political environment affecting the implemeiting 
jurisdiction or organization 
6. the dispoâtion of implementers for carrying out of policy decisions (Van 
Meter and Van Horn 1975:483). 
Another theory describes implementation as a function of the specificity of the policy 
mandate and the availability of resources. The more qiecific the mandate, and the more 
available the resources, the better the chance that the policy will be successfully implemented 
(Mon^oy and OToole 1979:466). This perspective assumes consensus of purpose as well 
as clarity and consistency of communication. 
An implicit assumption of the top-down or policy-caitered approach to 
implementation analysis is that policy makers control the organizational, political, and 
technological processes that affect implementation (Elmore 1979-80:603). Thus, when 
target behavior does not conform to expected standards, a typical response is to blame target 
actors and to examine the implemaiting agency in an attempt to determine what went wrong 
so that the implementation process might be fixed and the policy put back on track. The 
operative assumption is that implemaitation problems are resolved by coercing those charged 
with implementing public programs to conform to policy r^ulations (Under and Peters 
1987:461). A high priority for this approach is to improve communication to increase target 
actors' understanding of the policy and the obligations it imposes on them. 
The traditional, policy-centered approach is limited. It assumes a static social reality 
that can be controlled and manipulated by the policy-making agency. Such a reality does not 
exist Though valuable insights may be gained by this approach, an alternative method 
which examines the reality definitions and behaviors of target actors may prove more 
fruitful. 
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The action-centered or bottom-up approach 
The social world is highly complex. Thus, implementation cannot be viewed against 
the background of a static set of circumstances but must in some way speak to the dynamic 
quality of that world (Wittrock and deLeon 1986). This notion of public policy b^ins with 
an assumption of ambiguity rather than orda* (Steinberger 1981:29). Individual actors bring 
their unique experiences to each situation to mutually define the situation and to, in effect, 
create reality (Guba 1985:13). Social order is an ongoing human production and exists only 
as a product of human activity (Berger and Luckmann 1966). To successfully implement 
policy, one must acknowledge this dynamic and unda'stand its operation within the specific 
domain of the policy. 
The bottom-up or action-centered approach assumes that policy-makers have a strong 
interest in affecting the implemaitation process and the outcomes of policy decisions. 
However, the perspective challenges the assumption that policy makers ought to, or do, 
exercise the determinant influence over what h^pais in the implemœtation process. It also 
questions the assumption that explicit policy directives, clear statements of administrative 
responsibility and well-defined outcomes will necessarily increase the likelihood that policies 
will be successfully implemented (Elmore 1979-80:605). 
This perspective challoiges the researcher to understand the unique activities of 
individuals from a bottom-up perspective without preconceived notions of what that behavior 
should be. The assumption is made that policy is not the only or evai the major influaice on 
the behavior of people. By studying policy from the bottom up, the researcher is able to 
better understand the impact other influences have on the point where private choice and 
administrative action intersect (Hmoie 1979-80:604). 
Barrett and Hill (1981:19) describe the advantages of the bottom-up approach as 
follows: 
To understand the policy-action relationship we must get away from a single 
perspective of the process that reflects a normative administrative or managerial 
view of how the process should be, and try to find a conceptualization that 
reflects better the empirical cvidoice of the complexity and dymmics of the 
interactions between individuals and groups seeking to put policy into effect, 
those upon whom action depends and those whose interests are affected when 
change is proposed. To do this, we have argued for an alternative perspective 
to be adopted - one that focuses on the actors and agencies themselves and their 
interaction, and for an action-centered or bottom-up mode of analysis as a 
method of identifying more clearly who seems to be influencing what, how and 
why (cited in Ham and HiU 1984:10"^. 
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From this perspective, implementation must be considered in terms of the nature of 
inter- and intra-oiganizational power relations, the interests of implementation agencies and 
the people in them as well as the ovaall political process which shape what actually does and 
does not get done (Banett and Fudge 1981:20). 
The assumption of coercion, which is at the core of the top-down approach, has no 
place in the action-centered approach. 
Since other actors cannot be coerced, their consent must be obtained. Bargaining 
must take place to lecondle the difference, with the result that the policy may be 
modified, even to the point of compromising its original purpose. Coordination is 
thus another word for consent (Pressman and Wildavsky 19M:134). 
In such situations, implementers are not passive agents who receive policy, but are semi-
autonomous groups actively pursuing their own goals and objectives which may or may not 
be in accord with the objectives of the policy-makers. It is a pro-active environmait rather 
than a reactive one, where success is measured by the implementers in terms of their own 
definition of the situation or problem, even if it might be defined as a failure by the policy-
malœrs (Barrett and Fudge 1981:28). 
Implementation is not the imposition of a set program but is a process worked out 
over time by interested actors. Performance, ratho* tiian conformance to policy objectives, is 
the standard for success, and compromise is a means of achieving performance albeit at the 
expense of some of the original intentions (Barrett ^d Fudge 1981:21). 
This fluid or dynamic understanding of implementation means that: 
"policy implemaitation has no clear, decisive end point The outcome of one 
bargaining q)isode is the starting point of the next Success in bargaining is 
completely relative in one important respect: Each participant judges success in 
terms of ms own objectives, not in terms of an overall set of objectives that applies 
to all participants" (Elmore 1979-80:611). 
Policy outcomes will never be discrete, determined end points that can be measured and 
objectified. The policy is never completely implemented but goes on and, in the process, is 
transformed by time and new circumstances. 
Berman (1978) distinguishes betweoi macro-implementation and micro-
implementation. He defines macro-implementation as the means used by the federal 
government to influaice local delivery systems to behave in desired ways; micro-
implementation is defined as the response of local organizations and individuals to devise 
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and carry out their own internal policies (Berman 1978:164). The effective power, 
therefore, to determine a policy's outcome rests, not with federal administrators, but with 
local policy implemaiters. The power of local actors derives from their expertise, skill, and 
proximity to the essential tasks that are needed to accomplish the objectives of the policy. 
The possession of power by local actors opens the possibility for real negotiations, which 
they may use to ensure that the final effects of the policy are compatible with local needs and 
c^abilities. By studying this negotiating process for any implementing experioice, the 
analyst can gain insight into the overall process of how policy is changed to meet local needs 
(Elmore 1979-80:606). 
Because the effective power to influence policy outcomes resides at the base of the 
macro structure with the local implementers and the "street level" bureaucrats (lipsky 1980), 
higher authorities can only influence this process indirectly (Berman 1978:171-172). From 
the local perspective, therefore, implementation is the carrying out of local policy rather than 
federal policy. "If local priorities do not accord with those of the fedaal government, 
adoption decisions may be merely pro forma" (Berman 1978:177), and the commitment to 
the policy will wane quickly once the local objective has been achieved. Unless the practice 
is deliberately institutionalized in the soise of it becoming incorporated into a standard set of 
operating procedures, the original intent of the policy will probably not be achieved. 
The issue of micro-implementation raises several important questions for the present 
study. Among them are: 
1. What was the intent of the local sponsors in signing the original agreements 
with the Soil Consavation Service? Was their intait merely to obtain 
governmental assistance, or to carry out the intent of the agreements? 
2. What efforts were made by the Soil Conservation Service to routinize the 
maintenance expectations called for in the original agreements? 
3. What patterns of implementation were established early in the program that were 
detrimental to the long-term viability of the policy's objectives? 
4. How did the local area change over time to reiiifcrce or impede the 
implementation of the policy? 
Often overlooked in the policy-implementation process are the interests and 
perspectives of the target groups (Hjem and Hul 1982:105, Kiviniemi 1986:253). The 
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action ^proach to policy implemoitation must also undasland the world of the 
implementers. The implementers of policy initiatives live out thdr daily lives in a world 
bounded by the meanings they impose on the phenomena about them. It is these meanings 
which give credence and purpose to human activity, structuring their activity in a manner 
which is consistent with these meanings. From a policy-implementation perspective, the 
definitions and meanings which target actors place on elements of the policy world structure 
their behavior in a way which is consistent with these definitions (Fudge and Barrett 
1981:264-265). Such definitions may well conflict with the definitions and understandings 
of the actors who make Ae policy. This clash of reality definitions may well account for 
much of the failure of policy. 
A final level of analysis for the study of policy implementation is to examine socio-
cultural influences. Policy is a reflection of the larger dominant society which is the source 
of acceptable definitions of the "common good" and of the parameters within which 
solutions may be sought (Guba 1985, Ham and Hill 1984). These influences color both 
how a policy is designed and put into practice as well as how it is or is not accq>ted by target 
actors. The contradictions inherait in our social and economic system may lead to 
contradictions in the implementation of policy. As a result, many policies do not achieve 
their stated purpose. For example, in the Little Sioux watershed area, farmers were 
encouraged by the Soil Conservation Service to implemait conservation practices to preserve 
soil and therd)y maintain the long-tmn viability of the little Sioux area. At the same time, 
farmers were encouraged by other USDA officials to maximize their production to increase 
profits and to "feed the world." Dqpaiding on which of the two policies a farmer was trying 
to implement, the countervailing policy and the social good it represented would be 
compromised. In this instance, the need and desire for profits outweighed environmental 
concerns. Thus, farmers plowed land that should not have been cropped and thereby 
significantly increased soil erosion. 
Before concluding this section, a dissenting perspective on the action-centered or 
bottom-up ^proach to implementation needs to be discussed. Policy is not merely action for 
the sake of action. Policy is action for some purpose, generally to correct a social problem 
and to in some way better society. There is more to policy design and implementation, 
therefore, than just meeting local interests and desires. The inherent quality or worth of the 
policy idea is equally important, if not more so (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984:168). 
People at the grass-roots level are part of a larger social system which imposes standards of 
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behavior consistent with some fundamoital notion of what it means to be a citizen of our 
society. The policy process must sort out the responsibilities and obligations of citizenship 
from l^itimate local and iiidividual interests and incorporate tiiem into policy design and 
implementation strategies. At issue is the need to avoid fully accepting descriptive 
gmeralizations about local conditions and concerns as prescriptive statemaits about what 
policy should be (Hogwood and Gunn 1984:207, Linder and Peters 1987:463). 
There is a constant tœsion between the needs of society and the needs of the locality 
or the individual (Etzioni 1987). The presœt study acknowledges this tension but takes the 
position that by better understanding how policy is implemented at the local level, better 
policy can be designed and implemoited for the whole of society as well as for local groups 
and individuals. 
Often the issue is, as it was with the Little Sioux watershed program, how to 
preserve the largo* good intended by the policy and, at the same time, turn control of the 
process over to local actors who may be more interested in local concerns and less interested 
in the common good intended by the policy initiative. Such a situation creates tension 
between individual and collective interests. Yet if the norm is for local control, such taision 
is inevitable (Berman 1978:164). Whai local solutions clearly detract from the common 
good, howeva, policy-centered implementation strategies can become an important means to 
retain the int^rity of the policy in the &ce of local opposition. 
The issues of social values and the inherait worth of any policy as a means for 
advancing some larger good in society are critical issues. Such issues, however, are beyond 
the scope of this study and hence will not be discussed in any great detail. For the purposes 
of this study, the inherent worth of the policy creating the Little Sioux Wat^shed program is 
assumed. The study will, therefore, focus on the problems of implementing that policy. 
Core Assumptions 
Social order is an ongoing human production and exists only as a product of human 
activity (Berger and Luckmann 1966). To successfully implement policy, one must 
acknowledge this dynamic and understand its operation within the specific domain of the 
policy. Those charged with the implementation of policy must understand the pattern of 
forces operative in the policy environment (Argyris et al. 1985:19) and the individual and 
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collective reality which the forces represent Thus, the initial assumption of this study is that 
the implementation of policy is a continuous process of interaction within the vagaries of a 
changing and changeable social environment (Ham and Hill 1984:108). 
The implementation of policy is a process of interaction between a series of actors 
(Kiviniemi 1986:257). Because these actors can be separated by the cultural and attitudinal 
definitions of situations, as well as by the meanings, values, symbols, and languages they 
use, how they perceive and make sense of the world provides important clues to explain their 
behavior and responses (Kiviniemi 1986:262). How individuals make sense of the world 
has ramifications at the organizational level as well. 
Individuals and groups of actors, via the rules they establish (or absorb) for their 
own bdiavior and the roles they occupy in organizations, not only influence the 
specific decisions of those organizations, but also embed institutional structures 
with certain values and norms which will result in a distinctive organizational 
culture and a tendency to promote certain interests rather than others (Barrett and 
Fudge 1981:28). 
The second assumption of this study, therefore, is that it is necessary to understand the target 
actors' world relative to the policy's objectives. Ultimately, it is their understanding which 
is the final arbiter on the "truth" of the policy (Winter 1966:59). 
Policies generally fail to achieve their intended results (Barrett and Fudge 1981:3, 
Berman 1978:160). To understand the limitations of policy implementation, we must 
examine the implemoilation environmoit, which includes both process and structural 
considerations (Kiviniemi 1986:253). The conceptualization of the policy environment has 
traditionally been from the perspective of the policy provider. However, because policy and 
actions are shaped by broader social, political, economic, and cultural systems, a new focus 
that allows greater local input and perspective is needed (Kiviniemi 1986:258). Hence, the 
final assumption of the study is that the analysis of policy implementation is best made from 
a dynamic social action perspective which includes the influences of macro-factors 
(Kiviniemi 1986:252-253). 
An action-centered perspective is particularly useful for the present study. The 
l^slation creating the Littie Sioux watershed program mandated that local sponsors assume 
resix}nsibility for the operation and maintenance of the watershed structures. Because the 
local sponsors are autonomous agencies, the Soil Conservation So-vice has limited formal 
power to influoice their behavior relative to the maintenance of the structures. Legal 
sanctions may be used, but SCS is reluctant to use them, prefeiring instead to rely on 
2 3  
informal persuasion. The need for the present study indicates that this has not been an 
effective method. 
In summary, it is a fluid, indeterminate world in which SCS and the local sponsors 
interact for the purpose of maintaining and operating the structures. To study this 
interaction, a model of analysis is needed that accq)ts a dynamic world as a starting point and 
which can analyze action at the local level which impedes or supports the effective 
implementation of the watershed project. 
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CHAPTERin 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter outlines the methodology of the study. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of the research problem and a rationale for the methodology. Next is a discussion 
of the research questions which guided the study. Finally, the procedure used to collect and 
analyze the data to derive a theory of policy implementation is explained. 
The Research Project 
In October of 1988, the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) contracted with Iowa State 
University's Department of Sociology and Anthropology to evaluate the maintenance 
program for the watershed structures built by the Little Sioux Watershed project in the 
Western Iowa counties of Cherokee, Ida, Monona, Plymouth, and Woodbury. Data for this 
dissertation were collected as part of the SCS study. 
The study, "Social Study of Project Structure Maintenance: Western Iowa RivCTS 
Basin," investigated current understandings and expectations among local sponsors 
r^arding the operation and maintaiance of project structures. The purpose of the study was 
to profile perceptions of local and SCS obligations, review curroit maintenance activities and 
procedures, and make recommendation about organizational relationships and 
responsibilities so that these structures will continue to function as planned (Joint Agreement 
1988). 
By informal agreement, the study's parameters were expanded to include an analysis 
of relevant public policy issues and to develop a substantive theoiy explaining why the 
policy directives requiring local responsibility for the maintenance of the project structures in 
the Little Sioux watershed were not implemented as originally agreed. Such a theory is of 
interest both to SCS officials and to the social science community. The focus of this 
dissertation is the analysis of these public policy issues. 
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The Development of Grounded Theory 
Public policy confronts a complex, socially constructed reality, which is defined 
through the interaction of humans as they go about their daily lives (Berger and Luckmann 
1966, Guba 1985, Winter 1966, Wittrock and deLeon 1986). The methodological task, 
therefore, is to acknowledge the complexity of the social phenomena being studied (Strauss 
1987:6) and to understand the meanings that shape people's actions and decision-making 
processes. The methodology must also be capable of integrating these understandings into a 
theory that explains the phenomena under investigation. Specifically, this study seeks to 
understand how local actors in the Little Sioux watershed modified imposed policy directives 
to best serve their needs rather than the dictates of the policy. The findings of the study will 
then be generalized to explain the process of local implementation in other like situations. 
A grounded theory methodology focuses on the empirical level to derive theory from 
the empirical referents of human activity. Because it is an approach that allows the theory to 
emerge from the data, it is especially qipropriate for policy implementation studies (Fudge 
and Barrett 1981:250) and hence is an appropriate methodology for the purpose of this 
study. A grounded theory methodology is therefore used to gather data for the study, to 
analyze it, and finally to develop a substantive theory explaining the phenomenon under 
consideration. 
The key elements of grounded theory include conceptual categories, the properties of 
the categories, and the generalized relationships among the categories (Glaser and Strauss 
1967: 35). 
A category is a unique conceptual unit of the theoiy that emerges fi"om and is tied to 
the data. A property of a category is a conceptual element of that category that refines and 
amplifies its meaning. Derived concepts should be analytic in the sense that they can be 
generalized to otiier situations, and they should be sensitizing in that they are meaningful to 
the potential reader and relate to real world experiences. Categories and their properties are 
generated through a constant comparative process that systematically examines similarities 
and differences among the groups which are the focus of the study. The process of 
comparing similarities and differences among groups also generates generalized relationships 
among the conceptual categories that emerge from the data. The relationships are refined by 
the additional collection and analysis of data. If the derived theory was to be empirically 
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voified at some later time, the generalized relationships would become the hypotheses for 
testing (Glaserand Strauss 1967:36-40). 
Grounded theory uses a general comparative method to discover theory from data 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967:1). By constantly comparing many groups, the researcher is able 
to see their many differences and similarities which "leads him to generate abstract cat^ories 
and their properties which, since they emo-ge from the data, will clearly be important to a 
theory explaining the kind of bdiavior under observation" (Glaser and Strauss 1967:36). 
The comparative method is well suited to the task of generating theory. By focusing 
on similarities and differences among groups, the method highlights different modes of 
knowing and acting which must be int^rated and theoretically explained. Because this is a 
developmental process, the comparative method is particularly adept at generating theories of 
process and change (Conrad 1978:103). 
A grounded theory methodology is a flexible approach for gathering and analyzing 
data. It is not a rigid, standardized approach but may utilize a variety of data collection 
techniques and data sources to generate a rich comparative data base (Conrad 1978:103, 
Strauss 1987:7). The constant comparative methodology involves four interdependait 
stages used to identify, categorize, and compare data incidents. These stages are: 
1. comparing incidoits applicable to each category, 
2. integrating categories and their properties, 
3. delimiting the theory, and 
4. writing the theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967:105). 
Conrad (1978:103) summarizes the process as follows. In the first step of this 
process, the researcher collects data and codes them into categories of analysis. These 
categories or concepts (or variables) are abstracted by the researcher on the basis of a 
constant comparison of data incidents with other data incidents. As concepts emerge through 
this process of constant comparisons, the researcher begins to analyze the theoretical 
properties of each concept and moves into the second stage of the process, integrating 
categories and their properties. Here the researcher compares new data incidmts with 
properties of the concepts that have beoi abstracted during the comparison of incidents. The 
third step, delimiting the theory, involves noting differences among data incidents and 
inconsistencies between data incidents and emerging concepts, thus clarifying the emerging 
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theory and delimiting the theory to a smaller set of high^ level concepts. In the final stq) of 
the process the theory is presented in either a discussion format or as a set of propositions. 
Development of Research Questions 
In using a grounded theory methodology, the researcher is guided by research 
questions rather than by hypotheses (Glaser and Strauss 1967:45). Research questions for 
this study were generated from the agreement with the Soil Conservation Service and âom 
literature pertaining to policy implementation. The SCS agreement specified that the 
following information should be collected: 
1. the understanding, knowledge, and perceptions-of local obligations for 
maintenance; 
2. the factors contributing to and/or inhibiting sound maintenance of the 
structures; 
3. local perceptions of options to maintain the integrity of the overall project (Joint 
Agreement 1988). 
Implementation literature drew attention to the need to examine linkages among actors and 
the impact of macro-level social and economic forces. 
The research questions developed for this study are: 
1. What understanding, knowledge, and perceptions do local actors have of their 
obligations for the maintenance and oj^ration of the watersh^ structures? 
2. What are the links among the various actors, and how do these linkages 
support or deter implementation of the stated policy? 
3. How do the various actors understand soil conservation, and how does this 
understanding shape their behavior and their assignment of responsibility 
for maintenance of the watershed structures? 
4. What does private property mean to the various actors, and how does this 
understanding shape their accq)tance and cooperation reWve to the 
maintenance of the watershed structures as well as attendant soil 
conservation activities? 
5. What macro-factors impede or support appropriate maintoiance activities? 
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Following is a rationale for the use of these questions and their importance to the 
study. 
Obligations for maintenance 
An initial purpose of the study is to learn respondents' percq)tions and understanding 
of thdr obligation for the maintenance of the structures. This issue is caitial to the SCS 
study. Because different perceptions and understanding of maintenance obligations can lead 
to different maintenance behaviws, this issue is important 6om a policy perspective as well. 
If landowners do not understand that they have maintenance responsibilities, or if they have 
little or no sense of obligation for maintoiance, thai lack of action on thdr part is 
understandable and provides an entry point for new policy initiatives to inform and educate 
them about their obligations. 
T.inka{res among ar.tnrs 
Too Aequently, studies of implementation fail to examine the linages among various 
implemMiting bodies (Kiviniemi 198Q. An examination of this issue is particularly 
important for the presoit study because the original maintenance program was established on 
the assumption that the conservation district, the board of supervisors, and the landowners 
would cooperatively take responsibility for maintenance of the structures. On another level, 
it is also important to examine the continuing role of SCS relative to their linkages with local 
agencies. At issue is the extent to which SCS has allowed the local agencies to take the 
responsibility for maintenance, or wheth* by staying involved with maintoiance issues and 
practices, SCS may have starved off gaiuine local initiatives. 
Responsibilitv for soil conservation 
Data around this issue are needed to assess the extent of actors' knowledge about 
good soil conservation practices and the commitment to actually using them. The 
assumption is being made that the greater the commitment to soil conservation by 
landownKS, district conunissioners, and boards of supervisors, the greater the concern and 
sense of responsibility for the watershed structures. Information in this area also provides 
data about feelings and acceptance of govonment intervention to impose the use of good soil 
conservation practices. The issue of government intervention examines who is ultimately 
responsible for maintaining the soil: the individual landowno* or the government as 
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Fq)resentative of the public interest How people decide on this issue would influence 
behavior relative to the care of the watershed structures. 
Private/pubHc issues 
The federal government intervened to build watershed structures on private land with 
the understanding that thdr opoation and maintenance would be the responsibility of local 
public and private entities. How people understand the private/public relationship as it 
relates to responsibility for the structures is important to know. To the extent that the 
structures retained their publicness, landowners may be less concerned about them, and 
more willing to let the govoiunent maintain them. A related question is the issue of 
government intervention to r^ulate pivate behavior relative to land-use practices (see the 
discussion of responsibility for soil conservation above). How people understand and 
accept outside intervention can thwart or enhance the intervention's intended effects. People 
can organize in opposition, withdraw in apathy, passively conform, or actively cooperate to 
the bettermait of the common good (Kiviniemi 1986:260). 
Macro-level influences 
Western Iowa is not an isolated part of the world. Landowners who live and work 
there are influenced by macro-level economic systems and govemmoit policies which 
reinforce certain behaviors and curtail others. Data documenting these influences are 
particularly important for this study because the past 40 years have be«i a time of profound 
change in rural society. Understanding how these influences and changes impacted the 
social and economic structure of the little Sioux area and, in turn, impacted maintenance 
issues is important in assessing local actors' commitment to carrying out maintenance 
activities. 
Collection of Data 
As is typical of applied work, the issues which are important to the contracting 
agency define the parameters and methods of the study (Rossi et al. 1978, Gouldner 1957). 
The kind and amount of data and the method of collection for this study were dictated by the 
terms of the agreement with the Soil Conservation Service. The agreement specified that 
data were to be obtained through interviews with past and present relevant decision makers, 
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public officials, and other individuals knowledgeable about the project The agreemait 
further specified that interviews were to be primarily opai-ended questions with a limited 
amount of closed-aided structured questions (Joint Agreement 1988). 
A total of 65 individuals were interviewed for the study. Table 1 indicates the 
number, position, and location of the respondents. 
Table 1. Numbo* of individuals interviewed by position and county 
Ida Monona Woodbury ses Area ses State Total 
ses District 
Conservationist 1 1 1 • 3 
District 
Commissioner 5 5 5 15 
Board of 
Supervisors 4 3 2 9 
Inspector 1 1 2 
Landowner 9 10 • 8 27 
ses Area 
Personnel 5 5 
ses State 
Personnel 4 4 
Total 19 20 17 5 4 65 
Additional data for the study were gathered irom the Iowa State University Archives 
and other secondary sources of infcnmation about the Soil Conservation Service and the 
Little Sioux Watershed program. 
A prepared questionnaire was used to give structure to the interview process. Two 
questionnaires (see Appendix) were constructed. One was used with organization 
personnd, and a second was administered to landowners. Qiganization personnel included 
all SCS-related individuals, members of the boards of supervisors, and the district 
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commissioners. Before constructing the questionnaires, we traveled to the area to meet with 
the District Conservationist and oAer SCS personnel in each of the five counties. We also 
met with several district commissioners and visited several watershed structures. Our 
purpose was to learn about watershed structures and about the watershed program and to 
un^stand issues from a local perspective. The learnings and insights gained from these 
exploratory interviews were incorporated into the final version of the questionnaires. 
Once developed, the survey instrumoits were field-tested and further refined. The 
final forms were approved by the Soil Conservation Service. 
According to the guidelines of the comparative method, comparison groups should 
be selected that are theoretically relevant (Conrad 1978:103). All five counties met this 
criteria. The Littie Sioux Watershed program was present in each county, and, according to 
SCS, each county was experiencing problems of failing to adequately implemeit the local 
maintenance requirement As a practical matter, each interviews individually conducted 
interviews in two counties; joint interviews were conducted in the fifth county. I selected Ida 
and Monona Counties to conduct my interviews. We conducted joint interviews in 
Woodbury County. I also conducted interviews with SCS area and state level personnel. 
Because I am most familiar with these data as well as the nuances of the personal interviews, 
I will use only the data from these three counties and from the SCS personnel for the 
dissertation. 
Names of SCS personnel to interview were provided by the study's state level 
coordinator. Names of local individuals to interview, including landownas, district 
commissioners, and boards of supervisors, were suggested by the SCS District 
Conservationist in each county. He also recommended who among these groups might have 
the most information to provide and who might be most helpful. Based on these 
recommendations, I made the final selections as to who to interview and scheduled the 
interviews. Interviews were usually conducted at the individual's residence or place of 
work. The amount of time for each interview varied from as littie as an hour to as much as 
four-and-one-half hours. The average time was approximately two hours. 
The questionnaires were used as a guide. Many follow-up and clarifying questions 
woe asked to help me better understand what the individual was trying to convey. In some 
instances, when the individual had a breadth of relevant experiaice and information not 
captured by the questionnaire, the formal format was abandoned and the interview was 
restructured to follow the leads provided by the interviewee. This interviewing method is 
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consistent with the comparative method, as long as the data that are collected and analyzed 
are in the service of the grounded theory (Conrad 1978:103). 
Amplifying notes were taken during each interview along with recording the answers 
to specific questions. At the end of each day, the questionnaires and notes were reviewed, 
comments were edited and clarified, and a summary of the major learnings for that day was 
completed. 
Analysis of the Data 
The principle of theoretical sampling and the constant comparison method, as 
outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), were modified somewhat for the purpose of this 
study. "Theoretical sampling is the process of collecting data for comparative analysis" 
(Conrad 1978:102). In an ideal sense, theoretical sampling dictates that, once the initial 
collection of data is completed, the additional collection of data is controlled by the emerging 
data, with the collection process continuing until no additional data are found (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967:61). Because the agreement with the Soil Conservation Service limited the 
time and resources available for collecting data, it was not possible to strictly follow this 
process. Conrad (1978:104), however, suggests that the theoretical sampling of selected 
comparison groups is consistent with the criteria established for the constant comparison 
method if the selection process is based on the theoretical foundation of the research 
questions and preliminary criteria relating to categories. 
In developing a grounded theory of academic change, Conrad (1978) identified four 
comparison groups which fit his pre-established criteria. He then selected one group to 
create a theoretical framework which guided his analysis of the other comparison groups 
using the constant comparison method. Conrad's procedure is used for this dissertation to 
collect and analyze the data and to develop the grounded theory. 
Data from Woodbuiy County were used to develop an initial theoretical framework 
that was then used as the comparative basis to analyze data from Ida and Monona Counties., 
Woodbury County was selected as the initial county because its watershed program shares 
more similarities than differences with the programs in the other two counties. 
Data were analyzed in a two-step process. First, the questionnaires, field notes, and 
secondary data sources for each county were analyzed in terms of the research questions. 
The research questions provided an initial entry into the data and a method of organization to 
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focus on the applied and theoretical issues of the study. The prime objective of this analysis 
was to gain an understanding of how the watershed program developed and functioned in 
each county. A secondary objective was to begin the process of identifying cat^ories that 
would have relevance for deriving a theory of implementation. Results of the initial analysis 
are presented in Chapter 5. 
In the second step, the comparative method was applied. The data from Woodbury 
county were re-analyzed, using the initial emergent categories as a starting point Categories 
were identified along with their central properties and the conditions under which they were 
maximized or minimized, their consequraces, and their relation to each other. A tentative 
theory was then developed, which was next ^lied to the data for Ida and Monona counties 
to derive a more complete theory. A description of this analysis and an explication of the 
theory are presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BACKGROUND 
The chapter provides general background information about the Little Sioux area and 
the little Sioux Watershed program. The chapter begins with a description of the geogr^hy 
and history of the area. The problems of soil erosion and flooding are then discussed, 
followed by a description of the watershed program designed to solve these problems and of 
the key actors who were to implement it The chapter concludes with a discussion of SCS's 
relationship to the watershed program and the major land-use changes which compromised 
the program's effectiveness. 
Geography and History 
The Little Sioux River rises in southwestern Minnesota and flows in a southwesto'ly 
direction to enter the Missouri River about halfway between Sioux City and Council Bluffs, 
Iowa. The entire watershed contains 4,502 square miles, more than 93 percent of which lies 
within the State of Iowa. Figure 1 shows the boundaries of the watershed and the portion 
eligible for program funding. Wind-blown material, or loess, covers the lower part of the 
watershed, producing soils which are exceptionally productive as well as exceptionally 
vulna^le to eosion. (There are only two areas like this in the world; one is the Little Sioux 
area, the other is in Northern China.) 
Prior to its settlement by the white man, most of the Little Sioux watershed was 
covered with native prairie grasses. Early historians called the picturesque Little Sioux River 
Valley a promised land. Hie fertile area, with its gently rolling prairie soils and level lands at 
the lower reaches and steq) slopes in between, abounded in food for the Sioux Indians and 
early settlers (Little Sioux River Watershed 1959:5). 
The study area is located in the lower two-thirds of the valley. At the northern end of 
this area, the typography is gently sloping to rolling and the loess soils are three to ten feet 
deep. The topography at the lower end of the area is rolling to very steq) with loess soils 
found in depths of 25 to 50 feet and occasionally down to 100 feet Slopes in this area 
commonly range from 15 to 25% and sometimes over 50%. The study area is bounded on 
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the west by the Missouri flood plain. Until enactment of the flood control program, the 
flood plain experienced regular and severe flooding (Little Sioux River Watershed 1959:5). 
White settlemoit and tillage of the land b%an in the middle of ûie 19ih centuiy. 
Early farmers produced grain and some livestock for the commercial market By the late 
1930s, average farm size was about 200 acres with most Wing between 80 and 400 acres. 
By this time, two-thirds of the area farms were selling grain. The income 6om grain sales, 
however, was only one-sixth of total farm income. Livestock and hog Arming 
predominated in the area and produced most of the income (House Document No. 268,78th 
Congress 1943:6). 
Because the loess soils of the area are comparatively low in clay and organic 
materials, they are highly vulnerable to erosion. Soil erosion increased significantly during 
the First World War as the demands for increased production motivated farmers to cultivate 
the steep land. As a result, annual soil losses in many areas were frequently as high as 60-
100 tons per acre (Lamp 1958:1). The fertile soil of the Little Sioux watershed contained 
the seeds of its own destruction. The fertility of the area was an invitation to the careless, the 
ignorant, and the greedy to mine the land for early profits (Little Sioux River Watershed 
1959:6). 
Tillage practices exacerbated the problem. The norm was to plant up and down hills 
with no consideration givoi to the contour of the land. One long-time area farmer and 
resident said that the few who adopted contour planting were ridiculed by neighbors and 
agriculture agents. The conunon response was that anyone who farmed that way should be 
sent to the Mental Health Institute at Cherokee. One farmer who used contour methods was 
told by an agriculture agent that it was all right to plant this way for awhile but that eventually 
it would drive him crazy. 
Available technology also prevented widespread adoption of contour methods. 
Cultivating with horses was too slow to throw sufficient dirt to cover all the weeds in a row. 
Consequently, two passes at right angles to one another had to be made across each field. If 
a field was planted on a contour, this method of cultivation was vmy difficult if not 
impossible. Consequoitly, few farmers used contour planting. Cultivating by tractor could 
throw more dirt and hence only one pass was necessary. Thus it was not until the mid-
1940s, when the use of tractors was widespread, that greater use was made of contour 
methods. By then, however, much of the damage had akeady been done. 
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By the mid-1940s, nearly a century of agricultural development had takmi its toll. 
Huge gullies, 20 to 50 feet deep and 100 to 200 feet wide, were common. Active gully 
heads eventually destroyed lanes, roads, bridges, buildings, and rich farm land. Gully 
formation in the uplands moved tons of dirt downward through the ditches, creeks, and 
tributaries of the little Sioux to eventually be deposited on the flood plain along the Missouri 
River completely inundating the drainage ditches which had beai built to drain the 
bottomland for agriculture. Begirming in the early 1920s, draglines worked throughout the 
year to keep the drainage ditches cleared. One drainage district rqx)rted spending an average 
of $77,000 per year through the 1940s to clean and improve drainage ditches. The best of 
Siouxland soils were being deposited on the levees which criss-crossed the flood plain (Little 
Sioux River Watershed 1959:6). 
Hundreds of acres of rich crop lands wa-e destroyed annually by the advancement 
and widening of these gullies. For example, according to aerial photos one gully head in the 
main stem of a 6,000 acre watershed advanced proximately 2 miles in an 18-year period 
(1938-1955). The 1937 aerial photo indicated that a channel of no more than 4-6 feet in 
depth existed in this stretch of watercourse at that time. By the mid-1950s, this 2-mile 
watacourse was now 25-48 feet deep and 75-125 feet wide. Within this 18-year period, 
approximately 24 acres of the most highly productive land in the watershed was destroyed. 
The county road bridge, centrally located in this 2-mile stretch, had to be replaced 4 times 
between 1944 and 1955 (Lamp 1958:2). 
The average annual maintenance cost for a large number of road crossing sites was 
over $10(X). In many instances, bridges were lengthened; and in other instances, entirely 
new bridges were installed because of increased gully dq)ths. Maintenance costs were 
relatively high for railroads and other public utilities in the water^ed as well (Lamp 1958:2). 
By the early 1930s, damage fr^om flood run-o^ and from sediment deposits was 
considerable. Such damage included: 
1. land destruction; voiding by gully development 
2. land depreciation due to lateral development of gullies 
3. sheet erosion damage to agricultural lands 
4. erosion damage to public roads, railroads, public utilities, etc. 
5. damage to farm crossings, fences, and buildings 
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6. livestock losses 
7. floodwater and sediment damage: 
a. along all upland watercourses 
b. to draille ditches and lands in the Missouri River flood plain 
c. to municii%Iities 
d. to public roads, railroads, public utilities, etc. 
e. to farm crossings, fences and buildings (Lamp 1958:1). 
The land destructÎŒi caused by r^ular flooding removed large quantities of fertile 
topsoil from the upland farms, bringing about the gradual detaioration of an itTq)laceable 
natural resource. The worth of all damages totaled more than one-half million dollars each 
year (House Document No, 268,78th Congress 1943:1). 
A flood in June of 1951 ruined hundreds of thousands of acres as well as drowning a 
number of hogs and cattle (Soldier Sentinel 1951). A heavy rain in June of 1954 ruined 
thousands of crop acres and resulted in damage of several millions of dollars. In Monona 
county, the Maple River covaed the valley with water from Turin to Mq>leton, a distance of 
approximately 20 miles (Soldier Soitinel 1954). 
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, there was a concerted effort to demonstrate the 
benefits of good soil management At a meeting in early 1951, slides showing thé damage 
from the heavy rains of the previous spring were used to demonstrate the benefits of good 
soil management One set of slides showed that in unprotected areas, 2 million tons of soil 
were lost in approximately a 7-hour period. In one field, 340 tons per acre were lost on a 
15% slope. In contrast, other slides were shown of farms which used good conservation 
practices. These farms expaienced considerably less soil loss, with some experiencing none 
(Ute Independent 1951). 
The Key Actors 
Two groups of actors, the district commissioners r^resenting individual soil 
conservation districts, and the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), were important in the effort 
to educate people about soil conservation and to promote its use among farmers. From the 
beginning, the conservation districts and SCS have played key roles in implementing the 
Little Sioux Watershed program. 
The Soil Conservation Service is the technical agency of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture that helps landowners and operators apply soil conservation practices to land. 
3 9  
SCS supplies farmers with on-site technical assistance and information for the selection, 
installation, and maintenance of soil and water conservation practices. In addition, SCS 
develops soil surveys, monitors soil and water resources, and organizes small watersheds 
and flood prevention programs (USDA-SCS N.D.). The Soil Conservation Service uses 
interpersonal communication and public education to be a strong advocate for soil 
conservation (Hoban 1986:18). 
In Iowa, SCS programs are administered at the county level by a district 
conservationist who supervises one or more state and/or federal technicians. SCS also 
provides office space for the local soil conservation district (Hoban 1986:18). 
The soil conservation district was created by an initiative of the federal government 
which needed local agencies to accept federal conservation dollars and to l^itimize federal 
efforts to promote soil conservation at the local level. "District functions, powers, and 
organizational arrangements were outlined by the Department of Agriculture in a model act 
which was generally followed in state laws" (Parks 1952:11). L%ally the district is a local 
subdivision of the state. As such, in its legal structure and authority it is completely 
independent of the federal government (Parks 1952:11). Functionally, however, because the 
district has no taxing authority, it is depaidait on the resources and technical assistance of 
the federal government to implement programs (Parks 1952:14,16). The result is a hybrid 
organization. The district is at one and the same time both independent and dependent. Hie 
district has the legal authority and power to carry on its own conservation program 
independent of the Soil Conservation Service. However, it has neither the resources nor 
technical skills needed to carry out these programs. The district was to be a governmental 
apparatus to bring together in an ordered, common effort the competencies, energies, and 
resources of public agencies functioning in soil conservation (Parks 1952:16). 
In 1939, the Iowa 49th General Assembly passed the Soil Conservation Districts 
Law to make it possible for Iowa farmers to organize, establish and operate local soil 
conservation districts (Soldier Sentinel 1952). Each district is governed by five locally 
elected soil conservation commissioners who serve without pay. The commissioners' prime 
responsibility is to set local soil conservation policy. The formal duties of the 
commissioners are to: 
1. adopt a procedure for identification, inventory, and analysis of resource 
problems, including the orderly development of conservation plans for farms, 
communities, and watershed; 
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2. determine priority areas of work and eligible recipients of SCD services; 
3. develop a method for follow-up work; and 
4. develop an information and educational program to keq) local citizens informed 
about conservation matters (Hoban 1986:20). 
The soil conservation districts were designated as the local sponsors of the Little 
Sioux Watershed program (Onawa Sentinel 1952). The districts were the local agency in 
each county of the watershed program that linked the federal government, as represented by 
the Soil Conservation Service, with the farmer. The districts' responsibilities were to make 
the arrangements for carrying out the watershed program, including executing legal 
arrangements with local farmers and others to provide rights and permits to install and 
maintain the needed watershed structures (Lamp 1958:3). 
The Little Sioux Watershed Program 
Establishment of the program 
The Little Sioux Watershed program was formally established by the 78th Congress 
in 1944 with Public Law 534. In January of 1946, after Congress had appropriated funds to 
the Dqiartment of Agriculture to execute the program, the State Soil Conservation Committee 
of Iowa met in Sioux City, Iowa with district commissioners, farmers, and otha- interested 
citizens to review the authorized program and to establish an implementing procedure. 
At this meeting, the decision was made to have the soil conservation districts be the 
local sponsor for the watershed program as well as be responsible for securing all needed 
local cooperation (Summary of meeting 1946). The State Soil Conservation Committee 
recommended that a Works Committee be organized to assume certain goieral 
responsibilities and to provide overall guidance in the execution of the program. 
Late in 1946, a permanent organization, known as the Litfle Sioux Works 
Committee, was established by formal action of the 12 soil conservation districts which were 
concerned with the flood prevention program. Each distiict appointed one of its members as 
a permanent rq)resentative to the committee, and each district resolved to cooperate with the 
committee as it worked to establish uniform procedures for applying the Little Sioux 
Watershed program and to accept its decisions with respect to the priorities for the work 
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(Summary of meeting 1946). The initial duties of the little Sioux Works Committee wo-e 
to: 
1. represent the people of the Little Sioux watershed in dealing with federal 
agencies and mate recommendations to federal agencies in regard to the Flood 
Control program 
2. make recommendations to the soil conservation districts within the Little Sioux 
watershed as to the procedures to follow in carrying out the Flood Control 
program 
3. set up priorities of work in cooperation with the soil conservation districts and 
federal agencies (Summary of meeting 1946). 
The content of the program 
The goals of the watershed program were to apply soil conservation practices to farm 
land to inaease infiltration of rainfall, to reduce furthe gully development, and to reduce the 
amount of silt and sediment which is carried from tributaries to larger streams. 
The program to control flooding and related damages had two phases: 
1. the treatment of farm lands in the loess-covered portion of the watershed to 
reduce flood run-off at its source and minimize erosion; and 
2. the building of structures to control major gullies; that is, gullies so large that 
th^ cannot be stopped by individual action (House Documoit No. 268,78th 
Congress 1943:1). 
The land treatment measures were designed to increase the proportion of the 
watershed protected by tenaces and by grass and other close-growing covers. Farmers were 
also assisted to adopt improved tillage and planting practices. In some places, major gullies 
wo'e controlled by building earth dams to hold the water and let it drain slowly. In other 
places, flumes were installed to carry the floodwaters safely to the bottoms of the gullies. 
Many of the earth dams r^laced bridges, which were being maintained at great expense. 
Sketches of the structures most commonly build by SCS in the Little Sioux wat^shed are 
presented in Figures 2-7. These structures wae designed to have a useful life of 50 years. 
Thus, many of the earliest built structures are nearing the end of their planned design life. 
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The requirement for local input and responsibility 
The watershed program was conditional on local people contributing a portion of the 
construction costs of the the earthoi dams and on a local agency or agencies agreeing to 
"inspect, operate, repair, replace, and otherwise maintain die major gully control works in 
perpetuity" (House Document No. 268,78th Congress 1943:2). The conservation districts 
assumed this responsibility with the understanding that the county boards of supervisors 
would share in it 
Three groups of local actors thus became key to the success of the Little Sioux 
Watershed program; the landowner, the soil conservation districts, and the boards of 
supervisors. A fourth actor, the District Soil Conservation Service office, played a 
coordinating role and was ultimately the driving force bdiind the program. 
Once the construction work was completed and the watershed structures were 
satisfactorily installed in an organized watershed, the federal government no longer had 
responsibility for them (Lamp 1958:6). At this point, the policy of the watershed program 
required the conservation district, representing the local community, to assume responsibility 
for the operation and maintenance of the structures that were a part of the organized 
watershed. The acceptance of responsibility for the structures was documented by letter 
from the conservation district to the SCS district office. In the letter, the district stated that it 
accepted responsibility for the completed flood control work in the watershed and diat it 
would "follow through with establishing maintenance responsibilities with [the board of 
supervisors] and the farmer cooperators" (Eberly 1952). 
Maintenance responsibilities and activities 
Each conservation district agreed to maintain the improvements installed within its 
boundaries. A summary of SCS's understanding of this agreement follows. 
A formal inspection is to be made of each improvemmt by the district and the SCS. 
There is to be special inspection of all improvements shortly aAer periods of excessive 
runoff. The district has Ml responsibility for the operation and maintenance of all 
improvements installed under the program. Except for Ae major structures, maintoiance is 
the responsibility of fanners and others who hold title to areas on which improvements are 
installed. Major structures built on farm lands are to be maintained by the soil conservation 
district, unless other arrangements are made. All other major structures are to be maintained 
by titleholders to the areas on which the improvements are installed (Lamp 1958:5-6). 
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The district's formal arrangements for the maintmiance of the structures as 
recommended by the Little Sioux Works Committee is described in the Amendment to 
District Program and Work Plan (1954:1-2). The section reads as follows: 
Agreements with 'non-farm land' coopetators will provide that the maintenance of 
the improvements on those lands will be the responsibility of those respective 
cooperators. 
Agreements with 'farm land' cooperators will provide that maintenance of the 
improvements on farm land will be accomplished by: 
1. The county board of supervisors providing funds and doing repair work on 
structures in accordance with state legislation, or 
2. The district doing the repair work on structures with funds provided by the 
respective watershed group of farm land- owners, and 
3. The cooperators doing the repair work and maintaiance on all improvements 
other than structures, unless otherwise arranged. 
Funding of maintenance 
By statute, the federal govemmait could incur no costs for the operation and 
maintenance of the watershed program (House Document No. 268,78th Congress 1943:2). 
A funding mechanism, therefore, had to be created to pay for the expense of operating and 
maintaining each watershed. 
Funding the initial construction and the continuing maintenance costs of the 
structures was to be a cooperative arrangement The Amendment to District Program and 
Work Plan (1954:3) describes the arrangements. Owners of farm lands were to contribute to 
the district a cash amount equal to 2% of the estimated construction costs of installing 
structures on farm lands within the watershed area. To pay for maintenance costs in those 
counties where boards of supervisors refused to provide fimds or to assume maintenance 
responsibilities, landowners were required to make 15 annual payments to the district equal 
to 1/4 of the initial payment Landowners also had responsibility for maintaining all farm 
land improvements, such as waterways, charmels, diversion ditches and dikes, and terraces. 
Landowners also had responsibility for maintaining vegetative cover and for controlling the 
weeds and trees around the structures. 
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Changes in the program 
From the beginning of the watershed program, members of the public questioned the 
wisdom of spending so much money to prevent soil erosion. Costs for the early watersheds 
ranged from $10 to $225 per acre (Lamp 1949). Costs at the high end seemed excessive, 
particularly when much of the land was worth less than $75 per acre. SCS and members of 
the public who supported the watershed program believed much of the public did not 
understand the program or the public stake in the project (Lamp 1948). 
SCS did take steps to reduce the per-acre cost of the watershed structures. It 
streamlined construction procedures and standardized designs (Williams 1952). Also, it 
gave a higher priority to land treatment measures. Treatment standards were increased to 
require that at least 75% of the "sediment source areas which, if uncontrolled, would require 
a material increase in the cost of construction, operation, or maintenance" (Moon 1972) be 
adequately protected by terraces and grass waterways before federal funds could be spent for 
the construction of watershed structures. This requirement reduced the number of structures 
which had to be built as well as made it possible to build less expensive structures. 
Another effect of this change was to increase the landowner's costs to participate in 
the program. The Little Sioux project did not provide funds for the land treatment phase of 
the program. These cost w^ the responsibility of the individual landowner who was not 
always willing to make the expenditure, especially when he/she would derive little or no 
direct benefit firom the structure. In time, whai cost-sharing funds for taracing became 
available through other federal and state conservation programs, farmers became more 
coopaative in completing the required land treatment 
SCS and the Little Sioux Watershed Project 
SCS's initial involvement with the watershed project set patterns of interaction and 
expectations that are still in effect today. Many landowners were led to believe they would 
have little or no responsibility for the structures, and SCS did assume responsibility for 
some maintenance tasks. 
Many of those interviewed for the study, report that SCS applied excessive pressure 
to overcome landowners' reluctance to join an organized watershed and/or to allow a 
structure to be built on their land. The landowners were told that SCS would take care of 
maintenance and any problems that might occur. The local landowners were led to believe 
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that they would have no continuing responsibility for the structures. The expectation was 
established early in the program that the government would build and maintain the structures. 
As one official said: 
The general impression was given that the government would take care of 
everything and the landowner would have Uttle or no responsibility for the 
structures. The pattern was established early and jvetty much continues today. 
The structures are perceived to be the government's, and it is their responsibility 
to take care of them. 
The construction process affected the durability of the waterAed structures. As a 
result, ses has been forced to assume some maintenance responsibilities for the structures 
up to the present Building the structures, particularly in the early days of the program, was 
a "leam-as-you-go" process. The design and construction problems wa-e not standard, and 
with the goal being to build as many structures as possible, engineers made mistakes. Many 
structures, in retrospect, were not built as well as they should have beei. When problems 
began to develop, SCS took responsibility for those structures which needed repair because 
of inadequate construction metiiods. SCS justified the repairs because of a design deficiency 
in the original construction. 
Initially, repairs that were a result of design deficiœcies and those that were a result 
of inadequate maintaiance were hard to distinguish. To an outsider, the distinction seemed 
to be influenced more by political and financial considerations than by any technical criteria. 
The issue became more complex as new technologies and construction methods made it 
possible to repair structures to a higher standard than when originally built If the 
knowledge and technology standards in place at the time of construction wee used, SCS 
would have no responsibility for the repair. If, however, curreit state of the art critaia were 
used to make the determination, SCS could justify making the repairs. SCS's decision was 
to use state of the art criteria to determine if there was a design deficiency. This decisis has 
extended SCS's responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the structures and has 
compromised local incentive to assume full maintenance responsibility for tiie structures. 
Since design deficiencies are based on contemporary design knowledge and 
technology, the response by local sponsors to a need for major repairs is to have the problem 
defined as a design deficiency and hence not a local responsibility. Though seemingly 
standardized, design deficiency decisicHis become a matter of n^otiation, particularly when 
there is uncertainty about the cause of the problem or when the public interest is particularly 
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important The process conveys a sense of fluidity which is not present in the written 
agreements. 
The length of the n^otiation process and the sometimes perceived inconsistency of 
the decisions, particularly when they go against local interests, toid to undermine the 
credibility of the SCS. Many still remember the "good old days" when SCS fixed structures 
that needed fixing. These people can see no reason why SCS cannot continue to do so. The 
percq)tion is ingrained that SCS took care of maintenance in the past and so should continue 
to do so today. 
The availability of funds is another key factor in determining what maintenance task 
SCS is willing to assume. For example, in 1985 SCS used money from a federal jobs bill to 
hire summer employees to complete needed maintaiance work. At other times it has refused 
to complete repairs because of lack of funds. When the task is small and/or funds are ample, 
neither SCS nor the district object to completing the work. When repairs call for a large 
expenditure of funds, however, each agency is less willing to assume responsibility. 
Because the written agreements state that SCS is not responsible for maintenance, it is in a 
stronger position to affect decisions favorable to its interests. A perception exists that the 
availability of funds is the primary determinant of SCS willingness to take responsibility for 
repairs. 
The little Sioux Wato^shed program is unique. The proliferation of many small 
structures built in highly fragile soils has made it a very expensive program. In addition, 
because each watershed area encompasses relatively few acres, it is hard to generate financial 
support for the operation and maintenance of structures from local funding only. Funds are 
available for basic maintmiance and repairs, but there is an insufGcieit funding base to hire 
staff and to provide the technical support that is needed for a full scale maintenance program. 
Outside financial and technical support is needed to maintain the viability of the program. 
The uniqueness of the area and the waterdied project has intertwined SCS and the local 
sponsors in ways which were not envisioned by the project's designers or the original 
l^islation. The inability of the local sponsors to establish an independent funding base has 
forced their continued dependence on SCS, which in turn has precluded SCS from being 
able to remove itself from the program as the original legislation intended. At the same time, 
the ability of the conservation districts to develop their own autonomy and expertise relative 
to the operation and maintenance of the watershed structures has been compromised. 
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The soil conservation districts were created to work cooperatively with SCS to 
promote and implement soil conservation programs. The Littie Sioux Watershed program, 
however, emphasized local control for the operation and maintenance of the project 
structures. Despite the emphasis on local control, the Soil Conservation Service, keeping 
faith with its original mission, has remained heavily involved in the Littie Sioux Watershed 
program, and it has strongly influenced the direction of the program. The consequence has 
been to blur even further the lines of control and authority between the conservation district 
and SCS. 
Land-use Changes 
The tension between private interest and public good is inherent in the watershed 
program. In testimony before the U.S. Congress justifying the Littie Sioux Watershed 
program, the Secretary of Agriculture succinctiy articulated this t^sion: 
The farmers are the custodians of the basic resources upon which the destiny of 
this Nation ultimately depends. The public, however, has a paramount interest in 
conservation and in good land management Conservation is an inseparable part of 
the business of farming. The economic risk to the farmer is, however, too ^eat 
Thus the federal government should provide economic assistance through loans, 
credit, or grants to assist the farmer in implementing sound conservation practices 
(Brannan 1950:13-14). 
Private ownership of land and the right of the owner to use it as he/she best sees fit 
has always been a fundamental tenet of our society. The above defense of the program 
concluded by saying that the government in providing its assistance would rely primarily on 
the cooperation of the farmers. It is "they who would have the choice of taking part as they 
see fit as their own conditions require, and as the program itself merits cooperation" 
(Brannan 1950:14). By offering alternatives and fixes to the misuse of land in the Littie 
Sioux area, the watershed program questioned this article of faith but never seriously 
challenged it 
Much of the land in the Littie Sioux area probably should not have been settied or at 
least commercially farmed. The land is too vulnerable to erosion and society did not need 
this land to produce food. Nonetheless, private interests detmnined that individuals would 
settie the area and economic needs dictated that they would Arm the land for profit Through 
the early years of settiement, ignorance and the need for profits drove many farmers to 
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exploit and destroy much of the land. A series of government studies from 1939 through 
1941 served as the basis to design a remedial program, which became the Little Sioux 
Watershed project (Lamp 1949). One faction of the government was now in a position to 
heavily influence private land-use decisions. For a time it had a strong influaice as a large 
number of structures were completed and many of the most severe erosion problems woe 
overcome. 
Macro-economic forces, however, intervaied to upset the balance of private interest 
and public good in £avor of private economic gain. A decrease in cattle prices and 
government support programs motivated farmers to convert to row crops. Because the 
watershed structures had been designed for land use patterns which included little row 
cropping, the structures filled with silt faster than planned. The structures were in place and 
could not be changed. Only people's values and practices could change to prevent the 
deterioration of the watersheds. There was no incentive, however, at the individual level to 
change. The fundamental societal values of individualism and private ownership and use of 
land continued to prevail. 
Against this background, the little Sioux Watershed program continued to build 
structures, many times with little attention to ensuring that maintaiance issue were 
adequately addressed. Some structures were completed without adequate land treatment 
because SCS could not afford the time to obtain landowners' agreements to participate in the 
program and to complete the required land treatment Also, it was possible for an organized 
watershed to meet the 75% land treatment criteria and yet not have all structures in the 
watershed actually protected by land treatment measures. If a structure was below row 
cropped land with no treatment, it would rapidly fill with silt 
Passage of the Food Security Act (FSA) in 1985 significantly changed the 
private/public balance in favor of the public interest The FSA now acts like a governor on 
an engine. The basic drive to overuse the land to maximize profits is still there, but cuirent 
farm income is closely tied to govanment support payments. Thus, farmers are forced to 
conform to FSA rules to maximize their income. As a result, pressure on the structures has 
been relieved, at least for the immediate future. 
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CHAPTERV 
CASE STUDIES 
Data for Ida, Monona, and Woodbury Counties are presented to describe for each 
county: 
1. the development of the Little Sioux Watershed program, 
2. the funding and implementation of maintenance activities, and 
3. the responses local actors made to the research questions which guide this 
study. 
Key actors for the case studies are the county board of supervisors, the district 
conservation commissioners, and the landowners/farmers. Each case study provides a brief 
introduction to the county's wato-shed program and then uses the research questions which 
guide the study (see Chuter 3) as a framework to discuss local actors' experiences and 
impressions. The research questions are: 
1. What understanding, knowledge, and perceptions do local actors have of their 
obligations for the maintenance and operation of the watershed structures? 
2. What are the links among tiie various actors, and how do these linkages 
support or deter implementation of the stated policy? 
3. How do the various actors understand soil conservation, and how does this 
understanding shape their behavior and their assignment of responsibility 
for maintenance of the watershed structures? 
4. What does private property mean to the various actors, and how does this 
understanding shape tiieir acceptance and cooperation relative to the 
maintenance of the watershed structures as well as attendant soil 
conservation activities? 
5. What macro-factors impede or support appropriate maintenance activities? 
Table 2 indicates what questions in the survey instrument were used most often to 
answer the research questions. 
This study assumes that reality is a socially constructed phenomenon derived through 
negotiation among relevant actors (Berger and Luckmann 1966). For this reason, a range of 
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Table 2. Cioss-refereace of research questions with survey instument questions 
Research Question 
Survey of 
Conservation Organizations 
Survey of 
Local Landowners 
1 5, 6,7 22,23, 30, 32, 34, 35 
2 28,35 15, 28,51 
3 53, 54,55 64, 65, 66 
4 48,59, 60, 61, 62 69,70,71,72, 73 
5 56, 57 67,68 
perspectives is offered in an attempt to capture the variety of reality expaiences which make 
up the waterdied program within each county. Reality ultimately encompasses the full 
spectrum of these experiences and impressions. 
The mateial is primarily descriptive and provides the basis for the theoretical analysis 
and derivation of the grounded theory. The descriptive matoial is supplemented by tables 
that summarize district commissioners' and landowners' responses to the survey questions. 
Tables of data are not presented for boards of supavisors because the number interviewed 
was small, and in two counties, they were partially interviewed as a group. Their input is 
summarized as part of the narrative. 
A summary section for each county discusses similarities and differences across the 
three groups of local actors. The chapter cmcludes with an integration section that 
summarizes common themes and differences across the three counties. The counties are 
presented in alphabetical order. 
Common Elements 
Several trends which have had a significant impact on the watershed program are 
common across all three counties. The trends include a decline in farm numbers and an 
increase in average farm size, an increase in the number of acres planted to com and 
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soybeans, and a decline in the amount of land in woods and pasture. Tables 3 and 4 
summarize these trends. 
Table 3. Changes in the number of farms, farm size, acres of com and soybeans grown, 
and the number of cattle and hogs for Ida, Monona, and Woodbi^ Counties 
1940 and 1982 (Census of Agriculture 1940 and 1982) 
Ida Monona Woodbury 
1940 1982 1940 1982 1940 1982 
Number 
of farms 1,389 874 2,091 933 3,192 1,579 
Average 
farm size 
(acres) 192 297 203 406 164 303 
Acres of 
com 90,775 111,238 139,936 155,575 191,047 214,963 
Acres of 
soybeans 3,067 63,284 1,216 99,942 1,644 98,143 
Number 
of cattle 33,832 67,495 31,690 56,413 56,952 106,604 
NumbCT 
of hogs 43,864 113,442 41,415 68,466 73,379 162,855 
Larger farm units usually made it necessary to cultivate more land to make the farms 
economically viable. With more land under cultivation and a decrease in the number of acres 
in woods and pasture, the potential for soil erosion increased significantly. The increased 
cropping of soybeans also contributed to increased soil erosion. Because soybeans loosen 
the soil, they make it more vulnerable to the action of wind and water. More cropped acres, 
more soybeans, and less grassland increased the amount of runoff and siltation, which 
created additional pressure on the watershed structures built by the Little Sioux prqject, 
significantly decreasing their useful life. 
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Table 4. Changes in the number of acres of pasture and woodland for Ida, Monona, and 
Woodbury Counties 1945 and 1982 (Census of Agriculture 1945 and 1982) 
Ida Monona Woodbury 
1945 1982 1945 1982 1945 1982 
Acres of 
pasture 53,771 31,835 94,473 56,252 114,349 68,470 
Acres of 
woodland 624 461 16,587 17,339 12,224 10,771 
Ida County 
The construction of project structures in the little Sioux Wata-shed program began in 
1948. The majority of the structures in Ida County, however, were not built until the 1970s. 
As a result, bette^ materials and technology were used for construction, and the program's 
regulations and operations were more standardized. As a consequence, there have been 
fewer maintmance problems than in other counties. Also, of the approximately 100 
structures which have be«i built in the county, about 40% are road structures and are thus 
maintained by the county. Maintenance for the balance of the structures is the responsibility 
of the district commissioners and of the Soil Conservation Service. SCS provided cost-
sharing funds and technical assistance to construct all of the structures. 
When the watershed program began in Ida County, farmers were unaware of the 
consa-vation benefits that could be gained from participating in the program. Consequentiy, 
it was difficult to convince farmers to join an organized watershed. Today farmo-s are more 
interested in conservation and watershed programs, but there is no money for the 
construction of dams and other flood control devices. No new structures have been built in 
Ida County for several years. 
The county board of supervisors was initially reluctant to support maintenance 
activities (Lamp 1948). As a result, a maintenance fund was created from landowner 
payments to fund maintenance activities. Each landowner in the watershed was required to 
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make an initial payment at the time of construction as well as IS annual payments. The 
amount was based on a percentage of the construction costs. This fund is controlled by the 
district and is used to pay maintenance expoises for structures built on private land. The 
supervisors have signed maintenance agreements and assumed maintenance responsibility 
for structures built on county roads. 
Each year a part-time inspector is hired by the district to examine each watershed 
structure. He is responsible for routine tasks of clearing brush, cutting weeds, and filling 
minor holes. Other problems are reported to the commissioners, who take action. For many 
years, commissioners personally inspected each watershed structure in Ida County. This 
practice was discontinued as the number of structures increased and as the conunissioners 
became occupied with their own farms and businesses. 
County board of supervisors 
Obligations for maintenance The county's three supervisors and one supervisor 
who just retired were interviewed for the study. All four supervisors make a distinction 
between structures which are "ours," those structures built on roads, and structures which 
are "theirs," those structures which are on private land and therefore belong to the Soil 
Conservation Service. The supervisors take responsibility for the maintenance of "our" 
structures and leave the maintenance of "their" structures to SCS and the district If there is a 
major failure on any of the structures, or if structures need to be rq)laced, the supervisors 
stated that the county could not afford such a major expense. The three supervisors currently 
in office would not be willing to raise taxes to pay for maintenance or replacement expenses. 
All four supervisors indicated they were primarily concaned with roads. 
To date there have been few maintenance problems with any of the structures in the 
county. In the words of one supervisor: "Good contractors and good construction 
technology built structures which are essentially maintenance fiee." 
T jnkflges between actors There is excellent cooperation between the supervisors, 
SCS, and the district commissioners in Ida County. There are clear areas of responsibility 
through informal agreements made over the last 12 to 15 years. The supervisors maintain 
the road structures while SCS and the district are responsible for everything else. The 
supervisors, the district commissioners, and SCS pa-sonnel meet at the beginning of each 
year to discuss construction plans and to coordinate work. They meet at other times 
throughout the year if there is a specific problem that needs their joint attention. The 
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maintenance of watershed structures is usually not discussed. One supervisors stated that 
"cooperation is good for the taxpayers; SCS input helps stretch the local tax dollar further." 
Responsibility for soil conservation The supervisors believe that the landowner 
has prime responsibility for conservation, but that society can help through education and 
legislation which supports landowners' conservation efforts. Hiey believe that there should 
be more education of the general public about the interrelationship between the preservation 
of land resources and the production of food. 
The supervisors incorporate conservation benefits in county projects whenever 
possible. As one Supervisor stated: "Conservation is important. Everyone needs to do what 
they can do to help." 
Private property and public intervention The county does not intervene to work on 
private land or to enforce appropriate conservation practices. The supervisors believe, 
however, that it is acceptable for the federal government to set and enforce standards for 
private use of land. Further, they believe that the federal government has the responsibility 
to safeguard the public's investment in the watershed structures, and it is therefore acceptable 
for the government to require appropriate care of the structures. 
District commissioners 
Obligations for maintenance The commissioners believe the district is responsible 
for the routine maintenance of the structures. Two of the five commissioners believe there 
are maintenance operations beyond the capability of the district (Table 5). All five 
commissioners indicated that any major expenses, such as repair of washouts and 
replacements, should be the responsibility of the Soil Conservation Service. Also, the 
commissioners do not know what will happen to the structures once they have filled with 
silt In this sense, the future is uncertain for them. The structures are currently in good 
repair, however, so this is not an immediate concern. Hence, with a choice of high, 
average, or low priority, all five indicated that maintenance of structures is only average 
priority. 
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Table S. District Commissioners, Ida County: Percq>tion of maintenance and maintenance 
re^nsibilities (n=5) 
Questions YES NO 
Is current maintenance adequate? 5 0 
Does the district have maintenance responsibilities? 5 0 
Are there maintaiace operations beyond 
the capability of local sponsors? 2 3 
Linkages between actors There are currently good cooperative arrangements 
between the district, the county board of supervisors, and SCS (Table 6). Hie 
commissioners meet annually with the supervisors to discuss how they can support one 
another and to conduct joint planning for the next year. 
Relations between the commissioners and the landowners are acceptable. The 
fiarmars are perceived to be generally cooperative, particularly younger farmers. Apathy 
among some of the landowners is a barrier to good working relations. Most commissioners, 
however, indicated there were no major problems between groups. 
When the wateshed program began in Ida County, there was great difficulty in 
getting farmers to join watershed projects. They had many excuses such as: the dams would 
break; they didn't have the money; they didn't want someone telling them what to do; they 
didn't like something new; they didn't want terraces on their land. Today, the younger 
farmers are much more cooperative and willing to work with the district and with SCS. 
The maintenance of watershed structures is seldom discussed during either formal or 
informal interactions between the major actors. Because there are no major problems with 
the structures, agency personnel and landowners have little motivation to focus on 
maintenance issues. 
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Table 6. District Commissioners, Ida County: Satisfaction with working relationship 
between groups and perceived bamers to effective working relationships (n=S) 
Groups 
Extent of Satisfaction 
High Medium Low 
District Soil Conservation Service 4 1 0 
Board of Supervisors 4 1 0 
Landowners 0 5 0 
Suggested barriers to effective working relationships Times mentioned 
inadequate attention to small prc^lems - 1 
no problems - 4 
Responsibilities for soil conservation For the commissioners, soil conservation 
connotes some notion of responsibility for the future. As one Commissioner said; "One 
generation needs to take care of the next; protecting the soil is the best way to do this. It is 
our obligation." And in the words of another: "I am only h^e for a short time. I need to 
keep the land viable and productive for future generations." 
Two commissioners believe the landowner must have prime responsibility for soil 
conservation (Table 7). The landowner, however, must have the economic incentives to 
adopt conservation practices. Other commissioners believe it is the reqxansibility of the 
federal government to provide these incentives, and thus there should be a joint 
responsibility for soil conservation. A system of rewards and punishments should be 
maintained to ensure that 6rm practices are consistent with conservation requirements. The 
commissioners indicated that conservation measures are often not used on rented ground 
because renters do not have the same incentives to practice conservation as do owner-
operators. 
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Table 7. District Commissioners, Ida County: Perceived responsibilities for conservation 
and suggested conservation responsibilities society and landowners should 
assume (n=4) 
Who has prime responsibility to protect soil resources for future generations? 
Society Joint responsibility Landowner 
0 2 2 
What should society do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
provide funds for programs- 2 
establish and enforce regulations - 2 
education - 2 
set standards - 2 
What should landowners do to protect soil resources? Tinies moitioned 
conservation tillage practices - 3 
conservation practices - 2 
Private property and public intervention The commissioners believe farmers have 
the prime responsibility to maintain the land's productivity for future generations (Table 8). 
Ideally the individual farmer would voluntarily farm in this manner. The commissioners see 
little evidaice of this, however, and so government intervention and regulation is needed to 
force acceptable conservation practices. In the words of one commissioner "The federal 
government needs to intervene to shake things up a bit" The commissioners, generally, do 
not like the idea of intervention. However, it is an acceptable last resort measure to control 
soil erosion. Two of the commissioners indicated that cross-compliance is an acceptable 
method of intervention and control. 
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Table 8. District Commissioners, Ida County: Reqx)nses to statements about private 
property and public intervention (n=3) 
Statements Agree Disagree 
Conservation is a local/landowner issue and the federal 
government should stay out of it 0 3 
Because taxpayers benefit from conventional farming 
practices, they should bear the expense of repairing Ae 
soil erosion that results from these practices. 3 0 
The federal government has the reqwnsibility to saf^uard 
the public's investment in watershed structures by ensuring 
that they are used and maintain^ properly. 3 0 
The American farmer works primarily for himself and 
hence can use the land as he sees fit to maximize his profit 0 3 
Because agriculture is dependent on the environment, farm 
operations should be regulated to minimize damage to the 
environment 3 0 
Macro-influences A decrease in cattle prices along with high government subsidies 
for row crops were the major outside influences shaping farm practices (Table 9). The rich 
soils in the area also provided an incentive to concentrate on row crops. 
One conunissioner described these influaices in the following way. Because formers 
could no longer make money with cattle, they plowed up their grasslands to raise com and 
soybeans. When it again became profitable to raise cattle, farmers no longer had access to 
pasture. However, cattle could be raised in feed lots and fed the com and soybeans grown 
on their former rangeland. Government subsidies made it possible for farmers to make a 
profit with grain, and cheap grain prices made it possible for farmers to profit fi'om cattle. 
Thus, the incentives were to increase cropland to profit from government programs and to 
increase cattle herds to profit from cheap grain. Both practices contributed to increased soil 
erosion. 
A change in land values and SCS rules curtailed the construction of watershed 
structures in Ida County. When crop prices were high and land values were inflated, the 
cost-benefit ratios used to determine whether or not a watershed structure should be built. 
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were positive. As prices and land values dropped, a project's cost-benefit ratio would no 
longer be accq)table and tiie dams and other devices could not be built Thaïe was 
considerable construction activity for a time, and then nothing. The commissioners believe 
many more structures are still needed, but they do not believe they will ever be built 
Table 9. District Commissioners, Ida County: Macro-influences responsible for changes 
in cropping practices and their impact on watershed structures (n=S) 
Primarv influences for change Times mentioned 
economic factors - S 
government production programs - 3 
Results of these changes for watershed stiTictures Times mentioned 
increased row cropping - 3 
increased soil erosion - 3 
increased sUtation of watershed structures - 3 
Farmers - landowners 
Obligations for maintenance Several farmers said that landowners in the county 
were initially told about their maintmiance responsibilities. These farmers said, however, 
that many do not always remember, or they may choose not to remember. The lack of 
continuing contact or support from SCS contributed to fanners' "forgetting" about thar 
maintenance responsibilities. The normal process was to "put in the structure and that was 
it." 
Many farmers believe they have responsibility for the routine maintenance of their 
structures (Table 10). However, because they pay into a maintoiance fund, they believe any 
maintenance activity which incurs costs is not their responsibility but the responsibility of the 
district who controls the fund. Othar farmars believe paying into the fund absolves them of 
maintenance responsibility. As one farmer said: "As long as I am paying into the fund, they 
(SCS or the district) have prime responsibility for maintaiance. It is not my responsibility." 
Several farmas did indicate that even though they felt no basic responsibility for 
maintenance, they would be willing to do something if they know what to do. Generally, 
maintenance of the structures is not a high priority for Ida County landownas. Four of the 
seven farmers indicated it was a low priority, while three indicated it was only an average 
priority for them. 
Table 10. Landowners, Ida County: Perception of maintenance responsibilities and 
maintenance capabilities of local sponsors (n=9) 
Questions YES NO 
Do landowners have responsibility to keq> weeds and 
brush cut around their structures and to pafbrm other simple 
maintaiance tasks? 6 2 
Do landowners have responsibility for more complex 
maintenance and rq)air tadcs? 0 9 
Are there maintenance operations beyond 
the capability of local sponsors? 5 1 
Should SCS fund the maintenance and repair of your 
watershed structures? 4 2 
Linkages between actors Landowners believe there has been excellent support and 
cooperation from the two district conservationists (DC) in Ida County since the formation of 
the soil conservation district The district conservationists have provided stability and 
continuity. Because each DC recognized the advantage of working cooperatively with those 
involved in the watershed program, Ida County has evolved good working relationships 
between the county board of supervisors, the commissioners, and area farmers. 
Most farmers now have little or no contact with either SCS or the district to discuss 
the maintenance of watershed structures (Tables 11). SCS provided initial information to 
Ave of the farmers, but there was no continuing contact (Table 12). As a result, it is hard for 
the farmers to have strong linkages with either of these agencies. 
6 7  
Table 11. Landowners, Ida County: Satisfaction with working relationship between 
landowners and organizations (n=8) 
Extent of Satisfaction 
High Medium Low No Contact 
District Soil Conservation Service 6 10 1 
Board of Supervisors 5 10 2 
District Commissioners 6 10 1 
Table 12. Landowners, Ida County: Training and support given for performing required 
maintenance tasks (n=8) 
Questions YES NO 
Were you initially instructed how to perform routine maintenance? S 3 
Have you received continued maintoiance training and support? 0 8 
ses The District Commsioners 
Who provided your initial instruction? 5 0 
Responsibilities for soil conservation Many of the farmers believe they must take 
responsibility for the land (Table 13). Government programs, however, set the priorities for 
how they are to iarm, which is often contraiy to acceptable conservation practices. If 
farmers do not take advantage of government programs, they suffer financially, and few of 
them are in a position to sacrifice. Farmers who rotated crops and tried to practice good 
conservation were penalized by government programs which discouraged crop rotations and 
judicious use of chemical inputs. Several farmers believe society should use law, education, 
and economic incentives to aicourage farmers to practice conservation. 
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One lespondait observed that many farmers would like to use more soil conservation 
practices, but they face economic pressure from families, banks, and the government to 
maximize profits. As a result, these 6rmers are trapped into attaining short-term goals and 
using cultivation practices which are harmful to the avironmenL 
Table 13. Landowners, Ida County: Perceived responsibilities for conservation and 
suggested conservation responsibilities society and landowners should assume 
(n=8) 
Who has prime responsibility to protect soil resources for future generations? 
Society Joint responsibility Landowner 
1 3 4 
What should societv do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
provide funds for programs- 4 
establish and enforce regulations - S 
education - 3 
financial incentives - 4 
What should landowners do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
conservation tillage practices - 3 
crop rotations - 4 
minimal chemical inputs - 2 
landtreatmait- 5 
Private property and public intervention Several fermCTs believe the watershed 
structures belong to the public and, hence, the government has an obligation to intervene to 
ensure that the structures are used as intended (Table 14). Others believe the structures 
belong to the private landowner. A final group believe the structures ate owned jointly. 
Farmers believe the federal government needs to financially support conservation 
efforts (Table 15). These farmers believe government farm programs have helped created 
current soil erosion problems. The government, therefore, needs to help pay to solve these 
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problems. At the same time, iiarmers also believe landowners have to take greater 
responsibility for the land if they do not want the govemmmit telling them how to farm. The 
farmers are well aware that if they do not use the land responsibly, the government will 
intervene to make farm management decisions for them. 
Fanners stated they would prefa to make conservation decisions themselves. 
However, if farmers do not, then it is acceptable for society to regulate farm operations to 
minimize damage to die environment Farmers were unanimous, however, in their belief 
that "if the government is going to regulate, then it had better know what it is talking about" 
Table 14. Landowners, Ida County: Perceived ownership of the watershed structures (n^) 
Question Government Landowner Both 
Who owns the watershed structures 
on your land? 3 3 3 
Table IS. Landowners, Ida County: Responses to statements about private property and 
public intervention (n=8) 
Statemaits Agree Disagree 
Conservation is a local/landowner issue and the federal 
government should stay out of it 1 7 
Because taxpayers baieût from conventional farming 
practices, they should bear the expense of repairing die 
soil erosion that results from these practices. 7 1 
The federal government has the responsibility to safi^uard 
the public's investment in watershed structures by 
ensuring that they are used and maintained properly. 8 0 
The American fermer works primarily for himself and 
h«ice can use the land as he sees fit to maximize his profit 2 6 
Because agriculture is dependent on the environment, farm 
opoations should be regulated to minimize damage to the 
environment 7 1 
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Macro-influences From the farmer's perspective, the major outside influences 
have been economic factors and government programs (Table 16). Farmers could not make 
money with cattle so they changed to row crops and plowed up much of their grasslands to 
capture high grain prices and later to benefit from government subsidies. Farmers see 
themselves driven by government programs. Often they see themselves forced into making 
management decisions they know are harmful to the environment, but they believe they have 
no alternative. 
One respondent described farmers as pawns. He believed the watershed program, 
particularly in the early days, used the farmer as part of an experiment No one knew how to 
solve erosion problems. Various solutions were tried, however, and each time farmers were 
forced to adjust to new regulations and programs. Farmers needed government financial 
assistance, so they participated in the programs and followed the regulations. But these 
farmers were used by the government for some larger social purpose which they may or may 
not have wanted to support. 
Society's increased awareness of the need to save soil and protect groundwater 
supplies was an issue raised by two farmers. This awareness and concern has stimulated the 
development of conservation programs which have profoundly influenced current farm 
operations and will, in all likelihood, influence them even more in the future. 
Table 16. Landowners, Ida County: Macro-influences responsible for changes in cropping 
practices and their impact on watershed structures (n=9) 
Primarv influences for change Times mentioned 
economic factors - 3 
government production programs - 3 
rise of a conservation ethic - 2 
Results of these changes for watershed structures Times mentioned 
increased row cropping - 3 
increased soil erosion - 3 
increased sUtadon of watershed structures - 4 
watershed programs - 1 
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Smnmary 
Older respondents indicated that before the little Sioux Watershed program came to 
Ida County much of the land was highly eoded. They said there were many gullies and 
remedial action was needed. Today, however, they believe the county is much different 
The watershed program has eliminated the biggest problems, and severe erosion is under 
control. 
The consensus of the respondents is that the structures are in good repair and 
AilHlling their intaided function. More structures should be built, but the projects are too 
expensive now and the computation of cost and benefits does not justify additional 
construction. As a result, the district and SCS are concentrating on building taraces. . 
The district, the supervisors, and SCS work well together and make a formal effort 
to coordinate their work. Landowners are generally credited with being the least 
cooperative. Landowners, for their part, claim that they must operate in a complex world 
that primarily rewards economic decisions and not conservation decisions. If society wants 
farmers to skew their management decisions toward conservation ends, then society needs to 
provide economic rewards to make those decisions attractive. 
The role of the federal government as a regulator is resented, particularly by farmers, 
yet they welcome the income or help which government brings. The commissioner and 
supervisors look to the federal government as a source of funds for any major expense that 
might be related to the watershed structures. Curraitly thaïe is no need for federal financial 
assistance. In the future, howe/er, the potential for major expenses and the consequent need 
for federal funds is high. The commissioners have toured other districts in the Little Sioux 
area and have seen the problems those districts have with their older structures. All five 
commissioners recognize that someday those problems will come to Ida county, and they 
know they do not have the financial capability to solve the problems. 
Monona County 
Over 400 structures have beoi built in Monona County by the Little Sioux Watershed 
Program. Prior to 1948, when construction of the watershed structures began, a few of the 
wealthier landowners had organized private efforts to teach farmers about conservation 
tillage and planting techniques and to build small dams to control gullying. And, in the 
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1930s, the Civilian Conservation Corps had an active program of building dams and other 
watershed structures. 
Once the Little Sioux program began, farmars were receptive to building dams 
because they stopped the gullies. Farmers were less willing, however, to build terraces. 
Terraces interfered too much with tiieir farming, and many farmers did not see the 
connection betweai the viability of the dams and the use of taraces to protect them from 
excess siltation. Since terraces were not required during the first years of the program, few 
farmers built them. As a result, many watershed structures were built without adequate 
protection, and the holding ponds of these structures filled more quickly with silt, which 
decreased their useful life. 
A maintenance fund was established from the contributions of farmers who joined 
the organized watersheds. Each farmer was required to make a one-time contribution to the 
fund when the construction of watershed structures began on his/her land. Additional 
maintenance funds were provided by the county board of supervisors who agreed to 
financially support maintenance activities (Lamp 1948). 
Today the watershed structures are inspected once every three years by a part-time 
inspector. In the two years that a structure is not visited, the inspector sends a card to the 
landowner asking him/her to inspect the structure and to rqxxrt any problems. Some farmers 
comply with the request to inspect their own structures and to report any problems; many 
farma-sdonot The inspector completes simple maintenance tasks himself. Other 
maintenance needs are presented to the conunissioners for their consideration and to approve 
funding for repair. The commissioners are ultimately responsible for maintenance, and they 
involve the Soil Conservation Service as needed. 
Half of Monona County is bottom land; the oth»* half is rugged hill country. The 
geographic division has served to divide the people and to set patterns of interaction that 
impact on the issues related to the maintenance of the watoshed structures. Animosity is not 
as great as earlier, yet the patterns that were established as a result of the split continue to 
influence how people interact today. 
The relevant issue for the present study is that landowners in the hills received federal 
assistance for their water problems while landowna^ in the lowlands received little or none. 
An extensive system of drainage ditches was built on tiie lowland to make it possible to farm 
this ground. Federal assistance initiated the work, but the assistance was withdrawn. 
Farmers were forced to continue the work at their own expense. Extensive maintenance 
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work is needed to keep the drainage ditches functioning, and fanners must pay high 
drainage taxes ($12-20/acre) to fund this maintenance work. No general county revenues go 
for the support of the drainage system. The bottom land farmers resent hill farma-s receiving 
county money for the maintoiance of their watershed system. The lowland farma-s are thus 
not supportive of requests to increase the county's contribution to the maintenance of the 
upland watershed structures. 
County board of supervisors 
Obligations for maintenanne Monona County has three supervisors. Their primary 
concan is for the maintenance of the watershed structures which are on roads. They help 
with the maintenance costs of watershed structures on private land through an annual 
contribution to the district commissioners. The contribution is a line item in the county's 
budget and is funded from Rural Assistance Money, a state fund to be used for the benefit of 
rural people. The amount approximates what would be collected were the supervisors to 
levy the 1/4 mil tax on agricultural land which is allowed by the Code of Iowa for the 
maintenance of watershed structures. The actual tax is not collected because of the 
complicated bookkeq)ing procedures that would be required. By providing these fimds, the 
supervisors believe they are fulfilling their maintaiance obligations for the structures. All 
three believe SCS has prime responsibility for maintenance of all non-road watershed 
structures. 
The supervisors would prefer not to have the county involved with the maintaiance 
of any watershed structures. They would prefer a system similar to the drainage districts 
where individual farmers pay for maintenance proportionate to their need. 
Linkages between actors There is little or no contact in Monona County between 
the supervisors, district commissioners, and SCS. In the past, the three groups met annually 
to talk about common problems and concerns, but they have not held regular meetings for 
many years. The supervisors said that the district's annual request for maintenance funds is 
now sent by mail. The supervisors believe SCS would like closer working relations with 
them. For the supervisors, however, it is not a major concern. 
Responsibilities for soil conservation Because the county has little money to 
support conservation projects, the supervisors believe the landowners and the Soil 
Conservation Service should be responsible for soil conservation activities and concerns. 
The supervisors are primarily concerned with building and maintaining roads. 
A related issue for the supendsors is their concern that the swampbuster provision of 
the Food Security Act will return much of the lowland area to a swamp. They realize the Act 
is concerned with saving soil, but they believe the people in Monona County who live on the 
bottom land are more interested in conbolling water. The supervisors believe land should be 
used for production. Since they see a swamp as unproductive land, they do not support 
efforts to return lowland area to its original condition. 
Private property and public intervention The county does not work on private land 
unless it is part of a right-of-way. The supervisors believe, however, that the fed^al 
government does have responsibility to set standards for appropriate behavior by private-
individuals. From the supervisors' perspective, it is perfectly acceptable for the federal 
government to intervene to ensure that Ae watershed structures are used and maintained 
properly. 
District commissioners 
Obligations fnr maintenance The commissioners believe the district is responsible 
for maintenance tasks (Table 17). Because the district is short of funds, however, the 
commissioners prioritize the maintmance work. Urgent maintenance needs are given top 
priority for funding. Less serious problems are given a lower priority, and usually are not 
approved for funding. 
The commissioners are concerned about the annual maintenance contribution fiom 
the county board of supervisors. They believe the county board is an unreliable source of 
funds. As a result, the commissioners preCa" to use the county board's contribution only for 
the most urgent tasks and to save as much as possible for future major expenses. 
The commissioners are uncertain about what do to with dams that have filled with 
silt They do not have the money to rehabilitate these structures or to rebuilt them. Currently 
they are doing nothing. The commissioners believe that even though a holding pond is filled 
with silt, it still functions to slow runoff. Hence, the commissioners are content to wait and 
see what happens to these structures or what decisions are made at higher levels in SCS 
regarding these structures. 
The commissioners are also concerned about the number of older structures in 
Monona County. Hence, with a choice of high, average, or low priority, all commissioners 
indicate that maintenance is a high priority for them. They do not have sufficient funds to 
replace these structures or to make major rq>airs on them. They believe, however, that SCS 
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has access to emargency repair funds that could be used if needed. Hiey are also hopeful 
that new federal legislation will provide funds for the replacement of wata-shed structures. 
In summary, money is a major problem for the commissioners. Given their 
perceived financial limitations, however, they believe they are addressing the most urgait 
maintenance needs. There is more maintaiance and rq)air work they would like to complete, 
but at this time they have insufBcirat funds. 
Linkages between actors The commissioners disagree with the county board of 
supervisors over how much reqwnsibility the board should have for maintenance (Table 
18). The commissioners would like the supervisors to take greater re^nsibility. The 
supervisors, howeva", are content with their current level of support The supervisors, 
however, have been willing to be more cooperative in the past few years as they receive help 
from ses to construct road structures. The commissioner are also concerned with the lack 
of support from some landowners. 
Table 17. District Commissioners, Monona County: Perception of maintenance and 
maintenance responsibilities (n=S) 
Questions YES NO 
Is current maintenance adequate? 4 1 
Does the district have maintenance responsibilities? 5 0 
Are there maintaiace operations beyond 
0 the capability of local sponsors? 5 
The commissioners feel overwhelmed. Now that major expenses are needed to 
repair and rehabilitate watershed structures in Monona County, they perceive the federal 
government, who started the watershed program, withdrawing support and leaving financial 
responsibility for the program to the local sponsor. The commissioners also face uncertain 
funding from the supervisors and thus are reluctant to make even minor repairs. Feeling 
overwhelmed sometimes paralyzes the commissioners and prevents them fix>m making 
decisions or taking needed action. In general, the commissioners believe they "may have 
more responsibility than time and expertise would warrant" 
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Responsibility for soil conservation The commissioners believe landowners 
should have prime responsibility for consa-vation (Table 19). Society, however, should 
encourage conservation by setting standards and providing needed dollars. The 
commissioners believe, also, that for too long society has allowed farmers to farm in ways 
which are damaging to the environmoit The trend is now shifting to require more 
responsibility from the farmer. The commissioners are supportive of this change, but they 
want it accomplished with a minimum of regulation. 
The commissioners want SCS to better educate farmers about their maintenance 
responsibilities. They believe many farmers do not realize what their maintenance 
responsibilities are or what they should do to maintain the structures. 
Table 18. District Commissioners, Monona County: Satisfaction with working relationship 
between groups and perceived baniers to effective working relationdiips (n=S) 
Groups 
Extent of Satisfaction 
High Medium Low 
District Soil Conservation Service 5 0 0 
Board of Supervisors 0 4 1 
Landowners 2 3 0 
Suggested barriers to effective working relationships 
Uncertainty about funding -
Landowners have a poor attitude -
More personnel are needed -
Poor communication -
Times mentioned 
5 
1 
1 
1 
Private property and public intervention The commissioners believe the federal 
govemmait needs to promote conservation education and provide financial and technical 
support for the adoption of conservation practices (Table 20). And, since the government 
built the watershed structures, the commissioners believe it should take needed action to 
ensure that the structures are used and maintained propa-ly. Finally, the commissioners 
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believe the farmer is responsible for taking care of the land. However, if necessary, the 
government should regulate farm practices to minimize damage to the environment If there 
are no regulations, the commissioners fear that farmers may be reluctant to use appropriate 
soil conservation practices. The commissioners indicated very strongly that those 
landowners who e)q)loit the land need to be controlled. In general, the commissioners 
believe the Food Security Act of 1985 provides a good model for government regulation of 
fanning. 
Table 19. District Commissioners, Monona County: Perceived responsibilities for 
conservation and suggested conservation responsibilities society and landowners 
should assume (n=5) 
Who has prime responsibility to protect soil resources for future generations? 
Society Joint responsibility Landowner 
0 1 4 
What should societv do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
provide funds for programs - 2 
set standards - 1 
establish and enforce regulations - 2 
education - 2 
increase awareness - 1 
What should landowners do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
consŒvation tillage practices - 4 
crop rotations - 2 
Macro-influences The commissioners said that govemmait farm policies which 
«icouraged maximum production made a significant contribution to the early degradation of 
many watershed structures (Table 21). And, the policy which tied responsibility for 
maintenance of terraces to the land owner instead of to the land, also hastened the decline of 
the watershed structures. When a piece of land was sold, the new owner had no obligation 
I 
7 8  
to maintain the toraces which had been built to reduce erosicm and protect the structures. 
Many new owners ploughed the terraces on new land to farm it "fence row to fence row." 
The result was a large increase in soil erosion, which filled holding ponds and shortened the 
dams' expected life. The commissioners or SCS were unable to alter the practice. 
Farma-s - landowners 
Obligations for maintenance All farmers are willing to take responsibility for 
simple maintenance tasks, but they believe that maintenance tasks that cost money should be 
the responsibility of the district or of SCS (Table 22). Most farmers believe that the Soil 
Conservation Service should fund the maintenance and repair of the structures. With a 
choice of high, average, or low priority, three Monona County farmers indicated that 
maintoiance of the structures is a low priority while four indicated that it is an aveage 
priority. 
Table 20. District Commissioners, Monona County: Responses to statements about private 
property and public intavention (n=5) 
Statements Agree Disagree 
Conservation is a local/landowner issue and the federal 
government should stay out of it 1 4 
Because taxpayers benefit from conventional forming 
practices, they should bear the expense of rq)airing die 
soil erosion that results from these practices. 3 2 
The federal government has the responsibility to safeguard 
the public's investmait in watershed structures by ensuring 
that they are used and maintained properly. 5 0 
The American frnmo" works primarily for himself and 
hence can use the land as he sees fit to maximize his profit 1 4 
Because agriculture is dqiendait on the environment, farm 
operations should be regulated to minimize damage to the 
environmait 4 1 
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Table 21. District Commissioners, Monona Coun^: Macro-influences responsible for 
changes in cropping practices and their impact on watershed structures (n=5) 
Primary influences for change Times mentioned 
economic factors - 3 
government production programs - 3 
Results of these changes for watershed structures Times mentioned 
increased row cropping - 2 
increased soil erosion - 5 
increased siltation of watershed structures - 3 
Table 22. Landowners, Monona County: Perception of maintenance responsibilities and 
maintenance capabilities of local sponsors (n=10) 
Questions YES NO 
Do landowners have responsibility to keep weeds and 
brush cut around their structures and to perform other simple 
maintenance tasks? 10 0 
Do landowners have responsibility for more complex 
maintenance and repair tadcs? 0 10 
Are there maintenance operations beyond 
the capability of local sponsors? 8 0 
Should ses fund the maintenance and repair of your 
watershed structures? 7 1 
Linkages between actors Unless landowners have problems with their watershed 
structure, they have little contact with SCS or conservation district personnel (Table 23). 
Farmers who bought land with extant structures are the most isolated. These farmers are 
unclear about who owns the structures, who is responsible for them, and why the structures 
are on their land. These farmers make no payments to a maintenance fund; they receive no 
maintenance instructions; because the structures are inspected only once every three years. 
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they have no real contact with the conservation district or SCS; and they do not know the 
histoiy of the watershed project Five farmers indicated they received initial information 
about maintenance from SCS but there was no continued training or support (Table 24). 
The Iowa Dqpartmrat of Natural Resources (DNR) is buying land in the area for the 
Loess Hills Reserve. Once the DNR purchases land, it is removed from the tax base, which 
increases tax liabilities for the other county landowners. The increased taxes aie making 
landowners angiy and contributing to their ill feelings toward govemmait agencies in 
general. 
Table 23. Landowners, Monona County: Satisfaction with working relationship between 
landowners and organizations (n=8) 
Extent of Satisfaction 
High Medium Low No Contact 
District Soil Conservation Service 3 1 0 4 
Board of Supervisors 0 1 0 7 
District Commissioners 3 1 0 4 
Table 24. Landownas, Monona County: Training and support given for performing 
required maintenance tasks (n=10) 
Questions YES NO 
Were you initially instructed how to perform routine maintenance? 5 5 
Have you received continued maintaiance training and support? 0 10 
SCS The District Commsioners 
Who provided your initial instruction? 5 0 
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Responsibilities for conservation Most farmers believe the landowner is ultimately 
reqwnsible for conservation (Table 25). But these farmers believe society should help 
farmers practice conservation by sponsoring educational programs, providing incentives, 
and imposing regulations when needed. Farmers said that if only restrictions are imposed, 
they will resist adopting conservation practices; if incentives are provided, they will be more 
cooperative in adopting these practices. 
Other fermers believe that, while conservation and the land is important, land is still 
only an input in the production process. One farmer believes that where the top soil is deep, 
it is acceptable to lose more. Thus tha^e should be local standards for soil loss. To this 
farmer, "environmentalists are like the carpetbagger who traveled in the post-Civil War 
South." 
Other farmers are uncertain if they will be able to comply with cmservadon 
r^ulations. After visiting demonstration fields where appropriate land treatments have been 
applied, these farmers conclude the land can no longer be farmed because terraces on this 
land are too close togedier. Farmers on vulnerable land fear they will have to return their 
fields to grass and pasture and as a result be forced out of &rming. One farmer, however, 
was more optimistic. He believes "if people farm right, they can farm this soil There needs 
to be proper management and use of mechanical technology." 
For many farmers, responsibility for conservation is a very personal matter. "My 
responsibility is to take care of my land. I don't have the right to tell othas what to do with 
their land." Farmers do not like to be pushed on conservation matters. 
Private propertv and public intervention Some farmers understand the 
public/private issue in terms of the distinction they make betweai watershed structures and 
land treatment (Table 26). The structures were built by the government after being granted 
an easement by the farmer. The government thus owns the structures, and it is acceptable 
for it to intervene to maintain them and to ensure their proper use. Terraces, however, were 
built without any easement Hence, they are private property, and the government has no 
right to require maintoiance. What is unclear to many farmers is who owns and who is 
responsible for the watershed structures which have ceased to function. Some farm^s 
believe once a structure has completed its useful life, ownership reverts to the landowner. 
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Table 25. Landowners, Monona County: Perceived responsibilities for conservation and 
suggested conservation responsibilities society and landowners should assume 
(n=10) 
Who has prime responsibility to protect soil resources for future generations? 
Society Joint responsibility Landowner 
0 1 9 
What should society do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
provide funds for progrès - 4 
provide monetary incentives - 4 
establish and enforce regulations - 4 
education - 2 
What should landowners do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
conservation tillage practices - 3 
crop rotations - 3 
landtieatmrait- 6 
minimal chemical inputs - 1 
Some farmers believe they own the land and can use it as they see fit to maximize 
their profit (Table 27). Most, however, recognize that government needs to establish and 
enforce standards for the proper use of land to minimize aivironmental damage. Farmers 
realize they must be aware of these limits and farm within them. Farmers want outsiders to 
recognize that the 6rmer must use the land to make a living. 
Farmers acknowledge the importance of farm regulations and the inevitability of 
additional r^ulations, but they do not want a "non-fiarmer bureaucrat" telling them how to 
farm. The regulator has not earned the right to tell them how to farm. 
Macro-influences Upland frnma-s in Monona County spoke of an encroaching 
outside world that has changed the way farmers in the hill country relate to one another. The 
early watersheds were held together by cooperation and personal relations. As the original 
farmers left, new owners came not for the puipose of becoming a part of the community but 
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primarily to make profits. The sense of community and mutual support broke down. Many 
new owners became large operators and took advantage of government programs to 
maximize profits. Other new owners established large feedlot operations. Because their 
profits come from cattle and not rowcrops, these farmers are not dependent on the 1985 
Food Security Act Thus, they are not constrained by its cross-compliance provisions and 
are not concerned about soil conservation issues. 
The incentives provided by government programs to maximize production motivated 
farmers to turn woods and grassland into money producing crops (Table 28). The farmers 
believe greed was driving the majority of their peers. The most extreme example mentioned 
by nearly every respondent in Monona County was of a farmer who tried to convat more 
than 700 acres of woods and pasture into cropland. He destroyed the land and was never 
able to produce a crop. He did, however, establish a large com base for which he received 
large government subsidies. He eventually wait bankrupt, but now is receiving government 
assistance to rqyair his damaged land. Farmers resent the fact that those who exploited the 
land to maximize profits and reap high govemmait subsidies are now receiving govemmait 
assistance to repair the environmental damage they caused. The resentment is strongest 
among those who used moderation and attempted to farm in less environmentally damaging 
ways. 
Table 26. Landowners, Monona County: Perceived ownership of the watershed structures 
(n=10) 
Question Government Landowner Both 
Who owns the watashed structures 
on your land? 8 2 0 
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Table 27. Landowners, Monona County: Responses to statements about private property 
and public intervention (n=:9) 
Statemoits Agree Disagree 
Consolation is a local/landowner issue and the federal 
government should stay out of it 1 8 
Because taxpayers benefit from conventional fanning 
practices, they should bear the expense of repairing &e 
soil erosion that results from these practices. 5 4 
The federal government has the responsibility to saf<^uard 
the public's investment in watershed structures by 
ensuring that they are used and maintained properly. 9 0 
The American farmer works primarily for himself and 
hoice can use the land as he sees At to maximize his profit 3 6 
Because agriculture is dependent on the environment farm 
operations should be r^ulated to minimize damage to the 
environment 7 1 
Table 28. Landowners, Monona County: Macro-influences responsible for changes in 
cropping practices and their impact on watershed structures (n=8) 
Primarv influences for change Times mentioned 
economic factors - 8 
government production programs - 3 
rise of a conservation ethic - 1 
Results of these changes for watershed structures Times mentioned 
increased row cropping - 5 
increased soil erosion - 8 
increased siltation of watershed structures - 3 
conservation programs - 1 
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Summary 
There is geno-al agreement that the conservation district has primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of the watershed structures. The district, however, believes it is 
responsible only for less expensive maintenance items. The commissicHiers perceive their 
financial situation to be precarious and hence, they are reluctant to spend money. Their main 
source of funds, the county board of supervisors, is content for the moment to make an 
annual contribution for maintenance, but it is unwilling to increase Ae contribution. The 
commissioners do not perceive the supervisors to be a dependable source of funds. 
Ultimately, both the commissioners and the siq)ervisors look to SCS to fund major 
maintenance and repair problems. 
Relations are strained or non-existent between the supervisors and SCS and between 
the supervisors and the commissions Curraitly there is little or no contact or cooperation. 
SCS and the district generally have a good working relationship. However, SCS would like 
the district to take more responsibility for maintaiance, which the district is reluctant to do; 
and this has created taision betweai them. 
There is agreement across respondraits that landowners have prime responsibility for 
taking care of the land. The landowners are willing to accqit this reqwnsibility, but they 
want assistance fix>m society to provide education and financial incaitives to help them carry 
out their responsibilities. If necessary, it is acceptable for government to intervene to impose 
acceptable land-use standards. Farmers are well aware of society's increased concern about 
farm impacts on land and groundwater. Farmers will cooperate to meet society's 
environmental concerns, but fanners also need to make a profit 
Woodbury County 
Since 1948, over 400 watershed structures have been built in Woodbury County by 
the little Sioux Watershed project The Soil Conservation Service provided cost-sharing 
funds and technical assistance to build the structures. Currently, the county is responsible 
for maintaining structures built on roads, and the conservation district is responsible for the 
maintenance of structures built on private land. SCS provides technical support to both the 
conservation district and the counQf. 
The county board of supervisors were initially reluctant to financially support 
maintenance activities (Lamp 1948). Haice, landowner contributions were required to 
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establish a maintenance fund. The fund pays for maintenance of structures on private land. 
The commissioners, who nominally control expenditures 6om this fund, try to spend only 
the interest and leave the principle intact Funding for the maintenance of road structures is 
provitkd by the county. 
More recently, the supervisors agreed to hire a full-time inspector who works part-
time for the county and part-time for the district He inspects each structure annually. 
Problem structures are inspected more ûequaitly. The inspector is responsible for 
completing minor maintenance tasks, such as cutting weeds and brush and filling small 
holes. For structures on private land, the inspector is authorized to spend up to $500 for any 
one maintenance project without approval from the commissioners. Maintenance projects 
requiring more than $500 to complete must be approved by the commissioners. The 
inspector makes an effort to regularly visit farmers and to talk with them about what they can 
do to keq) their structures in good repair. 
County board of supervisors 
Obligations for maintenance The county's five supervisors are only generally 
aware of the arrangements for maintaiance. To their knowledge, the maintenance of 
watershed structures is adequate in Woodbury County. In the words of one supervisor, 
"They (SCS) don't have a lot of old structures in poor repair." The maintenance of the 
structures is not a high priority for the supervisors. They recognize the importance of 
consolation but more as an abstraction. As a practical matter, the supervisors' time and 
energy are devoted to other issues, such as maintenance of roads, provision of social 
services, and general fiscal matters of the county. 
Both supervisors interviewed believe the district conservationist (SCS) has prime 
responsibility for determining the priority for watershed maintenance activities and for 
funding them. The supervisors believe that in hiring the inspector, who has the 
responsibility for maintenance, they have fulfilled their maintenance obligations. If there are 
problems, the supervisors work with the county engineer and the district conservationist to 
resolve them. 
Periodically, some supervisors do visit specific structures to observe problems. The 
supervisors are involved with the planning of watersheds only when road structures are 
being considered. 
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Linkages between actors The supervisors believe their first responsibility is to the 
taxpayers and not to agreements made with the Soil Conservation Service or to some abstract 
notion of preserving the environment With respect to conservation issues, the county board 
follows the direction of the Soil Conservation Service. However, when it is necessary to 
expend county funds to address conservation issues, the supervisors becomes more 
involved, and they are generally less willing to cooperate. 
Both supervisors stated that issues of money and the extent of respmsibility for the 
structures are the major contentions they have with the Soil Conservation Service. Also, 
they complained that changing federal rules make it difficult for them to know at any one 
time what their responmbilities are relative to the maintenance of the structures. 
Woodbury County has inadequate funds for major repairs or for replacement of 
watershed structures. The supervisors, therefore, are concerned about what will happen to 
the structures and their future financial obligations for them. The supervisors view the Little 
Sioux Watershed project as another federal program that was started by the federal 
government then turned over to the local government for continuation. The supervisors, 
however, do not have adequate resources to operate and maintain the programs as originally 
intended. As a result, they are forced to pick and choose among programs to decide how 
they will spend their limited resources. 
Responsibilities for soil conservation The supervisors believe lack of cooperation 
from some landowners for implemoiting appropriate conservation practices is the biggest 
obstacle to the maintenance of the structures. 
The supervisors are supportive of conservation efforts in the abstract, but (hey 
become less supportive as actual dollars are needed to support conservation efforts. Both 
supervisors said that financial support for conservation programs should come primarily 
from the federal government and from landowners. Conservation benefits the landowner in 
a direct sense, as well as society more generally. These groups, according to the 
supervisors, should thus pay the bill for conservation. The supervisors are supportive of the 
federal government's right and duty to see that watershed structures are used and maintained 
properly. They believe too that, if necessary, farm operations should be regulated to 
minimize damage to the environment 
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District commissioners 
Obligations for maintenance The commissioners believe the maintenance of the 
watershed structures is adequate (Table 29). They are not aware of any serious problems 
that are not receiving attention. The structures are examined yearly so that the district can be 
aware of problems and take immediate action to correct problems. The commissioners also 
believe they can continue to financially handle routine maintoiance. They have, however, 
inadequate Amds for major repairs or for future replacement As a result, the commissioners 
are womed about what will hq)pen to the structures in the future. Haice, with a choice of 
high, average, or low priority, all five commissioners indicated that maintenance of 
structures is a high priority. 
In the past, major rqpairs were considered as design deficiencies and, therefore, the 
responsibility of the Soil Conservation Service. The commissioners have thus tried to have 
as many repairs as possible designated as design deficiencies. As one commissioner said: 
"The government has a deeper pocket, so let them pay." Olds' structures cause the most 
problems. They were built with poorer techniques and materials than are available today, 
and they have not been maintained as well as the newer structures. Consequently, the 
commissioners believe much of the maintenance work on the older structures is rightly the 
responsibility of the Soil Conservation Savice. 
The commissioners said they sometimes do not understand what responsibility and 
authority they have for enforcing the provisions of the maintenance agreements. The source 
of their confusion is in the origins of the program in Woodbury County. SCS was anxious 
to have a large number of landowner participate in the program. As a pa-suasion device, 
SCS assured landowners and commissioners that it would be responsible for most 
maintenance tasks. Also, SCS did not hold farmers responsible for not complying with 
program regulations. SCS wanted projects completed, and thus individual projects were not 
allowed to fail. As a result, farmers did not understand what the program was about and 
what responsibilities they were to have. As well, the conservation district appeared to have 
little responsibility or authority relative to the maintenance agreements they signed. 
Consequently, many farmers and some of the commissioners continue to believe that SCS is 
obligated for maintenance of the watershed structures. This perception is reinforce for the 
commissioners when SCS makes major decisions for the commissioners. In the words of 
one commissioner: "It (SCS) sets the direction and the agenda of what is going to get done." 
8 9  
The commissioners see themselves as obligated to go through SCS to accomplish their 
work. 
Being a commissioner is time-consuming and demanding. "For all practical 
purposes being a commissioner is not a volunteer position." The work is complicated 
because commissioners receive no real training for their work. They learn by doing. 
Table 29. District Commissioners, Woodbury County: Perception of maintenance and 
maintenance responsibilities (n=S) 
Questions YES NO 
Is current maintenance adequate? 5 0 
Does the district have maintaiance reqwnsibilities? 5 0 
Are there maintenace (^)erations beyond 
the capability of local sponsors? 4 1 
T inloigfts between actors The commissioners beUeve local government has little 
responsibility for consovation activities. For them, the individual landowner and state and 
federal government agaicies have a much greater responsibility. Consequently, the 
commissioners have more contact with landowners and with SCS than they do with the 
county board of supervisors. Most commissioners have a low extent of satisfaction with 
landowners (Table 30). 
A concern expressed by some of the commissioners is that SCS sometimes shows a 
lack of respect for landowners. At these times it conveys a saise of elitism and is insensitive 
to farmers' needs and problems. The commissioners believe SCS needs to speak the 
farmer's language. As one commissioner said: "Local people [the commissioners] can 
explain things better. Engineers sometimes have difficulty in relating to the fiumo^. They 
have a diAerait language and priorities." The main issue is that bureaucratic and technical 
language means little to the farmer, and its use only fbsta^ apathy and cynicism. 
The district and SCS are developing an assistant commissioner program in 
Woodbury County. The purpose of the program is to make SCS and the work of the district 
more visible and to establish regular communications with farmers. This is a pilot program 
for the state. 
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Responsibilities for soil conservation Most commissioners believe that the 
landowner must be responsible for conservation (Table 31). Society can provide education, 
set standards, and provide technical advice and mon^r; but ultimately it is the responsibility 
of the individual farmers to care for their land by preserving its productivity for future 
generations. From the Commissioners' perspective, farmers currentiy give priority to the 
market and to profits when making &rm management decisions. Conservation is usually a 
secondary concern. Realistically tiiere needs to be a balance betweai conservation and 
profits. If farmers cannot make a profit, thai they cannot practice conservation. 
Private propatv and public intervention All five commissioners believe some 
aspects of farming need to be regulated to eisure that farm practices are compatible with 
environmental needs (Table 32). As farmers, the commissioners know that farmers would 
like to keep the government out of farming. The commissioners believe, however, that at 
least some government intervention is necessary. As one commissioner said: "We need it to 
protect us from our worst tendmicies." 
Table 30. District Commissioners, Woodbury County: Satisfaction with working 
relaticMiship between groups and p&ceived barriers to effective working 
relationships (n=5) 
Groups 
Extent of Satisfaction 
High Medium Low 
District Soil Consavation Service 2 3 0 
Board of Supervisors 2 3 0 
Landowners 0 1 4 
Suggested barriers to effective working relationships Times mentioned 
different priorities: SCS build new. District maintain - 1 
not enough enforcement of laws- 1 
poor communication - 1 
funding- 1 
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Farmo'S are fighting increased incursion into their management decisions. The 
commissioners realize, however, that an increasing number of people believe farmers should 
be forced to take greater financial responsibility for the externalities of their fiarm operation. 
These non-farm people believe an outside authority should set priorities and impose 
r^ulations. Hie conunissioners tiy to have farmers realize they must farm more 
responsibly, or they will lose their freedom to farm as they please. 
Macro-influences Several commissiono's described our societal values as based on 
exploitation, maximization of short-term benefit, and "taking the easy way." The farmer is a 
reflection of this. In addition, the commissioners believe government farm programs have 
been a major cause of increased soil erosion (Table 33). The production incentives of these 
programs are anti-consavation. Hie programs provide incœtives to maximize production 
by plowing more land and by applying more chemicals. The Food Security Act, however, is 
forcing farmers to be concerned about soil and water conservation. The commissioners 
believe for most farmers, profits are still more important than taking care of the environment 
Conservation and concern for the environment, however, is slowly assuming greater 
importance. 
Farmers - landowners 
Obligations for maintenance Several farmers in Woodbury County said they were 
told that ses or the district would maintain the structures and that the farmer would have no 
maintoiance obligations. Other farmers believe because they pay into a maintenance fund 
they have no maintenance responsibilities. In the words of one farmer: "I pay for 
maintenance; someone else is supposed to take care of it" Farmers also raised the quality of 
construction issue. In the words of one farmers: "If SCS did not build them right in the first 
place, it is not the farmer's fault There is nothing he can do about it SCS should fix 
them." 
Other fiarmers have a different understanding of their maintenance obligations. These 
farma-s are willing to care for their structures and perform some maintenance tasks. Mainly, 
however, fmmers believe their maintenance responsibilities are limited to keeping the 
structures seeded, keeping cattle off them, and reporting any problems. Generally, farmers 
believe SCS or the district is responsible for actual repair work (Table 34). The priority 
given to maintenance varied. Two farmers said it was a low priority; two said it was an 
average priority, and three said it was a high priority. 
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Most farmers said they talœ the structures for granted. The structures are a part of 
the landscape; and as long as they function properly, farmers are not concamed about them. 
Table 31. District Commissioners, Woodbury County: Perceived responsibilities for 
conservation and suggested conservation responsibilities society and landowners 
should assume (n=S) 
Who has prime responsibility to protect soil resources for future generations? 
Society Joint responsibility Landowner 
0 1 4 
What should societv do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
provide funds for programs - 2 
establish and enforce regulations - 3 
education - 3 
What should landowners do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
conservation tillage practices - 3 
lobby legislatures for stricter laws - 1 
minimal use of inputs - 3 
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Table 32. District Commissioners, Woodbury County: Responses to statements about 
private property and public intervention (n=5) 
Statemaits Agree Disagree 
Conservation is a local/landowner issue and the federal 
government should stay out of it. 0 5 
Because taxpayers benefit from conventional farming 
practices, they diould bear the expense of repairing &e 
soil erosion that results from these practices. 3 2 
The fedaal government has the leqwnsibility to safeguard 
the public's investmoit in watershai structures by ensuring 
that they are used and maintained properly. 5 0 
The American farmer works primarily for himself and 
hence can use the land as he sees fit to maximize his profit 0 5 
Because agriculture is dependent on the environment, farm 
operations should be r^ulated to minimize damage to the 
environment 5 0 
Table 33. District Commissioners, Woodbury County: Macro-influences responsible for 
changes in cropping practices and Uieir impact on watershed structures (n=S) 
Primarv influences for change Times mentioned 
economic factors - 4 
government production programs - 2 
Results of these changes for watershed structures Tîmes mentioned 
increased row cropping - 3 
increased soil erosion - 2 
increased siltation of watershed structures - 4 
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Table 34. Landowners, Woodbi^ County: Perception of maintenance responsibilities and 
maintenance capabilities of local sponsors (n=8) 
Questions YES NO 
Do landowners have responsibility to keep weeds and 
brush cut around their structures and to p&fbrm other simple 
maintenance tasks? 6 2 
Do landowna-s have reqwnsibility for more complex 
maintenance and repair tasks? 0 7 
Are thee maintenance operations beyond 
the capability of local sponsors? 5 2 
Should SCS fund the maintenance and rqpair of your 
watershed structures? 7 0 
Linkages between actors The amount of contact between farmers and SCS or 
district personnel is a function of how many problems the farmers have with their structures. 
Because contacts are primarily on an as-needs basis, if there are no problems, there is 
generally no contact This contrasts with the intense involvement during the organizational 
and construction phase. Once the work was done, however, regular contact stopped, and 
the farmer became increasingly less aware of SCS and the district (Table 35). 
Most landowners received no training or instruction for taking care of the watershed 
structures (Table 36). They learned about maintenance over time through informal contacts 
with the inspector, SCS staff, or district commissioners, but no formal training was given. 
Since there is not a history of contacts, and hence no history of learning, new landowners 
are unaware of the purpose for the structures as well as their maintenance responsibilities for 
them. 
Farmers want SCS to recognize they are not dumb. Farmers believe very strongly 
that all knowledge does not come from books and classroom learning. They believe they 
possess practical, useful knowledge. When their knowledge is discounted and not utilized, 
farmers feel left out of the decision-making process for solving problems related to dieir 
structures or to other conservation matters. As a consequence, they lose interest in the 
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process. For the farmers, the ultimate measure of their regard for the Soil Conservation 
Service is a Amction of how well SCS has attended to their concerns, real or imaginary. 
Table 35. Landowners, Woodbury County: Satisfaction with working relationship between 
landowners and organizations (n=8) 
Extent of Satisfaction 
High Medium Low No Contact 
District Soil Conservation Service 3 1 3 1 
Board of Supervisors 4 1 0 3 
District Commissioners 3 3 0 2 
Responsibilities for soil conservation Most farmers indicated they know what farm 
practices should be used to care for the land. Yet they do not always use these practices. 
Their reasons are many: there are conflicting pressures; it is too much work; it is easier to let 
someone else solve the problem; govemmait subsidy programs are based on practices which 
are contrary to good conservation practices. Fanners indicated that protecting or increasing 
income is the most important factor whoi considering Arm managemœt decisions. 
Conservation issues are important, but adequate income is their first consideration. 
Farmers believe they should have the main responsibility for protecting the soil 
(Table 37). They believe, however, society should help with the costs of soil conservation. 
Society can also help by creating an environment that is conducive to the support of good 
conservation practices. Farmers generally need financial incoitives to adopt good 
conservation practices. Without them, they will tend to farm in ways that maximize income 
rather than necessarily support good conservation. 
9 6  
Table 36. Landowner^ Woodbury County; Training and support givai for performing 
required maintenance tasks (n=o) 
Questions YES NO 
Weie you initially instructed how to perform routine maintenance? 2 6 
Have you received continued maintenance training and support? 0 8 
ses The District Commsioners 
Who provided your initial instruction? 2 0 
Many of the farmers interviewed in Woodbury County are cynical about government 
efforts to promote conservation and good land management They believe those farmers 
who plowed all the land they could, tore out terraces, and planted fence row to fence row in 
response to govemment-^nsored production incentives were directly responsible for the 
rapid deterioration of many of the watershed structures. Yet it is these farmers today who 
aie receiving much of the help to put in teraces and to adopt other conservation practices. 
These farmers have been doubly rewarded: first, they reaped high profits by expanding their 
cropland and maximizing production, which also established a large com base on which they 
could receive deficiency payments, and second they received financial assistance to 
implement a range of conservation practices. Those farmers who consistently practiced good 
conservation have only their sense of stewardship for a reward. The farmers' cynicism 
reinforces their belief that government should maintain the watershed structures. From their 
perspective, it was government policies that created excessive erosion problems. 
Private property and public intavention The f^ers have varying pa*ceptions on 
the question of who owns the structures (Table 38). Most farmers believe the structures 
belong to the government A common re&ain was: "It [the government] built them; it should 
take care of them." Consequently, it is acceptable for govenmient to properly maintain the 
structures. On the other hand, farmers who indicated they owned the structures seemed to 
have a stronger sense of personal responsibility for the structures. 
Farmers indicate support for government inta-vention to regulate private bdiavior 
when that behavior is not publicly responsible (Table 39). When land-use practices become 
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too destructive, many farmers believe government can act as a safety valve to ensure that 
land is used properly. Farmers do not like government intervention, but they recognize 
increased r^ulation of farm operations may be necessary in the future to minimize damage 
to the environment 
One farmer said that as individuals, farmers have the right to use land as they see fit. 
How they use it may not always be good for the land, but they still have the right 
Table 37. Landowners, Woodbury County: Perceived responsibilities for conservation and 
suggested conservation responsibilities society and landowners should assume 
(n=8) 
Who has prime responsibility to protect soil resources for future generations? 
Society Joint responsibility Landowner 
1 2 5 
What should societv do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
become informed about conservation - 3 
legislation - 2 
provide fimds for programs - 2 
establi^ and enforce regulations - 4 
monitor practices - 2 
What should landowners do to protect soil resources? Times mentioned 
conservation tillage practices - 6 
crop rotations - 3 
minimal chemical inputs - 3 
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Table 38. Landowners, Woodbury County: Parceived ownership of the watershed 
structures (n=8) 
Question Government Landowner Both 
Who owns the watershed structures 
on your land? 5 3 0 
Table 39. Landowners, Woodbury County: Responses to statements about private property 
and public intervention (n=8) 
Statemmts Agree Disagree 
Conservation is a local/landowner issue and the federal 
govanment should stay out of it 2 6 
Because taxpayers benefit from conventional Arming 
practices, they should bear the expense of repairing tfie 
soil erosion that results from these practices. 4 4 
The federal government has the responsibility to saf^uard 
the public's investment in watersh^ structures by 
ensuring that they are used and maintained properly. 7 1 
The American former works primarily for himself and 
hence can use the land as he sees fit to maximize his profit 1 7 
Because agriculture is dependent on the environment, farm 
operations should be r^ulated to minimize damage to the 
environmait 6 2 
Macro-influMices Farmers indicated that macro-economic forces have had a 
profound influence on forming practices in Woodbuiy County and on the viability of the 
structures in the little Sioux area (Table 40). When cattle prices dropped, raising cattle 
became unprofitable. Because subsidies were available for row crops, farmers plowed 
grassland to plant row crops to obtain government payments. The high subsidies paid 
through government programs stimulated excess production to maximize profit Much land 
9 9  
that was plowed should not have been. The result was increased soil erosion which filled 
structures more quickly than planned. Low farm prices forced even more cultivation and 
greater use of chemical inputs to maximize production and income. 
Many farmers feel isolated and alienated. Woodbury County has grown increasingly 
urban, and the influence and needs of Sioux City tend to dominate the social and political 
agenda. Farmers believe political power is concentrated in the urban area, and the rural areas 
receive little attrition and few of the available benefits and resources. 
Table 40. Landowners, Woodbury County: Macro-influences respmsible for changes in 
cropping practices and their impact on watershed structures (n=8) 
Primarv influences for change Times mentioned 
economic factors - 7 
government production programs - 3 
Results of these changes for watershed structures Times maitioned 
increased row cropping - 6 
increased soil erosion - 2 
increased siltation of watershed structures - 2 
Summarv 
The consensus across respondents in Woodbury County is that maintenance of 
watershed structures is gaierally adequate. Non-farmers believe problems with maintaiance 
usually reside with the farmers and their unwillingness to initiate good conservation practices 
or to take greater responsibility for maintenance of the structures. The farmers, however, 
provide a dissenting perspective. They believe they are constrained by economic 
considerations and SCS does not take their input seriously.. 
The major problem is what to do when major rqmr and replacement costs have to be 
met The supervisors and the district commissioners believe the federal government created 
many of the problems with the structures. The govanment persuaded farmers to initially 
become involved in the program; the government imposed the conditions unde which the 
program would operate; and government farm policies rewarded those who exploited the 
land, which caused much of the current concern about the viability of the structures. 
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Because of these factors, the supervisors and the commissioners believe the fedoal 
government should take responsibility for major repairs and for replacement 
Finally, Woodbury County respondents are generally accq)ting of the govanment's 
right to intervene to ensure proper use of the land. The farmers may not like it, and they may 
complain, but these same farmers can suggest no other viable alternative. 
Summary 
This section discusses key issues raised by the research questions and describes the 
similarities and differences which exist across the three counties. Li general, there appear to 
be more similarities than di^œnces. The issues are interrelated but are separated here for 
the purpose of discussion. 
Obligations for maintenance 
There is general agreemoit that the local conservation district has prime responsibility 
for maintenance of the structures. The definition of responsibility, however, differs between 
the district and SCS. The districts believe their responsibility extends primarily to routine 
maintenance items such as rq)airing the bam (the soil at water's edge), cutting weeds and 
brush, and patching holes. They believe SCS should have responsibility for expensive 
repairs, such as major washouts, collapsed chutes, major leaks, and for replacement of the 
structures. The districts believe they have inadequate resources for these maintenance and 
operation responsibilities. SCS disagrees with this conclusion. Its official position is that 
maintenance, including replacement, is a local responsibility, which should include the 
county boards of supervisors as well. 
The county boards of supervisors, for their part, are satisfied with the current 
arrangements. They maintain road structures and let the districts and SCS maintain 
structures on private land. In two counties, Monona and Woodbury, the supervisors 
provide financial assistance to the district to help them carry out their maintenance 
responsibility. Budget constraints and political considerations prevent the supervisors from 
doing more. In addition, the supervisors do not feel bound by maintenance agreements that 
have been signed with the Soil Conservation Smdce sometime in the past An opinion by 
the Iowa Attorney General concludes that a current county board is not encumbered by the 
decisions of a previous county board and hence is not obligated to provide maintenance 
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funds (Norby 1986). The supervisors, therefore, are more interested in negotiating informal 
local agreemaits that are in the best interests of the local actors, irrespective of federal 
mandates and agreements with fedoal agencies. 
SCS, the district commissioners, and the supervisors would like the landowner to 
take more responsibility for routine maintenance. In Ida and Woodbury Counties, where 
farmers have paid into a long-term maintenance fund, there is more resistance from the 
farmers for assuming maintenance responsibilities. Since these farmers have paid for 
maintenance, they believe someone else should implement maintenance activities. In 
Monona County, where a one-time maintenance fee was paid, there may be more support 
fiom the landowners for taking greater maintenance responsibilities. However, long-time 
participants in the program counter they were told at the beginning of the program SCS 
would take care of maintenance and the farmer would not have to worry about it Hence, 
these farm^s are reluctant to assume maintenance responsibilities. New owners of 
structures in all three counties have received little if any information or direction about 
maintenance responsibilities. 
During the past 40 years, the patterns of interaction between all actors have shaped 
and reinforced expectations for the maintenance of the watershed structures. Curroitly, the 
informal agreements and experiences of the local actors play a much greater role in allocating 
maintaiance responsibilities than do the formal paper agreements that were signed in the 
past. 
Linkages between actors 
Ida County presents a unique example of continuity of relations and of a concerted 
effort among the the supervisors, the conservation district, and SCS to work cooperatively. 
As a result, there is a greater focus and purpose to activities related to the watershed program 
in Ida County. By contrast, in Monona County whae there is a long history of animosity 
between the supervisors, the conservation district, and SCS, the result is fear and suspicion. 
The commissioners are intimidated by the supa-visors and have withdrawn contact As a 
result, there is littie cooperative effort to address issues of mutual concern. In Woodbury 
County, a rural-urban dichotomy has the supervisors focused primarily on urban concerns, 
and they leave watershed concerns to the Soil Conservation Service. They have hired 
someone to represent their interests and to assume their maintenance responsibilities. In this 
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way, the Woodbury supavisors are uninvolved in the actual deliberations and decision­
making process related to the care and maintenance of the watershed structures. 
In all counties, the Arme is accorded the role of sc^goat, both for initially 
destroying the land and then being reluctant to make changes necessary to correct soil 
erosion problems. As a result, relations are not always harmonious between farmers and 
ses and the commissioners. Farmes look on outsiders with su^icion and with a certain 
amount of doision. For their part, farmers want to be accorded the respect they feel is their 
due. 
Responsibilities for soil conservation 
By genoal agreement, the landowner has prime responsibility for soil conservation. 
The issue is in defining conservation, responsibility, and the limits of that responsibility. 
Those interviewees who do not make their living from the land (the county boards of 
supervisors and SCS personnel) described the land in more poetic terms than the farmers. 
Farmers and commissioners who earn their livelihood from the land expressed a range of 
saitiments from the poetic to the pragmatic. Each farmer also described how he or she must 
resolve the need to use the land to make a profit and at the same time preserve the soil for 
future generations. No respondent had a clear answer for how best to do this. 
County boards of supervisors are supportive of conservation until it begins to cost 
more money than they perceive the county can afford. Counties lack resources, and, most 
importantly, the supervisors are unwilling to face the political consequences of higher taxes. 
As a result, the supervisors believe funding for the watershed program should come 
primarily from tiie federal government In this respect, they express a sentiment held by 
most of those intoviewed throughout the region: paymait for conservation is ultimately the 
business of the federal government Local citizens can do their part, but it is a very small 
part in comparison to the responsibility accorded the federal government 
Private propertv and public intervention 
There is no real consensus about who owns the structures. As a result, there is a 
range of opinion about the desirability of the fedoal government using private land for the 
public good. Those interviewed did agree that because the government built the structures, it 
has the right to ensure that the structures are used and maintained properly. Farmers did not 
express resentment at the government for maintaining the structures. Many, however, do 
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resent what they perceive to be an imposed obligation for them to assume maintenance 
responsibilities. 
Farmas did ««press resentment about the increased into-voition of the public telling 
them how to farm. At the same time, fiarmers recognized that society is more concerned 
about off-farm impacts of farming practices and that if farmers do not voluntarily change 
their practices, they will be forced to change by govemmoit regulations. 
Macro-influences 
There was general agreement that economic changes which were reinforced by 
government programs helped to concœtrate production, increase farm size, and stimulate 
increased production of row crops. Together these factors were a major cause of increased 
soil erosion in the littie Sioux watershed and the fasta'-than-planned deterioration of many 
of the watershed structures. As a result of these changes, the local sponsors and landowners 
question how much maintenance and rq)lacement responsibility should rightiy be theirs. 
The structures were built to one set of economic and environmental conditions. When the 
conditions changed, the original assumptions were no longer valid. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A GROUNDED THEORY OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation studies ask "Why did it happen this way?" (Van Meter and Van Horn 
1975:448). The purpose of this dissertation is to derive a grounded theory of policy 
implementation that answo^ why the policy objectives of the little Sioux Watershed project 
were not implemented as intended. Using the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5, this 
chapter develops a grounded theory to explain the implementation of the Little Sioux 
Watershed project A more general theory is then derived to explain the implemaitadon 
process in other situations whoie local sponsors are obligated to assume responsibility for 
federal programs. The chapter first addresses the question of what policy objectives were 
not achieved in the Little Sioux Watched project 
Policy Objectives not Achieved 
The legislation which created the Little Sioux Watershed project required that the 
operation and maintenance of the watershed structures must be the responsibility of a local 
sponsor (House Document No. 268,78th Congress 1943:2). The designated local sponsor 
for the project was the soil conservation district in each county. For each watershed project, 
the district signed an agreement with the Soil Conservation Sovice stating that "the local soil 
conservation district will operate and maintain works of improvement installed under the 
work plan, through arrangements with individual landowners and with cooperating 
agencies" (Flood Prevention Operations Guide 1962:16). The district entered into 
agreements with boards of supervisors, the Iowa Highway Commission, and railroads that 
required these agencies to operate and maintain structures built on their right-of-ways. The 
district retained the responsibility to "maintain works of improvement installed on fermlands 
using funds provided by landowners in a subwatershed through recorded farmer-district 
agreements" (Flood Prevention Operations Guide 1962:17). Agreements between the district 
and individual landowners obligate the landowner to make payments to a maintenance fund 
which provided for the operation and maintenance of the watershed improvements installed 
in their subwatershed (Maintenance Agreement 1977). The agreement with a landowner did 
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not obligate the landowner to perform maintenance tasks. Farmers interviewed for this study 
indicated that requests for them to help with maintenance tasks were conveyed votally. 
Maintenance is defined by SCS as: 
Work required to keep works of improvement in, or restore them to, their original 
physical and functional condition. 
Maintenance includes performance of work and application of measures to prévoit 
deterioration as well as restoring, rebuilding, replacing, and putting together parts 
that have been torn, broken or deteriorated (Opôation and Maintenance Handbook 
1971:1). 
Specific maintenance functions include the following: 
1. Reseed or resod and fertilize those areas that do not have an adequate stand 
of desirable vegetation where necessary, eroded areas must be restored 
before reseeding w resodding. This may require hand worldng and 
reshaping steq) areas. 
2. Cut or spray un(tesirable v^etation, trees and brush witli {^proved 
herbicides. 
3. Fertilize v^etation as required to maintain a vigorous stand 
4. Control grazing to insure proper vegetation growth. 
5. Mow vegetation as needed to maintain optimum cover and for desired uses. 
6. Repair areas of slides, slips, bulges, or excessive settlement on earth fills. 
Take action to eliminate causes of such deficiencies. 
7. Replace eroded naturals from gutters, and other areas and reseed as needed. 
8. Replace soil removed by rodents. 
9. Restore concrete that has deteriorated. 
10. Repair and replace concrete that has been displace, broken or otherwise 
damaged. 
11. Remove and replace damaged rodent guard on the drain die outlet 
12. Repaint all surfaces requiring protection by paint, as needed. 
13. Rqjair or replace damaged or deteriorated guard rail components (Operation 
and Maintenance Agreemoit 1985). 
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Data from interviews with SCS personnel and with district commissioners indicate 
that SCS continues to repair sq)arated concrete pipes and chutes, serious seepage on dams, 
undermined pipes or chutes, and serious benn erosion. The expectation at the local level is 
that SCS should continue to fix these kinds of problems. SCS personnel disagree. They 
are concerned that local qwnsors have not assumed full responsibility for maintenance, and 
they are concerned that some maintenance task are not being done. These personnel cite the 
following examples to documait their concern: dams overgrown with trees and brush, 
overgrazing, areas in need of reseeding, and pipes needing to be replaced. 
The policy objectives, therefore, that have not been implemented as intended by the 
original legislation are: 
1. local sponsors have not assumed control and responsibility for the operation 
and maintenance of the wato-shed structures as specified by Uie orig^ 
legislation, and 
2. maintaiance tasks are not being completed as specified in the agreements 
between local sponsors and the Soil Conservation Service. 
SCS continues to be more involved in the operation and maintoiance of the 
watershed structures than it would like or believes it should in terms of the enabling 
l^islation and of the implemaiting documaits that describe the responsibilities of local 
sponsors and of SCS. A grounded theory wiU be derived to explain: 
1. why local sponsors have not assumed full control of the operation and 
maintenance program, and 
2. why the Soil Conservation Service continues to have a high level of 
involvement with the operation and maintaiance of the watershed program. 
Before discussing the theory, it should be noted that local sponsors believe they are 
adequately maintaining the watershed structures. Thus, the perspective assumed in this 
chapter is that of SCS, which believes the watershed structures are not adequately 
maintained. The local perspective will be integrated as part of the daived theory. 
1 0 7  
The Initial Theory - Woodbury County 
As described in Chapter 3, the grounded theory will be developed by first reviewing 
the data from Woodbury County to derive an initial theory and then to refîne the initial 
theory through comparisons with data from Ida and Monona counties. 
Conrad (1978:102-103) describes the process as follows. As concepts emerge from 
the data or as data emerge that fît existing concqits, the researcher begins to describe the 
theoretical properties of the concept, its dimensions, its relationships to other concepts, and 
the conditions under which it is pronounced or minimized. The process involves returning 
to the original data as often as is necessary to bring closure to the theory. The further 
refinement of concepts and their interrelationships gradually leads to the development of 
theory. 
The initial analysis of Woodbury County's data yielded seven concepts to explain 
why the original policy requiring local responsibility for the operation and maintenance of 
the watershed structures was not successfully implemented. The concepts are: disparity of 
objectives, entanglement, false e?q)ectations, locus of ownership, non-adaptation, non-
institutionalization, and use of private property. The derivation and explanation of each 
concept follows. 
Disparity of objectives 
Disparity of objectives refers to the differing perspectives local residents and SCS 
have regarding why the structures were originally built and their continuing importance in 
the area. 
The watershed structures were built to control flooding and to reduce soil erosion in 
the Littie Sioux Watershed (House Document No. 268,78th Congress 1943). In the 
opinion of many long-time area residents interviewed for this study, bad the severe gullying 
and erosion been allowed to continue and the structures not been built, the area would be 
uninhabitable today. Thus, the initial concern for local residents was to preserve the area as 
a place to live and to work. Once completed, the structures performed as inten^d, 
eliminating major problems with flooding and severe erosion. In the words of one long­
time resident and farmer: 
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The structures saved the land in this pM of Iowa. There used to be a tremendous 
amount of mud that would flow when it rained. Now there is none. There would 
have been nothing left in this part of the country if nothing had bera done. 
With this objective achieved, however, £umers and other area residents have become 
less concerned about the structures and their continuing viability. Six of the eight 
landowners said that because the structures continue to conbol flooding, they do not worry 
or think much about them. Maint^iance issues are thus not a concern for them. The 
structures have performed well ova the years, even when nearly filled with silt, and these 
fiymers see no reason why the structures cannot continue to protect the area. 
ses pm-sonnel, on the other hand, understand the value of the structures in a more 
general sense. For them, the structures represent a conmiitment to saving soil SCS built 
these structures as part of their organizational conunitment to prevent soil erosion. Local 
SCS persormel describe the structures in engineering terms, and they are well aware of the 
problems that can result from impropa care. 
Personal values interact with and reinforce professional values to solidify a 
commitment to soil conservation as an end in itself. One SCS official was described by a 
landowner as "being married to soil consavation." When asked to talk about what land 
means to tiiem and what their reqwnsibilities are to it, SCS personnel indicated a strong 
stewardship ethic to preserve and take care of the land. Their stewardship ethic is more 
prwiounced than for many of the farmers in Woodbury County who described land in more 
functional terms. One a 10 point scale measuring percQ>tions of land with 1 being land 
merely as an input of commodity production and 10 being land as a living organism, SCS 
personnel averaged 9.3 while farmers averaged 7.8. 
A strong organizational and personal commitment to the watershed program sustains 
SCS's involvement with the projects to ensure that the structures are maintained properly 
and that the structures will continue to protect the land. In contrast, local residents see the 
structures as fulfilling a function. Since the function is bdng met, there is little sustaining 
interest in the structures. As a result, landowners are content to let SCS or the district 
maintain the structures. 
Entanglemait 
Entanglement refers to SCS's continuing involvement with the local sponsor 
compromising its ability to assume indq)endent decision-making. For the purpose of this 
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analysis, independence refos to the ability to make and implement decisions without 
recourse to another agency for authority or resources. Bitanglement has meant that the 
conservation district has been unable to establish itself as an independait entity, and that 
ses has been unable to remove itself from the waterdied program. 
ses has assumed responsibility for correcting problems in watershed structures 
when the problems are caused by a design deficiency. Because design deficiency criteria 
change as new design techniques and technologies are adopted, SCS has continually helped 
maintain the structures since shortly after the program began. Because the district did not 
have to pay for these repairs, it has been a willing participant in this arrangement 
The percq)tion by landowners is that SCS is the dominant organization. Initial 
maintenance instructions were provided by SCS to two landowners, and five of Ae eight 
landowners indicated that SCS establishes priority for watershed maintenance activities. 
Two of the five believe SCS should establish maintenance priorities. In the words of one 
farmer: "The district is just a formality. If you want to get something done, you go to 
SCS." 
As described by one SCS official, when funds were available, SCS was willing to 
perform maintenance tasks because it wanted to "get the job done and to do it right" 
However, as funds have become less available and problems more numerous, SCS is less 
willing to provide maintenance. The district, however, has not gained the independence and 
control of resources it would need to completely assume this responsibility. Three of the 
four e^qperiaiced commissioners (The fifth was just recently elected.) indicated that funding 
is a major concern for them. 
The district lacks an independent source of funds. The conservation district was 
formed at the request of the federal government to act as local representative for soil 
conservation programs. Because it has no taxing authority, it must depend on other 
govemmmt entities for the resources needed to carry out mandated programs. The district 
does have a maintenance fund, but it is not adequate for major expenses. A related factor is 
the extent of control the district has over its funds. Some commissioners and several 
farmers in Woodbury County expressed the opinion that the commissioners do not always 
have the decision-making power they should in spending district money. Their po-ception 
is that SCS makes the decisions and then informs the district about the action it has takoi. 
One commissioner described interaction between the district and SCS as "a colonial 
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relationship." Such action, or the belief that such action exists, saves to reinforce the 
pa-ception and/or the reality of dqpaidency. 
SCS's continuing involvemoit with the maintenance program is also a function of its 
mandate to represent the public interest in matters of soil conservation. As described by one 
member of the board of supervisors and confirmed by five of eight farmers, the federal 
government needs to be involved in conservation issues to mediate between conflicting 
interests and to support conservation concerns. This responsibility and expectation makes it 
difficult for ses not to aisure that the maintenance of the structures is adequate. 
ses is a formal organization and thus has its own office, technical and support staff, 
support vdiicles, and necessary equipmait to help it cany out its tasks. The district has 
only a state clerk to provide staff support, and she works out of the SCS office. For 
supplies and equipment and for management and technical support, the district must go to 
SCS. The littie Sioux area does not provide an adequate resource base to support the 
technical and organizational needs of the district As a result, SCS and the district are 
inexorably bound together, and SCS is over-responsible for the affairs of the district 
False expectations 
False expectations describe the promises made by SCS to landowners and to the 
district that, in contrast to the intent of the enabling l^slation, SCS would assume major 
responsibility for maintenance. 
An SCS official described how farmers were approached about the watershed 
program. He said: "SCS made a lot of promises to get things started. People got it for 
nothing, and they want to keep getting it for nothing." The expectation was conveyed by 
SCS in the b^inning of the program that it would help maintain the watershed structures. 
This percqjtion was confirmed by two otha local SCS personnel and by three of the eight 
farmers. Farmers who were reluctant to commit to the program were assured by SCS that 
they would have no worries; SCS would take care of everything. On that basis, many 
farmers agreed to participate in the program. However, the expectation was set for many 
farmers that maintenance was not their responsibility. As a result, they have been more than 
willing to have someone else perform maintenance tasks. They themselves have a minimum 
commitmait 
As described by one commissioner: "The rules were changed in the middle of the 
game" and SCS began to require the district and landowners to perform maintenance 
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responsibilities specified in the l^islation and project agreements. As a result, many 
landowners and commissioners feel misled, and they have not been cooperative. 
SCS's willingness to repair design deficiaicy problems reinforced the pacq)tion 
that it would assume responsibility for most maintenance obligations. 
Locus of ownership 
Locus of ownership refers to the perception by landowners that because the 
govemmoit paid to construct the dams, the structures belong to the government along with 
the responsibility to maintain them. 
Five of eight landowners believe they do not own the watershed structures on their 
land, ses and the district are attempting to change this perception for structures built more 
recentiy. They are getting more cooperation and better understanding now, but there is littie 
change in landowners' perceptions for those structures built early in the program. 
For many landowners, the perception of non-ownership and hence non-
responsibility is reinforced by paying into the maintenance fund. Two landowners indicated 
that because they pay a maintenance fee, they should have no maintenance responsibility. 
From their perspective, their paymœt absolves them of any significant maintenance 
responsibility. Some farmers are willing to hdp, just to be helpful, but the prime 
responsibility resides with SCS and/or the district 
Again, this perception has been rdnforced by SCS's continuing involvement with 
the watershed program to provide maintoiance for (tesign deficiencies. 
Non-adaptation 
The formal interpretation of who has maintaiance responsibility for the watershed 
structures has remained constant Non-adaptation, therefore, refm to the constancy of the 
policy's formal interpretation even as the conditions which gave rise to the original policy 
changed. The social, economic, and environmental conditions which shaped the content of 
the original policy changed significantiy over the 40 year life of the project The formal 
policy, however, did not As a result, local sponsors believe they are justified in changing 
their interpretation of the policy to fit the new realities. 
The structures were built to last SO years. The design of the structures assumed that 
most of the land would be in grass and that row crops would be minimal. When changing 
economic conditions favored the plowing of grassland to plant row crops, silt runoff 
1 1 2  
increased significantly, particularly if there was inadequate land treatment As a result, the 
structures collected silt at a much faster rate than planned. Several structures are akeady 
filled or nearly so. 
Commissioners and landowners believe the production policies of government farm 
programs stimulated much of the increased cultivation of the land. Government actions thus 
served to undermine the district's efforts to promote conservation and to protect the 
structures. Four commissioners believe that because government policy hastened the 
deterioration of the structures, the district is absolved of at least some of their maintenance 
reqx)nsibilities. Many landowners agree with this conclusion. A commait made by four of 
the eight landowners was that government policy forced the deterioration of the structures; 
thus the government should fix them. 
Local ses personnel generally agree with this explanation for the rapid deterioration 
of the watershed structures. 
The reluctance to change also impacts the maintenance fee structure and collection 
process. The revenue gmaating capability of the commissioners has not changed to keep 
pace with their increased financial needs. New funding mechanisms have beai created at the 
state level enabling organized watersheds to tax themselves for maintenance puiposes (Code 
of Iowa 1987), but no Little Sioux area watershed has adopted this procedure. Landowners 
do not want to pay higher taxes, and, since seven of those interviewed believe maintenance 
is the federal government's responsibility, they have little incentive to support a tax increase. 
Because landowners are contrat with the current practice, commissioners are reluctant to 
make changes. 
Non-institutinnaliyarinn 
Non-institutionalization refers to the non-standardization at the local level of 
operating procedures and responsibilities. Non-institutionalization has affected the local 
sponsors, landowners, and SCS. As a result, continuity in the program has been 
compromised. The lack of standard operating procedures is partly the result of the 
dq>aident relationship between the district and SCS and the consequait inability of the 
district to establish itself as an indq)aident entity. 
One manifestation of non-institutionalization is a lack of consensus about what to do 
with structures needing to be replaced either because of age or because they are filled with 
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silt The district and SCS each looks to the other to take responsibility for a decision and the 
consequent action. In the mean time, needed action is not being taken. 
Neither SCS nor the district have established themselves as distinct agencies with 
many farmers. Farmers know individuals who answer their questions or solve their 
problems, but they are uncertain with which agency these individuals are associated. Thus 
individuals sometimes represent their own perspective and not that of the agency they 
represent As a result, clients have varying experiences with receiving assistance. The 
agency may over- or undeicommit its resources leaving one client with more help than 
he/she should have and another with less. 
Lack of training for the commissioners contributes to the non-standardization of 
procedures. Commissioners learn their responsibilities on the job from veteran 
commissioners. Thus, the quality and consistency of training is not maintained. 
Socialization is an informal process with little control over what commissioners are or are 
not learning. There is also a lack of training for landowners. Only two indicated receiving 
initial instruction for performing maintenance activities. No landowner indicated receiving 
any continued training or support 
Usgpf private prppgity 
The final concept refers to the landowners' belief that their land is theirs to use as 
they like and that the government ultimately does not have the right to tell them how to use 
it 
This perception was best stated by one farmer who said: "Farmers have the right to 
use the land as they see fit, even if they do not exercise that right appropriately!" As an 
example, one farmer said that he needed the pond created by the structure on his land to 
water his cattle. Regardless of what SCS or the district said, he would use it for that 
purpose. Other farmers indicated they believe SCS is too restrictive in how it permits land 
around the structures to be used. 
The priority most farmers give to economic considerations when making farm 
management decisions is an indication of farmers' belief that land is primarily an economic 
input to be managed to maximize returns. Five of the eight farmers indicated that while 
conservation is important, they still must make money and hence consovation is for them 
secondary to profits. 
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With r^ard to the structures, farm^s will tolerate them if they do not substantially 
affect farmers' profits. When profits are compromised, farmers will take what remedial 
action is needed to maintain the profitability of their farming enterprise. If the action 
compromises the viability of a structure, it is of little concern to farmers. Minimal concern is 
made easier by the perception that the structures primarily belong to the government and that 
someone other than the farmer is responsible for maintaining the structures. 
Data from Ida and Monona County will next be examined before presetting die final 
discussion of the theory. 
Ida County 
The implementation of the watershed program in Ida County was similar to 
Woodbury County. No new information was learned from the Ida County data that would 
significantiy alter the ctmclusions resultiing from the analysis of Woodbury County data. 
As in Woodbury County, the majority of Ida County landowners believe that 
maintenance of the watershed structures is primarily the responsibility of the soil 
conservation district or of the Soil Conservation Service. Hence, landowners' willingness 
to assume anything but routine maintenance tasks is minimal Two landowner indicated 
they were unwilling to accq)t even minimal responsibility. Reinforcing this position is the 
belief Aat the structures belong to the government, and the government should tiius take 
responsibility to maintain them. Landowners were willing to paiticipate in the program 
because it would solve gully problems on their land. Once this problem was solved, the 
structures and the problems they were built to solve, Wed in importance. M^tenance of 
the watershed sti-uctures is a low priority for most farmra- respondents. Finally, Ida County 
landowna-s believe they retain the right to use their land as a production input to maximize 
their profits. Five farmers recognize they must farm responsibly, but profits must come 
before conservation. 
The importance of the initial expectation concept is reinforced by the fact that five 
farmers did remember being told by SCS that they would have maintenance responsibilities. 
These farmers indicated a greate willingness to assume some of the maintenance 
responsibilities than those who had no similar recollection. 
The Ida County conservation disbict, like the Woodbury County district, was not 
able to establish itself as an independent agency in terms of controlling its decision-making 
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and resources, and it remains dépendait on SCS for technical and management assistance. 
ses is percâved as the dominant agency. Five of seven landowners believe SCS 
does and should establish maintenance priorities. All five commissioners believe SCS will 
need to fimd major repairs or replacement of structures. The board of supervisors, also, 
believe SCS should fund major maintenance expenses. The supervisors are unwilling to 
provide county funds for maintenance of structures on private land. 
The good working relationships that exist between the board of supervisors, SCS, 
and the district commissioners make for a positive work environment, but the basic 
expectations and dq)endencies remain unchanged. 
The commissioners aie veary aware that increased soil erosion is a result of economic 
conditions and government programs which favored maximum production of row crops. 
Though the problem has not been as serious as in Woodbury County, because of the relative 
newness of the structures and a greater emphasis on adequate land treatment, the 
commissions^ are well aware that they face serious problems in the future. All five 
commissioners believe Ae responsibility for maintenance should be changed to reflect this 
changed external reality. 
SCS remains responsible for some maintaiance obligations of the district relative to 
the watershed program. SCS has assumed this responsibility because its organizational 
mandate is to solve soil erosion problems and because no viable altanative agency exists to 
provide the management and technical assistance needed by the district SCS's willingness 
to repair design deficiencies set the expectation early in the program that local sponsors 
would not be responsible for all maintenance problems. As such, the district let SCS 
perform as many maintenance tasks as it was willing, which served to reinforce the original 
expectation. 
In summaiy, though the formal policy has not changed, the implementation of the 
watershed program in Ida County has been changed by the local actors to fit local conditions 
and local perceptions of responsibilities to the mandates of the program. Local sponsors do 
not have the level of responsibility envisioned by the original legislation. 
Monona County 
The basic trends evident in Woodbury and Ida Counties are present in Monona 
County as well. A discussion of these trends will not be repeated here. A new concept 
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which emerged from die Monona County data and which has a significant impact on the 
implementation of the watershed program will be discussed instead. 
In all counties, a reliable or stable source of finances is an important issue to the 
district commissioners. In Monona County, however, it is a paramount issue as a perceived 
lack of adequate funds paralyzes the commissioners, oftoi preventing them fh>m needed 
action. Hence, the additional concept to be adopted for this study is: perceived financial 
security. 
Perceived financial security is the confidence, real or imagined, that adequate 
funding will be available to cover anticipated ejqpoiditures. 
In Monona County, maintenance for the watershed structures was initially funded by 
the board of supervisors (Lamp 1948). As a result, a minimal financial commitmoit was 
required from farmers who participated in the program. In the first few years of the 
program, this was an adequate source of fimds. However, the State Comptroller challenged 
the legality of the method used by the supervisors to raise and q)end maintenance funds. As 
a result, the supervisors stopped raising maintenance funds through a tax levy. 
A second attempt was made to generate maintenance funds by tax levy. The Code of 
Iowa permits counties to impose a 1/4 mill levy on all agricultural land for the purpose of 
maintaining watershed structures. Whoi die Monona County supovisors levied this tax, the 
wording of the law was successfully challenged in court and so again the county stopped 
taxing county residents for maintenance expenses. Instead, the supervisors agreed to use 
state funds to make an annual contribution to the district to help with maintenance expoises. 
The amount of the contribution is comparable to what would be raised through the 1/4 mill 
levy. The supavisors have made an annual contribution for the past several years. 
The division between hill people and lowland people provided added incentive for 
the supervisors not to use county funds for the maintenance of upland watershed structures. 
As well, a long history of poor relationships between the board, the district, and SCS 
exacerbated diffaences and made it more difficult to resolve common issues. Currently the 
supervisors and the commissioners communicate only by mail. 
The commissioners have a relatively small amount of funds available to them from 
the initial contributions of farmers. In addition, they are uncatain about the continuing 
support of the board of supervisors. These realities, coupled with the history of uncertainty 
about maintenance funds, has made the commissioners reluctant to spend money for 
maintenance. Four Monona commissioners said they prorate maintenance expenses. Other 
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districts, by contrast, are relatively comfortable with their financial position. The 
commissioners perceive they have adequate funding for the maintenance taslfs for which 
they believe they are le^nsible. All the commission's recognize they cannot finance 
major rqiairs and replacements, but they do not perceive this as their responsibility and so 
are less concerned. In Monona County, however, the commissioners are uncertain if they 
even have adequate funds for those responsibilities they have assumed. 
Haice, the concq)t of perceived financial security is an important dimension in 
trying to understand why local sponsors have not assumed more control of the 
implemaitation of the watershed program. To the extent that local qwnsors perceive their 
funds to be adequate for maintenance, to that extait are they willing to spend within those 
limits. When this is not the case, when a district perceives it has inadequate funds, it will 
curtail spending, even for maintenance which objectively it should be able to complete. The 
concqpt also explains why districts limit thdr sense of responsibility for maintoiance. The 
extent of their responsibility is bounded by the po'ceived availability of funds. All districts 
believe they have inadequate funds for major items, hence the perceived limit of their 
responsibility stops at that point 
The perceived financial security also has relevance for the other actors. The 
supervisors are reluctant to over-commit themselves to fund maintaiance because they do 
not want to raise taxes, or compromise the financial int^rity of the county by spending 
money they do not have. Landowners place financial integrity above other consid^ations. 
Most are willing to cooperate only to the point they paceive their cooperation will be a 
financial burden. And finally, SCS is bounded by its percq)tion of financial security. 
When funds were adequate, several local SCS personnel indicated the agency was willing to 
spaid for maintenance tasks. Now that funds are scarce, it wants to limit its obligations and 
invoke the original und^standings. 
Another concq)t raised by the Monona County data is the quality of working 
relationships between actors. In Monona County they are poor. The supervisors and the 
commissioners no longer have personal contacts and a degree of animosity exist between the 
two groups, and the supervisors and SCS personnel seldom meet In the other two 
counties, relations are adequate to excellent. In Ida County, the three main sets of actors 
meet annually to conduct business, and in Woodbury County, while there is little formal 
contact between the commissioners and the supervisors there is little animosity. The 
commissioners and SCS working relationship is accq)table. 
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The conclusion of this research is that, while important, the quality of the working 
relationships between actors at the local level is not critical to the issue of local control. It is 
a variable that operates in the background to influence other variables. In Monona County, 
the poor working relationship between the commissioners and the siq}ervisors exacerbates 
the commissioners' sense of financial insecurity. Yet the supervisors continue to support 
the maintenance program. By contrast, in Ida County, the commissioners and the 
supervisors have an excellent working relationship. Yet the supervisors provide no financial 
support for the commissioners' maintenance reqwnsibilides. 
The Grounded Theory of Policy Failure in the Little Sioux Watershed 
The concq>ts derived from the data of Woodbury, Ida, and Monona Counties 
interact in the following way to explain why local sponsors have not assumed full 
responsibility for the opaation and maintenance of the Little Sioux watershed structures. 
Local control and initiative were compromised fiom tiie b^inning of the program. 
SCS's initial promises that it would maintain the watershed structures coupled with its 
subsequoit rq)air of design deficiency problens set patterns of expectations that formed 
landowners' and commissioners' perceptions for who had ultimate responsibility to maintain 
the watershed structures. Because each actor's needs were being met, none raised serious 
objections to these arrangements. Landowners had gullies repaired and flooding stopped; 
the districts did not have to expend extra funds; boards of supervisors did not have to pay 
for maintenance and were able to have road structures build; and SCS fulfilled its mission of 
preventing soil erosion. Few landowners developed a strong sense of ownership and 
responsibility for the structures, and the counties were able to benefit from increased erosion 
control without having to pay for it 
Because of an inadequate resource and skill base, the districts were unable to 
establish themselves as indepaident agencies with regard to control of decision-making and 
resources. Each district was dependent on SCS for the knowledge and resources it needed 
to carry out its mandate to operate and maintain the watershed structures. Because its input 
was needed by the district for maintenance, SCS was unable to remove itself from the 
operation and maintmance program. In addition, SCS overtly assumed responsibility for 
some maintenance functions. This motivated the district to have SCS complete as many 
maintenance tasks as it was willing to assume. By taking responsibility for maintenance, 
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SCS obscured the distinction between itself and die district As a result, the extait of each 
agency's authority and responsibility for maintenance is now ambiguous. 
As maintenance funds became scarce relative to perceived need, each district 
redefined its domain of responsibility for maintenance to fit available funding. The 
e^qjectation was that SCS would assume responsibility for the difference. For political 
reasons, the boards of supervisors were reluctant to increase their financial support of the 
maintaiance program. 
Macro-economic factors radically changed farming practices which significantly 
increased soil erosion and applied additional pressure on the watershed structures. Farmers 
believed the land was theirs to make a profit What impact their behavior might have on 
increasing soil aosion and shortening the expected life of the watershed structures was a 
secondary concern to most farmers. The more rapid deterioration of the structures 
exacerbated weaknesses in the relationships and applied increased pressure on all actors to 
assume greater maintenance responsibilities as funds became increasingly scarce. 
As the original conditions and assumptions changed, so too did people's 
commitment and willingness to assume responsibility for the program. When the watershed 
program began, local people may have been willing to assume responsibility for the 
operation and maintenance of the structures when the potential problems seemed 
manageable. Time and circumstances changed the gravity of real and potential problems 
with the structures. In response to these changes, local actors became less willing to assume 
the responsibilities originally specified in the policy. The assumptions and conditions which 
guided the development of the original policy changed, but the expectations of the formal 
policy did not change. As a result, local actors remade the policy to better suit their needs. 
The General Derived Theory 
Data fiom the Little Sioux Watershed project are used as the basis for a grounded 
theory of policy implementation to explain why local actors fail to implement policy 
objectives as specified in the original policy. The concepts described above provide the core 
of the theory. Grounded theory may be presented in either a series of propositions or in 
discussion form (Glaser and Strauss 1967:31). The theory for this study is presented in 
discussion format 
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1. It is frequently the policy of the federal government to initiate programs at Ae 
local level with the stipulation that a local sponsor will assume reqwnsibility for the program 
once the start-up phase is complete. This requirement is part of the legislation that 
authorizes the program. The assumption is that once its obligation is completed, the federal 
govenmait will no longo* have dtiier financial or managemait responsibility for the 
program, but that it will be the responsibility of the local sponsor to continue the program as 
described in the original mandate. Often a local sponsor does not assume the responsibility 
as intended and the government must either assume responsibility for the program to oisure 
that social goals are maintained or let the local spcmsor redefine the policy to focus primarily 
on local objectives. 
2. To promote the objectives of the program, the govemmmt and local actors enter 
into agreements to work cooperatively. The respective parties to the agreement, however, 
may in fact be working toward different objectives. Local actors are primarily interested in 
solving immediate problems. They are less concerned with broad societal concerns. 
Government actors and programs, however, seek to promote the general good, which 
sometimes conflicts with local concerns or call for sacrifices which local residaits are 
unwilling to make. The disparity betweai local concens and general societal concerns can 
goierate contradictions which may undermine the original intent of the program. 
3. In the initial stages of a program, the fiedaal government is the dominant actor. It 
controls resources; it can influoice decisions about who will benefit from the program, and 
it can create expectations for the long-term implemaitation of the program. The government 
can use its power to induce participation from otherwise reluctant participants. Baiefits and 
promises outside the normal expectations of the program can be given to benefactors. When 
a local sponsor assumes responsibility for the program, it also inherits the promises and 
false expectations. If these expectations are contrary to what is needed for the local sponsor 
to effectively carry out its responsibilities, they will serve as a barrier to effective 
implementation. 
4. If the local sponsor has inadequate finances, personnel, technical and 
management expertise, authority, and equipmoit needed to carry out the responsibilities of 
the policy mandate, its operating procedures, relationships, and expectations will not be 
institutionalized and the agency may fail to establish itself as an independoit entity. As a 
result, it will remain overly dependent on the agency or agencies which dispense the needed 
resources. 
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The panceived lack of adequate funds is critical. A local agency will assume only as 
much responsibility as it perceives it can adequately finance. Available finances tend to 
define the responsibility domain rather than the dictates of the policy. 
5. The federal agency which dispenses resources and the local sponsor which 
recdves them can develop a mutually dépendait lelationdiip which curtails the freedom and 
indqiendence of both the local sponsor and the federal agency. The local sponsor needs 
technical and financial resources from the federal agency, and the federal agency needs the 
local sponsor to give it legitimacy at the local level. The mutually dependent relationship is 
debilitating for both agencies. 
6. The external conditions that influoiced the rationale for the original policy and 
shaped its development change over time. If the policy maker's understanding and 
interpretation of the policy does not accommodate these changes, the local sponsor will 
reinteipret its responsibilities in light of the changed extmial reality to best meet its needs 
and resources. 
7. Local actors who fail to develop a sense of ownership for the project or program 
will be less likely to support local initiatives to assume control and respcHisibility. If the 
perception remains that the program objectives are primarily the government's 
reqwnsibility, local actors will support the government's continuing involvement 
8. If the successful implementation of a policy in some way dq)ends on 
compromising or challenging a fundamaital tenet of our society, such as freedom to use 
private land to maximize personal gain, the shape and direction of the policy will be changed 
to accommodate the societal value rather than the value changing to accommodate the policy. 
Fundamental societal values thus provide a boundary within which the policy may be 
implemented, irrespective of the actual content of the l%islation. 
Piscussion 
Policies which require the control of a local sponsor for success but which fail to 
address the above conditions will gaierally fail to achieve the objective of local control. 
Within such an environment, local actors will reshape policy objectives to serve local 
interests and needs. This in turn will apply greater pressure on the government to maintain or 
increase its involvement with the program to assure that the program's common good is 
achieved and that what has already beai accomplished will not be compromised. This 
reaction further diminishes local autonomy and impedes local willingness or ability to assume 
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responsibility. At the same time, because it is to the advantage of the local sponsor to have 
someone else do its job, it is a willing accomplice. 
Hoice, the real relation is what is arranged at Ae local level. What is on paper is of 
little consequaice. The formal document is primarily a means to obtain money or support 
The paper itself imposes no strong sense of obligation (Berman 1978:177, Hill 1981:211, 
Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:177). This is particularly true when the federal agency is 
perceived to be inconsistmt in its enforcement of the regulations governing the program. In 
addition, local actors are well aware that many federal policies support special interests and 
thus operate at cross-puipose to one another. All respondents in this study, for example, 
spoke of the inherent contradiction between SCS's conservation policies and ASCS's 
(Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service) production policies. Local actors, also, 
are aware that the federal government readily changes policy directives to accommodate 
political considerations. Public decision-making is driven by self-interest politics and the 
realization of short-term goals (Fudge and Barrett 1981:285). Because local actors are a part 
of this same environment, they are motivated to operate in a similar fashion (Booth 1979). 
Local problems are increasingly the result of factors that local citizens cannot control 
(Krannich and Humphrey 1983:76, Summers and Branch 1984:159). As a result, local 
officials r^ularly petition the federal government to help solve thar problems (Schaipf 
1977:340). Federal agencies cultivate requests for assistance because their organizational 
character is defined through their activity (Selznick 1949:259), and their survival as an 
agency is dq)endent on their ability to consistently mobilize resources to implement 
programs and projects. Dominant societal values of equality and democracy, however, 
demand that local participants be involved in the working out of projects conducted jointly by 
federal and local agencies. Hence, many federal programs are designed to foster local 
participation and to build local capacity for solving problems. The involvement of the fedaal 
government in this process, however, may work against building local capacity and 
achieving local control. 
An overbearing federal presence can mitigate against local actors obtaining the 
expertise and resources they need to assume responsibility for a program. In addition, 
federal administrators may co-opt local sponsors by retaining control of a program to serve 
agency objectives (Selznick 1949:261). And local actors may be willing accomplices in 
allowing the federal agency to control the change process. Federal agencies provide needed 
resources enabling local resources to be used for other needs, and government intervention 
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may absolve local actors from the effort and responsibility needed to solve problems. The 
end result is that local control and responsibility is not achieved. 
The availability of federal siqxport to resolve local problems may act as a disincentive 
for local actors to solve these problems. Thus, many federal programs contain within them 
the seeds of their own destruction. These programs are designed to support local 
responsibility, yet they create dependence cm federal resources and solutions which diminish 
local initiatives and capasàty building. 
The derived theory provides an explanation for this process in the little Sioux 
watershed. Local sponsors will implement federal policy initiatives in ways which are 
consistent with their expectations of government behavior, the extent of local resources, 
their dominant values, and their paceptions for survival in a competitive economy. The 
following chapter will discuss the applicability of the theory to other situations. 
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CHAPTER Vn 
COMPARISONS WITH IMPLEMENTATION THEORIES AND LITERATURE 
This research has examined the question of why local sponsors of fedaal projects 
may not assume the d^ree of control and responsibility mandated to them by the program's 
enabling l^islation. Data 6om the little Sioux Watershed project in Western Iowa has been 
used to derive a grounded theory explaining why local sponsors redefined policy objectives 
to conform to local percq}tions of need and resources and thus did not assume the degree of 
responsibility envisioned by the legislation. A general theory of policy implementation was 
thai derived from the implemratation experience of the Little Sioux Watershed program to 
explain the policy implementation process in similar situations. The relation of these 
findings to other theories and discussions of policy implementation is the subject of this 
chapter. 
The chapter begins with a brief summary of the grounded theory: 
A Summary of the Grounded Theory 
In the Little Sioux watershed, local sponsors have been given the responsibility to 
opaate, maintain, and replace watershed structures built by the Little Sioux Watershed 
program. The local sponsor, the soil conservation districts, and the policy-making agency, 
the Soil Conservation Service, are linked by project agreements which describe for each 
project the work to be accomplished and the mutual responsibilities of each party to the 
agreemoit Whai the project is completed, the local district saids a letter to SCS indicating 
it accepts the completed structures and the responsibility to operate and maintain them. A 
current inventory of the project structures indicates varying awareness, understanding, or 
interpretation of expectations between SCS and the local soil conservation districts for 
maintenance of the structures (Joint Agreement 1988). Over time, the codified agreement of 
local responsibility for maintenance has eroded to the point where now, at least from the 
perspective of SCS, many structures are inadequately maintained, threatening the continued 
integrity of the program. 
Hght concepts were derived from the implementation experience of the Little Sioux 
watershed program to generally explain the failure of local sponsors to assume responsibility 
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for fedml projects. Hie concepts are: disparity of objectives, entanglement, false 
expectations, locus of ownership, non-adaptation, non-institutionalization, use of private 
property (immutability of dominant societal values), and perceived financial security. The 
concepts intaact in the following way. 
The agency that initiates a policy and the local sponsors who implement that policy 
may have different objectives that over the long-term impede the implemraitation of the policy 
intended by the sponsoring legislation. Federal and local interests may mesh initially, but 
over time, as the immediate problem is solved and local actors become absorbed in other 
interests and concerns, federal and local interests may diverge. Because the more global 
concerns of the initiating agency remain constant, its commitment to the policy objectives is 
unlikely to change, which may set it in opposition to the local sponsor. In the Little Sioux 
area, local interest was focused initially on stopping gully erosion and flooding. Once this 
goal was achieved, by building grade and water control structures, landowner interest in the 
structures declined. SCS, on the othra* hand, remained committed to its mission of 
preventing soil erosion and committed to preserving the integrity of the structures as one 
means to carry out this mission. 
The federal government's initial intervention to support a program can compromise 
local control. By making false promises and by initially assuming local responsibilities, a 
federal agency can create false e^)ectations for its continued involvement. Once established, 
expectations are difficult to change. In the little Sioux, SCS indicated that it would maintain 
the watershed structures and did assume maintenance responsibilities related to rq)airing 
design deficiencies problems. As a result, local sponsors and landowners, expecting 
continued government assistance and responsibility, were unwilling to accept full 
responsibility for the structures' maintenance. 
An inadequate resource base makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a local sponsor 
to establish itself as an independent aitity capable of carrying out policy mandates. The need 
for resources and technical assistance can enmesh the local sponsor with the initiating agency 
compromising the sponsor's ability to establish its independence and legitimacy. 
The Little Sioux watershed does not provide sufficiait population to support 
indepradoit soil conservation districts. In addition, the legislation which established the soil 
conservation districts envisioned a close working relationship between the districts and SCS. 
The districts' dq)aidence on SCS for support compromised their ability to act 
independently. At the same time, SCS's over-responsibility for the districts' obligations 
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compromised its ability to use its resources for other needs. The lack of guidelines defining 
each agency's authority and responsibility and the absence of established procedures to teach 
these guidelines to new generations of commissioners and landowners exacerbates the 
entanglement between the two agencies. 
If local qwnsors and citizens develop little sense of ownership for the program, they 
will be reluctant to assume responsibility for it In the little Sioux area, for example, many 
landowners believe die structures belong to the government and thus they accept minimal 
responsibility to care for them. 
If the successful implementation of a policy requires the change or modification of a 
fundamental value of our society, for example, the right to use land as a private good, local 
behavior will follow the dictates of the value rather than of the policy. In the Little Sioux 
area, individual landowners retain the right to use their land as they please even though in the 
aggregate their land use practices impair the viability of the structures. 
In summary, local sponsors and actors will redefine their responsibilities for a 
program to be consistent with their expectations of government behavior^ their available 
resources, their dominant values, and their poceptions for survival in a competitive 
economy. 
Comparisons with Other Implementation Theory and Literature 
The theory described above provides an explanation for why local sponsors of 
federal programs might not assume the degree of responsibility expected by the federal 
agency. The following section discusses these findings and the contributions of the 
grounded theory in relation to extant policy implementation theory and literature. 
Fudge and Barrett (1981:252) suggest three areas that are key to understanding the 
implementation process. They are: linkages between agencies, interaction and negotiation, 
and perception and values. In addition to these factors, the present study suggest two other 
areas that are important when considering policy implementation. The two additional areas 
are: adequacy of resources, and the external environment as a catalyst for change. These Ave 
issues will be used as a framework to discuss the grounded theory in relation to other 
implementation theory and literature. 
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Linkages between agencies 
How pendes and individuals interact for the puipose of implementing policy is of 
fundamental inqxirtance for explaining policy outcomes. Generally, the examination of 
policy implementation assumes a hierarchic relationship between the policy-making agency 
and the implementing body. Policy outcomes are measured in tangible products which 
document the policy's success or lack thereof. Problems with implementation are resolved 
through bett^ control and communication. As discussed previously, this approach assumes 
a static world controlled Aom the top-down by government officials who impose policy 
directives and assume they will be carried out The approach taken by this research assumes 
the contrary. Specifically, the research assumes it is a fluid, dynamic world wherein actors 
n^otiate to define reality to best meet current needs. As time and circumstance change those 
needs, a new order is negotiated and new alliances form. Hence, to understand policy 
implementation, one must examine and understand how agencies interact over time for the 
purpose of implemoitation. 
The reality of changing linkages draws attention to the importance of examining this 
relationship as a unit of analysis in addition to examining each implemeiting agency 
sq)arately. Hjem and Porter (1981) have devdoped the concq)t of implementation 
structures to explain such linkages. 
They (kfme implementation s^cture as "bundles of program related activities and 
parts of organizations" (Hjem and Porter 1981:211). The important aspect is not the formal 
description of how organizations relate to one another for the purpose of implementing 
policy or programs but the informal structure that actually shapes the implemaitation 
process. Implementation structures are formed for the purpose of resource exchange or to 
share in power (Fudge and Barrett 1981:256). An assumption of this perspective is that 
implemaitation structures are voluntarily joined to obtain benefits for the mutual self-interest 
of the con-joining agoicies. 
Discussion of implementation structures in the literature does not include examples of 
agencies forced to interact by l^slative fiat The l^dation creating the soil conservation 
districts functionally joined SCS and the district under the assumption that it would be 
mutually advant%eous to do so. Hie concq)ts of entanglement and non-institutionalization 
derived from the examination of the littie Sioux watershed suggest otherwise. 
Whai the policy objective is a concrete task, the creation of an implemaitation 
structure may facilitate its achievement by combining resources and skills from two or more 
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agencies. In such an instance, the implementation structure is an effective means to some 
end. Once the goal has been achieved, the joined agencies are free to establish new 
relationships in response to new needs and circumstances. 
When the policy objective, however, is the assumption of local responsibility and 
control, a tadc which requires clear authority, indepaidence of decision-making, and control 
of resources, an implemoitation structure may be debilitating because it impedes the ability 
of the local sponsor to exacise those functions needed to actually assume control and 
responsibility. In addition, if the implementation structure cannot be dissolved, the local 
sponsor is forced to remain in a relationship which compromises its independence and 
decision-making authority. And Aere is little motivation for these agencies to institutionalize 
the authority and responsibility aspects of their relationship. 
In a competitive environment, agencies will freely join with other agencies. Hence, 
each agency needs to maintain a high quality of service to one anotho- to "keep" the otha- in 
the relationship. In a forced relationship, the respective agencies cannot not work together. 
Thus, there is little need to formalize their interactions or to strive for quality of mutual 
service. 
The concept of entanglement in the grounded theory describes a condition that 
prevaits a local sponsor from achieving the indepoidaice needed to assume responsibility 
and control for federal programs. In the Little Sioux, the conservation districts were tied to 
ses for the purpose of maintaining the watershed structures. The relationship with SCS 
precluded the districts from forming alliances with other agencies which might have 
strengthoied them and which might been more supportive of local control. The non-
institutionalization of policy, procedures, and training tends to reinforce the mutual 
dependence of the two agencies. 
Implementation structure provides a useful unit of analysis. However, the present 
research suggests that for the purpose of implementing policy, they are most effective when 
formed spontaneously and for the calculating reasons of the joining agencies. 
In the grounded theory, linkages betweai agencies define formal relationships and 
mutual expectations. However, the theory also acknowledges the importance of the meta-
consequences of these relationships by drawing attention to the costs to each agency 
resulting fi^om the relationship and how the relationship creates a new reality. Unequal 
access to resources compromises the independence of each agaicy. The agency which is 
poorer in tangible resources is unable to establish itself as an independent entity, yet it retains 
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power over the resource rich agency by being able to call on it for needed inputs. Because 
the latter must respond to prevent the receiving agency Aom failing, it too is locked in a 
dependent relationship that compromises its int^ty as an independent oitity and limits the 
availability of its resources for other needs. The relationship can also create a new reality of 
responsibility and expectations. By assuming some elements of the local sponsor's 
responsibility, the government agency creates the expectation that it now has that 
responsibility, which becomes part of the new reality. 
Negotiation 
Implementation literature suggests that the ability to control policy execution or to 
ensure compliance with policy objectives is a major factor in determining the success or 
failure of a policy (Fudge and Barrett 1981:258). The assumption of this research, however, 
is that overt compliance is less important than compliance derived through negotiation, 
bargaining, and compromise. 
Strauss (1978) argues that social order - the norms and rules which define 
permisable bdiavior - is in a constant state of flux and that the solidification of social order 
at any point in time is the result of negotiations which determine what that order should be. 
Applying this perspective to organizations, Elmore (1978) suggests that negotiation and 
change is the key to understanding organizational behavior. From this perspective, 
agreements are never final They are merely respites between rounds of negotiation and 
represent the best deals participating parties can make for the moment. 
Seen in this way, implementation is an evolutionary process that is constantly 
changing to adjust to an ever changing world (Majone and Wildavsky 1984:176). 
Negotiating actors, however, are not completely free. They must contend with structural 
constraints imposed by limited resources and political power (Fudge and Barrett 1981:263). 
In addition, data from the little Sioux indicate that disparity in power between agaicies can 
limit their options to negotiate solutions to needs. 
Insufficient attention in the literature has been given to the importance of history and 
external factors that shape the n^otiation process and predispose it in a certain direction. 
Two of the derived concepts, false expectations and disparity of objectives, explain why. 
The false expectations laid down by SCS at the beginning of the program relative to their 
willingness to assume maintaiance responsibilities set the stage for further negotiating 
sessions. By agreeing to perform maintenance, SCS abdicated their power to negotiate on 
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equal terms with the landowners. The landown^, having obtain what they wanted 
(structures to stop gullying without responsibility for them) had no reason to continuing to 
bargain. SCS for its part wanted to renegotiate the agreement and have landowners assume 
more responsibility for maintenance. However, SCS had little to offer in return, and many 
landowner have been unwilling to change the original agreemaiL 
The relation with conservation districts is similar. SCS set the expectation early in 
the watershed program that it would assume responsibility for some types of maintenance. 
Hence, negotiations were around whether a maintoiance requirement was to be the 
responsibility of SCS or of the district The fundamental purpose of the policy, to have local 
sponsors in control of the program, received little attention as both agencies concentrated on 
more tangible concerns. 
The locus of ownership cŒicept explains a similar process. For many landowners 
the structures do not belong to them but to the govemmenL Hence they have minimal 
concern for them. When SCS has wanted increased maintenance responsibility from them, 
they have been reluctant to respond. 
The grounded theory addresses the issue of limits imposed on negotiation. It also 
draws attrition to the need to examine the d^tee of power negotiating parties have relative 
to one another as they attempt to bargain a solution to a problem. In each instance described 
above, SCS early in tiie watershed program gave up a large measure of its power. By telling 
landowners they would have no maintenance responsibilities, SCS obtain the initial 
compliance of landowners. By completing design deficioicy repairs, SCS maintained the 
continuing integrity of the watershed program. Over time, however, as a result of decisions 
made to maximize short-term benefits to the prqgram, SCS weakened its position to affect 
long-term benefits. 
If implementation proceeds through a process of n^otiation which carries the 
relevant action from one stage of the program to the next, then the grounded theory suggests 
that a balance in power between negotiating parties provides a more effective medium for 
n^otiation and for the long term viability of the program. 
The 1985 Food Security Act pahaps provides a good example. The landowner and 
the govemmait each have something to give and something to gain from the relation. 
Farmers are able to make accq)table profits, and the government is able to ensure better land 
management practices. 
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N^otiation is important for understanding policy implementation. More attention, 
however, needs to be given to the composition of power in the negotiating process. The 
agency with more overt power may actually have less real power in its ultimate ability to 
affect bdiavior. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), for example, describe how subordinates 
in an organization can wield considerably more influoice and authority than Aeir formal 
positions would indicate by gaining control over "persons, information, and 
instrumoitalities" (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:455). Their power may be enhanced by 
superiors who have little knowledge of their subordinates' activities. Local sponsors are in a 
similar position. It is they who are in regular contact with one another and other local people 
needed to cany out the policy. Further, they control the communication networks, what 
information passes along these networks, and the formal and informal anangemaits that are 
needed to initiate and complete an activity. 
Because a policy initiating agency has diverse responsibilities, it is usually unable to 
provide close supmdsion of die local sponsor. In addition, the parent agency also has weak 
options for sanctions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:467-468). As a result of these two 
factors, local actors have considerable fieedom to recreate public policy and implement it to 
best fit their needs. 
The grouncted theory indicates that for a federal agency wishing to support local 
control, it needs to maintain a balance of power between it and the local sponsor. By 
allowing the local sponsor to become dependent, the federal agency enables the sponsor to 
attain power over it through potaitial inactivity. This in turn compromises the ability of the 
federal agency to perform its responsibilities and precludes the assumption of control by the 
sponsor. A balance of power betweai agencies allows each to n^otiate from a position of 
strength. 
Perceptions and values 
A basic assumption of this research is that reality is constructed in different ways by 
different individuals. Each individual has need to impose order on experience and does so 
by developing a model of the world based on their personal experience. Pa'cq>tion and 
experience thus reinforce one another to shape human bdiavior. Human action then is not in 
response to an observable stimulus but is a product of a system of expectations which 
originate in the actors' past experiences and which define their perceptions of the probable 
reaction of others to their acts. Through action, humans construct a social world with its 
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own internal logic. The intonal logic of this world and the developed network of meanings 
is what must be understood by the outside analyst to truly understand and explicate human 
behavior (Silverman 1974:126-127). 
In assessing implementation outcomes, actors' definitions of the situation and the 
subjective meanings they attach to their actions and to the actions of govemmoit actors are 
keys for explaining their behavior (Fudge and Barrett 1981:266). Helco and Wildavdcy 
(1974), for example, examine how government officials came to decisions about the 
spending of public money and conclude that it is the officials' perceptions of the problem and 
the need for action that is the crucial factor. Objective definitions of need are of considerably 
less importance. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) distinguidi between actual impacts and 
perceived impacts of a policy. Thqr conclude that the peceived impacts are more crucial in 
finally determining public accq)tance for the policy. 
In the grounded theory, the concq)t of false expectations describes how the 
percqjtion of what constitutes reqwnsibility is more crucial than the formal agreements that 
specifically define the duties of lesponâbility. According to the theory, how actors perceive 
their neqwnsibilities can result in behaviors that support policy initiatives or in behaviors that 
are contrary to the policy's original intent In the littie Sioux watershed, SCS formed initial 
percq)tions of maintenance responsibilities by promising landowners they would not be 
responsible for maintenance and by assuming responsibility for the repair of problems 
caused by design deficiencies. As a consequence, local actors perceived tiiey would not be 
responsible for maintenance activities. Govemmoit actions helped local actors define the 
limits of local maintenance responsibility. SCS created an alternate reality to the one it 
intaided, namely local responsibility for maintenance. 
The theory also describes how a government agency's self-perceptions can dictate its 
reqwnse to policy initiatives. If an agency's defiinition of duty is grounded in a belief that it 
is responsible for an important aspect of the public trust, it will act with great fervor to carry 
out the dictates of policies which advance the public welfare. SCS's perception of itself as a 
preserver of soil and a preventer of soil erosion enables it to maintain a long-term 
commitment to adequate maintenance for the watershed structures. In contrast, local 
landowners who see the structures primarily as objects which belong to the government, are 
less concerned with the public benefit that derives from the structures and relatively soon 
lose interest in them. 
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The attitudes, values, and perceptions of the situation held by various actors shape 
their response to the problem definition and to appropriate action (Fudge and Barrett 
1981:264). Consequently, divergoit experiences and perceptions can serve to divide groups 
from one another (Kiviniemi 1986:262). Thus, it is important to examine and understand the 
underlying assumptions and values which influence the problem definition and agreed upon 
solution. For fanners in the little Sioux area, private ownership of land is a dominant 
societal value. Haice solutions to problems of soil erosion that impose land-use restrictions 
are resisted by farmers. Each said they would prefer to make land-use decisions themselves. 
Though farmers are genuinely concmed about conservation and try to farm in ways that are 
less harmful to the soil, their land is still theirs and they do not want someone telling them 
how to use. As one farmer said: "It is un-Ameican." Individuals or agencies that are 
perceived to support restrictive land-use thus have minimal support and credibility in the 
rural community. 
The derived concepts of false expectations and immutable societal value help explain 
the implementation experience in the Little Sioux watershed. Their significance in this 
instance gives added credence to the importance of understanding the value definitions and 
pm:q)tions of reality that guide people's behavior. From the perspective of ttie policy­
making agency, these concq)ts demonstrate that perceptions can generate unintended 
consequences for policy initiatives. SCS actions early in the program created an alternative 
reality it did not desire. Thus, decisions and activities takoi at one point in time may over a 
period of time create patterns ofbdiavior that are d^ilitating to the overall objectives of the 
policy. 
Adequate resources 
The need for adequate resources, including funds, equipment, and technical 
expertise, to successfully implement policies is axiomatic (Gurm 1978, Sabader and 
Mazmanian 1981). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:465) for example indicate that the 
limited supply of financial resources is the major contributor to the failure of government 
programs. Scharpf (1977) suggests the state's increasing inability to provide adequate 
support for policy initiatives undermines the viability of these initiatives and precludes the 
ability of the state to continue to play as important a role in solving social problems as it has 
in the past 
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Other literature discusses how sufficient resources and the degree of specificity in the 
policy mandate interact to influence the implementation experience. Montjoy and OToole 
(1979) theorize that the more abundant the resources and the more narrow the mandate, the 
easier the implemaitation task. This position is consistent with the grounded theory. If local 
actors have insufficient resources, and if mixed messages are givai about the extent of local 
responsibility required, it is theorized that local sponsors will be less willing to assume full 
responsibility for the program. This has been the experioice in the little Sioux watershed. 
Insufficient resources were available for local sponsors to assume full responsibility for the 
program and the policy mandate, while clear and concise in the l^islation, was presented in 
a vague and uncertain manner. As a result, local sponsors did not assume full responsibility 
for the watershed program. 
Kiviniemi (1986:259-260) discusses how resources interact with values to either 
promote or impede policy initiatives. The grounded theory can be interpreted in a similar 
way. Local actors with poor access to resources and with values supportive of other 
objectives, maximization of profits for example, have littie or no support for assuming local 
responsibility. In the grounded theory, values interact with resources in other ways as weU. 
The concqit of paceived financial security is grounded in values of thrift and dd)t 
avoidance, which influence the perceived amount of available resources. Because sponsors 
want to avoid debt, they redefine their responsibility to conform to the level of available 
resources. 
Resources are gmerally thought of as tangible items which can be rq>laced when 
they become scarce. The concept of perceived financial security, however, suggests that 
perception of quantity available may be more important than the actual amount available. In 
the little Sioux watershed, the availability of resources, both real and perceived, limit what 
local sponsors do relative to their legislated responsibilities. limited resources have forced 
the districts to maintain an over-dep«ident relation with SCS to obtain needed assistance. 
And, the perceived inadequacy of funding has prompted them to limit spending and/or to 
redefine their responsibilities. The concept of perceived inadequacy of resources suggests 
that in some instances intervention strategies may be needed to help local sponsors redefine 
their reality to be consistent with more commonly held percutions. 
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The external aivironmait as catalyst for change 
Macro-influences are a catalyst for change and adjustment Because policy is formed 
in response to problems created by a changing social and economic environmait, the policy 
must change to reflect the changed external reality. In this way, policy both changes in 
response to external factors, and, in its changing, is a force for further change (Fudge and 
Barrett 1981:273). 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:472) describe the influence of environmental factors 
in terms of adequacy of resources and local support, and how prevailing social and economic 
conditions will be affected by the implementation of the policy. They also suggest that the 
support or opposition of elites and interest groups can have an important influence on how a 
policy is implemented. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981:7) identify external factors as 
socioeconomic conditions, available technology, public support, and support from leaders. 
Sarason (1981:9) indicates that policy is foiged in the marketplace of power and influence. 
When power and influaice shift over time, policy must change to reflect the new balance of 
power and influence. 
The above literature discusses a variety of external factors such as, resources, local 
support, socio-economic conditions and technology, that influoice policy implemaitation. 
Each of these factors helped sh^ the development of policy in the Little Sioux watershed. 
Inadequate resources helped maintain the dependent relationship between SCS and the 
conservation districts. The absence of local support required the districts to establish 
maintenance funds to support (har maintenance activities. Changing technology made it 
possible to change the design deficiaicy definition which tied SCS to a long-term 
commitment to perform maintaiance. And, socio-economic factors brought about new land 
use patterns. 
Though these and other factors are important in shaping policy implementation 
experiences, little attention has been given in the literature to how local actors respond to 
these external factors. The grounded theory suggests the external environment is a critical 
influence on the design and implementation of policy. Specifically, the concq)t of non-
adaptation suggests that if a formal policy does not adjust to fit a changed external 
environment, local actors charged with implementing the policy will make necessary 
adjustments to bring the policy into line with their percq>tion of the problem and the 
resources they have to address the problem. 
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Discussion 
The grounded theory provides a unique perspective to implementation literature. 
Most liteiature and research describe situations whae there exists a greater degree of formal 
control and authority betweai the policy making agoicy and the implementing agency than 
exists between actors in the littie Sioux Watershed. The grounded theory describes the 
consequences of a relationship betweoi organizations which are independent in legal 
structure yet dependent in function. The results derived from an examination of this 
experioice can be helpful for understanding the limits of such arrangements for achieving 
prescribed policy objectives. The key notions derived from the grounded theory are as 
follows. 
The grounded theory has drawn attention to the importance of determining whether 
implemoitation structures are formed voluntarily or imposed by some external force. The 
findings suggest implementation structures are more effective when voluntarily joined. 
A local sponsor's need for financial and technical resources and a federal agency's 
need for legitimacy at the local level can create an imbalance which skews n%otiating power 
to the local sponsor which gives legitimacy to the federal agency. Because such a 
relationship can compromise the authority and integrity of the federal agency, it is important 
that the local agency be required to draw more on local sources of financial and technical 
assistance to maintain a balance in negotiating power. In this way, the federal agency is able 
to maintain control of its activities, and the local sponsor is able to maintain independence of 
decision making and authority. 
N^otiation does not take place in a static oivironmenL Thus, in examining 
implementation in terms of negotiation processes, one must consider history and the prior 
expectations that are brought to the negotiating arena. External events and the level of 
commitment of the n^otiating bodies can significantiy influence the process and the 
outcome. 
The grounded theory reaffirms the importance of understanding actors' definitions of 
reality and dominant values for inteipretating their behavior. 
In summary, traditional top-down qjproaches to implementation analysis provide the 
observer with a one dimensional view of the implemaitation process. On the other hand, a 
purely local perspective results in description with littie assurance that the description will 
hold valid in other situations. As an alternative, Fudge and Barrett suggest a "grounded 
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theory approach to the study of implementation" (Fudge and Barrett 1981:250). They 
suggest this as a means to link the need for detailed study at the empirical level with the need 
to develop theory that will be applicable in a variety of situations. The present study is a 
contribution to this effort. The concepts derived from the Little Sioux Watershed program 
provide suggestions to administrators seeking to maximize local control and responsibility. 
The derived concepts are suggested alternatives to the perfect implementation schemes 
derived from an idealized notion of how policy should be in^lemented (Gunn 1978, Sabatier 
and Mazmanian 1981). Policy recommaidations based on the derived concq)ts are 
discussed in the following chq>ter. 
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CHAPTER Vm 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policy research provides pragmatic, action-oriented recommendations to policy 
makers (Majchrzak 1984:12). Hiis chapter fulfills this charge by offering recommendations 
to Soil Conservation Service policy makers regarding the Little Sioux Watershed program. 
And die chapter offers general recommendations for implementation strategies that will 
increase the likelihood of local q)onsors assuming the d^ree of implementation 
responsibility specified by the enabling legislation. 
Policy recommendations are not made in a vacuum. Consequently, the criteria used 
to formulate recommendations is an important issue. Recommendations may be informed by 
policy objectives as well as by input gathered from target actors and other local informants. 
The relative weighting of these two sources of information when formulating policy 
recommendations can save to maintain a policy in its listing form or to redefine a policy to 
betto" serve local needs. The chapter b^ins with a brief discussion of the criteria used for 
making policy recommendations. 
Criteria for Policy Recommendations 
The making of policy recommendations to improve policy perf<mnance is a 
normative activity. The policy-focused approach to implementation analysis assumes that the 
prescriptions and methods which constitute the policy are correct and in the best interests of 
the target population in particular and of society in general. From this perspective, 
recommendations should support policy objectives and suggest ways to better achieve their 
ends. In contrast, however, the action perspective is descriptive. The standards of this 
perspective are an accumulation of individual viewpoints without reference to a unifying set 
of values or norms. The action perspective is an effective method for describing how things 
are, but it is less effective for describing how things should be (Hogwood and Gunn 
1984:207, Under and Peters 1987:463). 
Elements of the public policy provide standards to measure results. The action 
perspective, on the other hand, provides insight into how people understand and define these 
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prescriptions and how they perceive the limits to change. The perspectives are 
complimentary, and both aie needed for effective policy recommendations. Because of the 
normative character of recommendations, the analyst should make explicit what objectives 
he/she is advancing. 
The following section ofRas recommendations specifically for the Little Sioux 
Watershed project The next section offers gaieral recommendations. 
Recommendations for the Little Sioux Watershed Project 
The purpose of this research was to develop an explanation for the failure of the local 
sponsors to assume full responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the watershed 
structures that were built as a part of the Littie Sioux Watershed program. The assumption 
of the following recommendations is that local control is a reasonable objective for the 
watershed program and that it is an attainable objective given certain modifications in the 
program. It is further assumed that local control is a value that should be promoted. Hence, 
the following recommendations are suggestions for helping local sponsors assume greater 
control and responâbility for the operation and maintenance of the structures in the Littie 
Sioux watershed. The recommaidations incorporate local concerns about what cunentiy 
prevents local sponsors from assuming greater reqwnsibility. 
General strategies for building local capacity include expanding the base of citizen 
involvement, enhancing the leadership pool, and enlarging the information base (Garkovich 
1989:207, Ryan 1987). These strategies will provide a framework for recommendations to 
increase local capacity to carry out the maintenance reqwnsibilities of the Littie Sioux 
Wata-shed program. 
Expanding the base of citizen involvement 
Actions are needed to involve a greater number of people in deliberations about tiie 
watershed program and its future in the area. In this way, local citizens can provide direction 
and support for changes required in the operations and maintenance program. 
1. There should be an information program to inform landowners and other Little 
Sioux citizens about the watershed structures, their history, their purpose, and the care that 
landowners can give them. There would also be benefit in developing written material on 
these subjects to distribute to fanners and other interested individuals and organizations. 
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2. Iowa State University's final report evaluating the Little Sioux watershed 
maintenance program should be widely circulated among SCS personnel, district 
commissioners, boards of supervisors, and the public in the study area. The report can 
educate people about current problems with the watershed program and invite their input for 
n^odated solutions. To the extent the report is controlled by SCS/Des Moines, to that 
extait does it rekifoice the percq)tion that problems with the watershed program are 
primarily the responsibility of SCS and that any solutions will be imposed by SCS/Des 
Moines. As a result, there will be less incentive for local actors to seek solutions. Many 
people provided information for the study; they should have die benefit of the study's 
conclusions. The report could be used in conjunction with the Soil Conservation Service's 
Westran Iowa Riverbasin Study as the basis for a public discussion about the wato-shed 
program and its future in the area. 
fahance the leadership pool 
New leaders should be identified and trained to give direction and support to soil 
conservation programs and to tiie opoation and maintenance program for the watershed 
structures. As well, current district commissioners and inspectors should receive orientation 
and training to increase their knowledge and sMlls relative to managing the operations and 
maintenance program. 
3. The assistant commissioner program that is being developed in Woodbury 
County should be œcouraged and extended to otha- counties. 
4. There should be an orientation and training program to provide new district 
commissioners with general information about their responsibilities as well as specific 
information about their respective county and its problems and programs. Current and past 
commissiono-s should be surveyed to develop die specific content of the orientation and 
training program. 
5. There should be a commissioner's manual (loose leaf) that each commissioner can 
use as a reference and as a guide to his/her responsibilities and to the procedures that should 
be followed for implemaiting the program. Again, current and past commissioners should 
be surveyed to develop the specific content for the manual. 
6. More extensive training is needed for the inspector to upgrade his skills. The 
inspector position should be accorded professional status. It should be either a full time 
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position or defined as part of the responsibility of a Ml time position. The role of the 
inspector in Woodbury County might be used as a model for other counties. 
Boiargifle thg mformtiop bas? 
Local sponsors and landowners need technical information to hdp them better 
manage the watershed maintenance program, and they need process information to help them 
resolve conflicts and establish good working relationships. Their respective authority and 
responâbility for maintenance should also be specified. 
7. There should be regular financial reports and an annual audit of any funds 
controlled by the commissioners with the final report distributed to SCS, the board of 
supervisors, and other interested parties. A feedback mechanism should be incorporated into 
the reporting process to provide the commissioners with a more objective assessment of thdr 
financial condition and the %Q)propriateness of their spending patterns. 
8. Parameters of acceptable maintenance criteria should be established by SCS. 
These criteria, along with action strategies to implement them, should then be taught to the 
commissioners and inspectors in training sessions specifically designed for this purpose. 
Local action strat^ies should be informed by local input to aisure their successful 
implementation. 
9. A good working relationship with the boards of supervisors should be established 
in each county. This should include uvular meetings to talk about mutual concerns and 
planning sessions for mutual cooperation. It is recognized that it would take cooperation 
fiom the supo-visors to make this possible. Nonetheless, an effort to bring about better 
relationships and to increase the involvement of the supervisors in the watershed program 
should be initiated. 
10. There is need to provide specific feedback to the district commissioners, the 
boards of supervisors, and landowners describing maintenance problems with the watershed 
structures from the perspective of SCS/Des Moines. The view from the field is that they are 
doing as well as can be expected with available resources. The discrepancy of perspectives 
can be used as a point of intervention. 
Other considerations 
Providing needed information, enhancing communication, and increasing the skills 
of local actors is an important but not sufficient strategy to build local cq)acity (Wilkinson 
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1986:9). In the little Sioux watershed, structural issues which make it difficult for local 
sponsors to carry out their responsibilities for the watershed program need to be addressed. 
11. ses needs to decide who ultimately has responsibility for die operation and 
maintenance of the watershed structures and what that responsibility means. The 
information then needs to be clearly communicated to all local sponsors. If local sponsors 
have ultimate responsibility, SCS needs to allow the sponsors to implement their 
reqwnsibilities without SCS interference. If SCS continues to intervene, the question of 
responsibility is blurred. 
12. Local qwnsors must have adequate resources to carry out their responsibilities. 
A funding plan should be developed for each county that specifies sources of funds and an 
appropriate mechanism conservation districts can use to draw on these funds for the 
operation and maintenance of the watershed structures. 
Conclusions 
There are limitations that would need to be overcome before implementing several of 
these recommendations. However, an awaraiess that alternatives to current practices exist 
can serve as a point of departure for discussions about local sponsors assuming greater 
responsibility for the watershed program. 
General Recommendations 
This section discuses actions federal policy makers can take to increase the 
likelihood that local sponsors will carry out responsibilities delegated to them by federally 
initiated programs. The guiding assumption of these recommendations is that local sponsors 
should assume greater control of federally sponsored programs. The recommendations 
suggest ways to create conditions that can make this possible. 
Concepts derived from examining the implementation of the Little Sioux Watershed 
program suggest barriers which if not adequately addressed by an implemmtation strategy 
may prevent local sponsors from assuming the degree of responsibility specified in the 
enabling legislation. 
The concepts of false expectations, disparity of objectives, and locus of ownership 
are concerned with issues resulting from miscommunication, misunderstanding of the 
program's intent, insufficient attention to unintended consequences, and lack of follow-
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through regarding program objectives and obligations. The ratanglement and non-
institutionalization concepts describe reduced local control resulting from over-dependmcy 
on the sponsoring federal s^ency and the failure to opeiationalize consistent definitions of 
authority and responsibility by the federal agaicy and the local qx)nsor. The concq)ts of 
non-adaptation and p^ceived scarcity of resources address issues relating to external £actors 
and the need for an adequate resource base to implement programs. The immutability of 
dominant societal values concept indicates that policies will be shaped more by social values 
than by legislative mandate. 
An effective implementation strategy, therefore, will provide for accurate information 
about the policy. The strategy will ensure that the target audience has a clear understanding 
of the policy's intent It will seek to minimize unintended consequoices that are contrary to 
the policy's objectives. It will define clear areas of authority and responsibility between the 
federal agency and the local sponsor and minimize interdependence between the two 
agencies. The strategy will be flexible to accommodate changes at the macro level, and it 
will ensure that suffici^it resources are available for the local sponsor to carry out its 
responsibilities. Finally, the strategy will attempt to work in concert with dominant societal 
values which are supportive of policy objectives. 
If the goal of the implementation strategy is for local sponsors to assume control of 
the program, then the development of the strategy must begin at the local level with local 
input rather than be imposed by the federal agency (Ebnore 1978:215). Federal agencies 
charged with implementing policy initiatives with local sponsors, therefore, have a dual task. 
They must develop local capacity, and they must create conditions for the policy initiative 
(both its content and the idea of local control) to readily diffuse. 
The adoption-diffusion model provides a comprehaisive inventory of the tasks and 
information needed to create an effective implementation strategy. The inventory of tasks 
will be integrated with the geneal strategies for building local c^acity to suggest 
recommendations outside agencies may use to enable local sponsors to assume program 
responsibilities given them by the enabling legislation. 
The adoption-diffusion model may be used to: 
- determine relevant characteristics of the taiget population, 
- select key individuals to initiate the policy, 
- select information sources and communication channels, 
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- understand the role of attitudes and values, 
- understand the role of structural or institutional constraints 
(Korsching et al. 1983:430). 
Movant çharaçferistiçs pf # tarent pqpylatign 
Knowledge of ttie target population is an important first stq) in designing an 
implemaitation strat%y. The data gathered at this stage will provide the basis for designing 
a communication strata and for learning local values and attitudes. This task can also be 
used to build support for the policy by using an action research strategy. Action research "is 
a process through which researchers - with research concepts and ddlls - and citizens - with 
concerns about issues - work together in a co-equal partnership to develop sound 
information for use within a particular setting" (littrell 1985:188). Action research provides 
a means to learn about the target population as well as involve local citizens in addressing the 
policy issues. This research strategy increases local actors' knowledge of the problem, 
generates local commitment and support for a solution, and increases the outside agency's 
knowledge of the local population and sensitivity to their needs. 
Select key individuals 
Policies are implemented through people. Hence it is important to idoitify those 
individuals who will support the policy initiative and who will assist in "selling" it to others. 
Adoption-diffusion theory suggests that specific groups, each with unique characteristics, 
will adopt new ideas in predictable patterns. One group, the early adopters, hold positions 
of prestige and influence within the social system and serve as opinion leaders and role 
models for other members of the system. They decrease uncertainty about a new idea by 
adopting it and conveying their evaluation of it to other members of the social system 
through interpersonal networks (Rogers 1983:249). 
When determining local population characteristics, individuals can be identified as 
potential members of the early adopter group. Leaders and supporters for the policy 
initiative can be drawn from this group and used to convey information about the policy to 
other members of the target population. 
Citizen involvement in the implementation process can be expanded by working with 
existing associations or organizatitms. Local groups are an integral componoit of local 
c^acity because they are already in existence and because they can involve people who 
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otherwise might be ignored (Garkovich 1989:209). Extant organizations are more effective 
than organizations specifically created by an outside agency to assume responsibility for local 
programs (Hughes 1985:88). Hence, local sponsors should be drawn from extant 
organizations or associations. Such groups can serve as a focus for support of the policy 
and help to carry out local responsibilities described in the policy. 
Local sponsors and other supportive citizens need appropriate knowledge and skills 
to carry out their reqwnsibilides as local sponsors and as supportai of the policy initiative. 
Process-oriented and technical-oriented knowledge are needed (Ryan 1987:16-9). Training 
in social action strategies and conflict management are process oriented methods that can 
enable local sponsors to identify specific steps for achieving goals or for resolving conflicts 
that inevitably arise as policies are implemented. A training of trainers component should be 
an integral part of any leadership and skills training program. In this way, training can be 
ongoing with minimum recourse to an outside agency. 
Information sources and commimimrinn rhannrfs 
There needs to be an effective communication campaign that accurately 
communicates information about the policy's objectives, its projected impacts, and the 
responsibilities local citizois will have relative to the policy. If people bette understand and 
are in agreement with the policy's prescriptions, they will be more supportive of them. The 
campaign should avoid making promises that cannot be kept and creating impressions that 
are contrary to the intent of the policy. The ultimate goal of the campaign should be to create 
the reality that local citizens and sponsors will assume ownership of the program. They 
should understand that it is their program and not the govemmait's. 
Merely providing information about the policy, however, is not sufficient to generate 
local support Personal contact and concrete examples of the policy's benefits will help 
persuade people to support it (McAlister 1981:96). The credibility of those providing the 
information as well as the frequracy of contact are important elements in generating support 
for a policy initiative (Atkin 1981:275-277). Individuals who have credibility with the target 
population should have prime responsibility for conducting the communication campaign. 
Policies generally have a long life before they are considered routine (Kiviniemi 1986:254). 
Therefore, an ongoing communication campaign should be instigated to shape people's 
understanding and acceptance of the policy over an extended period of time. The principles 
and practices of product advertising might be helpful in this regard. 
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The role of attitudes and values 
The values, attitudes, and expaiences of different groups of actors shape perceptions 
of the policy and determine whedier or not action is needed to address issues raised by the 
policy (Barrett and Fudge 1981:28). Therefore, a policy has no particular meaning until one 
is attached by the various participants in the policy process (Stdnbo-ger 1981:30). Because 
attitudes and values help define meaning, outside agency personnel need to be sensitive to 
local values relevant to the policy and integrate tiiese values into the implementation slrat^y. 
For example, in areas where the desire for autonomy and independence is strong, these 
values can serve as motivation for local control. 
Structural or institutional constraints 
Structural constraints can result when the local sponsor's responsibility and 
authority are inconsistently defined, when over-dependence prevoits the local sponsor 6om 
controlling its resources and decision-making, whai extonal evaits significantiy change the 
original conditions that the policy was designed to address, and when there are inadequate 
resources for the local sponsors to perform their responsibilities (Hogwood and Guim 
1984:199-205). Strategies need to be incorporated in the implementation design to address 
these issues. 
There should be clear definitions of responsibilities and lines of authority and 
communication established between the federal agency and the local sponsor. Actors should 
know procedures for taking action and when action is to happen. The federal agency should 
support the indq)endence of the local sponsor, and the federal agency should not assume 
local responsibilities. The local sponsor's ability to assume responsibility should not be 
compromised. 
The federal agency also needs to decide how much control it is willing to give the 
local sponsor. If it is willing to give complete control, thai it needs to be willing to live with 
the consequences. If it is willing to give only partial control or if some consequences are 
unacceptable, it needs to know these parameters when negotiating with the local sponsor. 
Without knowing the parameters, the agency may someday find that it has assumed more 
control and responsibility than it wanted. 
External events include changes in the economy, the resource base, government 
policy, and political considerations. Changes in any or all of these factors can profoundly 
influence local events and significantly change the policy environment When this happens, 
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the policy-making agency should adjust the policy to betto* fit the changed external reality 
and retain the integrity of the poliQr. If policy-makers fail to make these adjustments, local 
actors will make changes on their OWIL Their adjustments may or may not retain the original 
intent of the policy. 
Strategies for controlling and reqx)nding to the environmoit include the use of 
environmental impact statements, force field analysis, aivironmental scanning, and trend 
data for forecasting. Building in flexibility might include (tevelqping contingency plans for 
aspects of the implemaitation when environmental conditions appear ambiguous or when 
predictors indicate the possibility of substantial change (Kettner et al. 1985:215). 
Adequate resources are key to local sponsors successfully implementing 
responsibilities required by the policy initiative (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:471, 
Montjoy and OToole 1979:468). Hius, a mechanism is needed to generate adequate 
resources for the local qwnsor to use in implementing its responsibility. If inadequate 
resources are available, it may be best not to implement local control measures or to modify 
them to fit the resource base. Local sponsors ultimately will assume only responsibility for 
those program aspects which are supportable by the available resource base. 
gmnmary 
In summary form, the recommendations are as follows. Many of the 
recommendations are interrdated and help reinforce one another. 
1. Determine the relevant characteristics of the target population using an action 
research strategy. 
2. Identify and solicit the support of early adopters within the t^et population 
who V# support the policy's objectives and local responsibility provision. 
3. Identify and solicit the support of local associations for the policy initiatives. 
4. Provide a regular training program to give local sponsors and other supporters 
an £^propriate knowledge base and the technical skills needed to carry out 
their reqwnsibilities. 
5. Conduct a communication campaign to inform the target population about the 
policy initiative. Implement a long-term advertising program to keep people 
aware of the policy and supportive of its objectives. 
6. Learn local values and incorporate them into the implementation strategy. 
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7. Specifically define the respective aufliority and responsibilities of the local 
sponsor and the federal agency. 
8. Ensure that the local sponsor has adequate independence to control resources 
and decision-making. 
9. Ensure that there are adequate resources for the local sponsor to carry out its 
responsibilities. 
10. Make adjustments in the policy content and structure to reflect a changed 
external environment 
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CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY 
When federal programs are initiated to serve local needs, it is generally a matter of 
policy to give local sponsors responsibility for implementing the program after the initial 
federal involvement is complete. In addition to solving local problems, such programs also 
address general societal needs. In the Little Sioux watershed, for example, the wat^shed 
program was developed to stop flooding and severe soil erosion as a means to maintain the 
economic viability of the area and to preserve soil for the good of society. 
Since local sponsors primarily represent local interests, and since they usually have 
access only to local sources of financial support, they will redefine policy and 
implementation strategies in ways which are consistait with their percq>tion of the problem 
and their available resources. Local solutions, however, may be inadequate to address the 
larger societal need that was the original goal of the policy. Hence, the policy does not 
achieve its stated objectives, and the societal good may be compromised. To be certain that 
the stated objectives of the program are met, the federal agaicy initiating the project may 
assume greater responsibility for implementing the program than was intended by the 
sponsoring legislation. This alternative, however, compromises the integrity of the federal 
agency and is an added drain on its resources. Local control is also compromised as local 
sponsors are discouraged from assuming their full responsibility. 
Federal agencies prefer that programs achieve their intended results and that policies 
which guide these programs be implemented as prescribed. The research problem for this 
dissertation, therefore, has been: 
1. to learn how implementation strategies can be better devised to increase local 
compliance with policy objectives and to minimize policy drift; 
2. to learn how an outside agency, the federal government for example, can retain 
influence on the direction and integrity of a policy over which it Im no formal 
control. 
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Data for this research were obtained by examining the operation and maintenance 
program for the watershed structures built by the little Sioux Watershed project in Western 
Iowa. The specific objectives of this study were: 
1. to gather data from prin^ and secondary sources to be used to derive a 
substantive implemaitation theory; 
2. to derive a grounded theory explaining local actor behavior relative to the 
maintaiance of the Little Sioux wateâied structures; 
3. to derive a general theory of policy implementation and to compare this 
derived theory with other implemaitation theories; 
4. to make recommendations for improving implementation strategies. 
The data were obtained from personal interviews with 65 individuals who wore 
knowledgeable about the operation and maintenance program of the Little Sioux Watershed 
project Additional data were obtained from the Iowa State University Archives and from 
general publications about the watershed program and the Soil Conservation Service. 
Findings 
According to the grounded theory, the implementing behavior of local sponsors in 
the Little Sioux watershed was influenced by a variety of factors: the initial promise of SCS 
to assume maintenance responsibilities; SCS's willingness to repair design deficiency 
problems; the failure of landowners to assume ownership of the watershed structures; 
changes in land-use practices which hastened the deterioration of the structures and increased 
financial pressure on the sponsors; the absence of an adequate resource base to support the 
local sponsors' independence from SCS and the consequent over-involvement of SCS in 
local sponsors' affairs; the failure to institutionalize standard operating procedures; and the 
persistence of a land-use ethic that vests ownership of land in the individual and accords 
him/her the right to use it as a production input to maximize profit. 
According to the grounded theory of policy implementation, local sponsors and 
actors will redefine federal policy initiatives and implement programs to be consistent with 
local expectations of government behavior, the availability of local resources, their dominant 
values, and their perceptions for how best to survive in a competitive economy. 
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The response of many farmers to the watershed program is illustrative of the theory. 
Farmers' initial reluctance to participate in the program was overcome by government 
promises that they would have no continuing responsibility for the watershed structures built 
on their property. For these farmers, the watershed structures belong to the government, 
who has responsibility to maintain them. Other concerns are now more important. Today, 
farmers are primarily concerned about low prices for thdr products, increasing government 
regulations, and the impact on their operations of increasing public concon about the 
environment The cumulative effects of these issues on farmers' ability to make a profit 
receive considerably more attention than issues relating to the maintenance of watershed 
structures. 
Federal agencies thus need to ensure that their actions shape local sponsors' 
perceptions of reality in a way consistait with the dictates of the policy. Further, agencies 
should be certain that an adequate resource base exists to provide local sponsors with the 
resources they need to carry out the imposed responsibilities. In addition, federal agencies 
need to develop mechanisms to ensure that available resources are actually utilized. Federal 
and local agaicies should avoid «itangling alliances that commit the federal agency to 
assume more responsibility for local affairs than required by the oiabling legislation. An 
over-responsible federal agency curtails the ability of a local sponsor to make indq)endent 
decisions and to assume the full extent of its authority. Finally, federal agencies need to be 
aware of the local impacts of macro-level changes in social and economic systems and how 
these impacts will alter the policy in question. Federal agencies' Ailure to make needed 
adjustments in the practical intapretation of the policy serves as a catalyst for local sponsors 
to make their own changes and, in the process, compromise the integrity of the policy and 
the social goals it seeks to attain. 
Significance of this Study for Policy Theory and Research 
The grounded theory provides a unique perspective to implementation literature. 
Most literature and research describe situations where there exists a greater degree of formal 
control and authority betweai the policy making agaiqr and the implemaidng agency than 
exists between actors in the Little Sioux watershed. Consequently, there was little extant 
theory to guide the research. Thus, a grounded theory methodology which generated theory 
to explain the implementation of policy in such situations was particularly useful. 
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The grounded theory describes the consequences of a relationship between 
organizations which are indepaidait in Içgal structure yet dq)endent in function. The results 
derived from an examination of this experience can be helpful for understanding the limits 
such arrangements have for achieving prescribed policy objectives. The key notions derived 
from the grounded theory are as follows. 
1. The grounded theory has drawn attention to the importance of determining 
whether implementation structures are formed voluntarily or imposed by some extonal 
force. The findings suggest implementation structures are more effective when voluntarily 
joined. 
2. A local sponsor's need for financial and technical resources and a federal 
agency's need for legitimacy at the local level can create an imbalance which skews 
n^otiating power to the local sponsor which gives legitimacy to the federal agency. 
Because such a relationship can compromise the autiioiity and integrity of the federal agoicy, 
it is important that the local agency be required to draw more on local sources of financial 
and technical assistance to maintain a balance in negotiating power. In this way, the federal 
agency is able to maintain control of its activities, and the local sponsor is able to maintain 
independence of decision making and authority. 
3. Negotiation does not take place in a static environment Thus, in examining 
implementation in terms of negotiation processes, one must consider history and the prior 
expectations that are brought to the negotiating arena. External evoits and the level of 
commitmoit of the negotiating bodies can significantly influence die process and die 
outcome. 
4. The grounded theory reaffirms the importance of understanding actors' 
definitions of reality and their dominant values for interpretating their behavior. 
Personal interviews proved to be an effective means to obtain respondents' views on 
the issues in question. Personal interviews made it possible to ask follow-up questions, and 
respondents were able to provide information they believed was important rather than only 
respond to issues raised by the researcher. Personal interviews were particularly effective 
for this study as the issues were complex and extended over a considerable period of time. 
The opportunity to personally interview respondents was especially helpfiil to some 
farmers who had great difficulty in answering the structured questions of the formal survey 
instrumoit For many farmers, the rigid categorization of reality imposed by the structured 
questionnaire did not fit their conception of reality, hence it was difficult for them to 
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respond. For this group, reality was concrete and particular. They were unable to abstract 
firom particular experiences to general experiences or perceptions of an issue and answer on a 
more-less, strongly agree-strongly disagree continuum. These distinctions had no meaning 
for them. When these individuals could not answer a question, they would feel stupid, 
embarrassed, and frustrated. Thus, it was important to be able to ask questions in other 
ways or to ask follow-up questions as a means to either obtain information or to clarify 
answers. 
The personal interview was also helpful when interviewing individuals who had a 
range of experience and insight beyond the scope of the prepared questionnaire. To be able 
to discuss these issues with them added significantiy to the quality of the data. 
One weakness in relying on personal interviews to collect data was the small number 
of individuals that could be interviewed within any one county. A lack of representativeness 
may have resulted leading to a biased perspective. For instance, it would have beai useful to 
have interviewed more large (1000 acres or more) farmers and more farmers less 
sympathetic to soil conservation. 
Another potential problem with this methodology is that the researcher's biases and 
preconceptions can influence the discussion of issues and the conclusions reached. This 
researcher addressed the validity question by being aware that it was a potential problem, by 
a liberal use of clarifying questions and summarization, and by corroborating data from one 
respondent with data from other respondents. Extensive notes were taken and r^larly 
edited to retain the respondent's pa-spective. 
Needs for Additional Research 
The present study suggests several areas for additional research. 
1. The grounded theory and its component concepts need to be tested and used to 
analyze other like situations to learn what gaieral usefulness they have for explaining local 
sponsor behavior. The prime method used to empirically study implementation is the case 
study (Mon^oy and OToole 1979:467). These studies focus on a relatively narrow span of 
time witii insufficient attention given to how the implementation process fits within the larger 
social system (Kiviniemi 1986). Because any intervention strategy is an attempt to maintain 
or transform an extant social order (Lloyd 1986:189), implementation is best studied 
longitudinally (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:474). 
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The grounded theory developed in this study was generated by examining a program 
that has been in operation for 40 years. Hence, the data provide a unique perspective that 
can serve as a starting point for examining the long-term experience of policy initiatives. 
The study was not a true longitudinal study, but the concepts daived from the study can 
save as the basis for designing longitudinal studies of policy implementation. 
2. An initial assumption of this research was that reality is a socially constructed 
phenomaion and that by understanding how relevant actors construct their reality and 
impose meaning on elements of the policy world, the researcher can better understand the 
implemoitation experience. This perspective proved fruitful in the present research. The 
concepts of false expectations, disparity of objectives, and locus of ownership emphasized 
the importance structures of meaning have for explaining individual bdiavior. 
In a policy context structures of meaning are defined as "the understandings that 
participants have regarding the policy's purpose, its potential impact and its relationship to 
other policies" (Steinberger 1981:31). Because the exact meaning of a policy is ambiguous 
and manipulable, a policy will have différait meanings for différait individuals. Part of the 
implementation process, therefore, is for policy implementers to establish the "correct" 
meaning of the policy (Steinberger 1981:30). 
Research is needed to determine how aware policy implemaiters are of the process 
humans use to define reality and to impose meaning on policy elemaits. Results from the 
Little Sioux study indicate that those policy implementers may have discounted the 
importance of this process. Othawise, they might have takai more care to ensure that the 
original percq)tions of the program were consistent with the intentions of the the policy. To 
the extait that this lack of knowledge is generalized, policy implemaitation will be less 
effective. Knowledge of the reality construction process can assist policy implementers to 
use the structure of meaning process to better support the achievement of policy objectives. 
3. The grounded theory considers both micro and macro factors in explaining the 
implementation of the little Sioux Watershed program. Research is needed to learn the 
relative influence each factor has for ej^laining implementation behavior. Berman (1978) 
indicates that micro factors ate more important for explaining a policy's outcome. Sabatier 
and Mazmanian (1981:3) indicate that macro-level and legal factors primarily determine how 
a policy will be implemented. The current study indicates that while micro-level fiactors 
were crucial in explaining local actors' failure to assume responsibility for maintenance of 
the watershed structures, often the local actions were in response to macro factors. For 
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example, farmers plowed more ground in response to falling prices and government 
programs encouraging full production. As a result, local sponsors felt less responsible for 
maintenance because increased siltation of structures was the result of factors which they 
could not control. 
A better understanding of these influences can help policy-makas and implementers 
mitigate at the local level potoitially n^ative impacts of macro-Actors and design 
implementation strategies to take advantage of the strengths of local control. Ultimately, 
better knowledge and understanding of the relative influence of macro- and micro-factors 
will allow policy implementers to retain control of the implementation process. 
4. The connotation of the entanglement concqrt in the grounded theory was largely 
negative. Research is needed to determine if there are positive models of relationships 
between federal agoicies and local sponsors. If found, research is needed to determine what 
factors account for the positive relationship and to what extent the factors are rq)laceable to 
other situations. 
Federal agencies and local sponsors will continue to be forced by enabling legislation 
to work cooperatively. Experioice in the little Sioux indicates that forced relationdiips 
between organizations create problems with maintaining a power balance, controlling 
resources, and maintaining a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. These specific 
areas could be a focus for research to learn how these factors influaice the relationships and 
operating procedures betweoi functionally depaidoit agencies. 
5. In examining agencies which are functionally dependent, the relationship between 
control of resources and the balance of power would be a fruitful area for additional 
research. The conventional assumption is that the agency which controls resources is more 
powerful and able to influmce the behavior of the receiving agency (Van Meber and Van 
Horn 1975:468). Berman (1978:177) suggests that insufficient attention as been given to 
the influence and control subordinates have on die overall direction and effectiveness of an 
organization. 
The present research indicates that local sponsors, by virtue of their mutually 
dq)endent relationship with SCS, were able to manipulate the more powerful agency by 
failing to take responsibility for maintenance tasks that by legidative mandate rightly 
belonged to them. Research is needed to further ejqplicate this phenomenon. If the weaker 
agency is consistently able to skew the power balance in its favor, the wisdom of forming 
such alliances is questionable. 
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Federal agaicies aie required by convmdon and political consideations to form 
alliances with local sponsors. Yet results from this study show that one reason the Little 
Sioux watershed policy was not implemented as designed was because of the mutually 
dq)endent relation between the conservation districts and SCS. The present study indicates 
that by maintaining relationships with local sponsors, federal agaicies lose control of the 
implementation process and as a result, the projected impacts of the policy are diminished. 
6. The assumption is made that local citizens want responsibility and control when 
resolving local problems. Further, it is believed that local involvement can lead to the 
successful implementation of programs (Ehnore 1978:213, littrell 1985, Ryan 1987). 
Otha- research, however, challenges the assumption that local citizens want to participate in 
decision making or to be responsible for solving local problems (Hughes. 1985:88), and the 
record of successful local initiatives is not strong (Garkovich 1989:215, Wilkinson 1986:9). 
Data from the Little Sioux study indicate that local sponsors have not beai as 
successful at implementing the watershed program as federal policy mako^ would like. 
Data also indicate that local actors expect the federal government to assume major 
responsibility for die wata-shed program contrary to the intent of the policy initiative. At the 
same time, local sponsors and landowners want to influaice how the program is carried out 
Research is needed to better clarify what role local citizens want relative to 
addressing local problems. This research can also address the question of how best to 
incorporate into the policy design process local perceptions of problems and possible 
solutions to them. 
Related research could be conducted to diamine if there are some kinds of local 
problems that are more amaiable to local solutions. In the Little Sioux, for example, 
respondents indicated they were willing to assume responsibility for minor maintenance task 
but that SCS should have responsibility for major tasks. A final research question is what 
do local citizen understand by local control and how does this contrast with the perspective 
of federal agaicies. 
If research should find that local citizais have minimal interest in implementing some 
kinds of programs, then more resource efficient implementation strategies could be adopted. 
For example, as was suggested by several SCS personnel, it may have been more efficient 
and effective for SCS to assume full responâbility for the operation and maintenance 
program in the Little Sioux watershed rather than rely on the local conservation districts. 
Results from such research would enable policy makers to better allocate scarce resources. 
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7. Ambiguity is a "saliait and ineluctable characteristic of public policy" 
(Steinberger 1981:29). Further testing of research methods is needed to learn how best to 
study this elusive subject The use of personnel interviews and archival research in this 
study proved successful for capturing some of the ambiguity in the implementation of the 
littie Sioux watershed program. The study, however, was limited in scope. A more 
structured survey format would have provided a greater breadth of information but would 
have sacrificed dq)th for efficiraicy. Perhaps some combination of a mail or phone survey 
and in-dqpth personal interviews would be a good compromise. 
Summary 
Results from this research indicate that citizens expect the federal government to 
maintain a critical role in resolving social problems at both the local and national levels. For 
example, respondents believe the federal government should establish and enforce guidelines 
for acceptable land-use practices. To retain credibility in the policy arena, however, federal 
agencies need to approach policy implementation &om a more dynamic perspective than 
curraitly. Local sponsors and other actors readily make accommodation with a changing 
physical and policy environment to maximize their position. The federal agencies will need 
to do likewise. 
In this context, implementation might better be understood as evolution. The 
implementation process is part of a larger social process which is in a constant state of Aux. 
Attempts to influence the direction of social change are in turn influenced by the change 
process itself. Haice, implementation initiatives are not constants but must adjust to an ever-
changing social, political, economic, and physical environment All the while, some 
constancy of purpose and direction must be maintained. 
1 5 8  
REFERENCES 
Amendment to District Program and Work Plan 
1954 Tor Flood P^ention Assistance in little Sioux Watershed." Little Sioux 
Works Committee. 
Argyris, Chris, Robert Putnam, and Diana McLain Smith 
1985 Action Science. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Atkin, Charles K. 
1981 "Mass Media Information Campaign Effectiveness." I^. 265-280 in Ronald E. 
Rice and William J. Paiidey (eds.), Public Communication C^paigns. Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications. 
Barrett, Susan and Colin Fu^e 
1981 Policy and Action. London: Methuen. 
Barrett, Susan and Michael J. Hill 
1981 Report to the SSRC Coitral-Local Government Relations Panel on the 'Core' 
or Theoretical Component of the Research on Implementation (unpublished). 
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann 
1966 The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor Books. 
Berman, Paul 
1978 "The Study of Macro-and Micro-implemaitation." Public Policy 26(2): 157-
184. 
Booth, Tim 
1979 "Finding Altonatives to Residential Care - The Problem of Innovation in the 
Personal Social Services." Pp. 176-184 in Christopher Pollitt, Lew Lewis, 
Josephine Negro, and Jim Patten (eds.), Public Policy in Theory and Practice. 
Kent, Great Britain: The Open University Press. 
Brannan, Charles F. 
1950 Statement at hearings of the House Committee on Agriculture on the Missouri 
River Basin Agricultural Program, August 1. United States Dq)artment of 
Agriculture 1M6-50. 
Census of Agriculture 
1982 Census of Agriculture, Geogn^hic Area Series, Iowa. Washington DC: United 
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Census of Agriculture 
1945 Census of Agriculture. Geographic Area Series, Iowa. Washington DC: United 
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
1 5 9  
Census of Agriculture 
1940 Census of Agriculture. Geographic Area Series, Iowa. Washington DC: United 
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Code of Iowa 
1987 Soil and Water Conservation Laws, Chapter 467A. 
Conrad, Clifton 
1978 JA^G^unded Theory of Academic Change." Sociology of Education 51(2): 
Eberly, Lawraice 
1952 Letter to George Lamp, District Conservationist, accepting responsibility for 
the Theobold Minor Watershed of Woodbury County. Archives, Parks 
Library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Elmore, Richard F. 
1979-80 "Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions." 
Political Science Quarterly 94(4): 601-616. 
Elmore, Richard F. 
1978 "Organizational Models of Social Program Implemaitation." Public Policy 
26(2): 183-228. 
Etzioni, Amitai 
1987 "The Responsive Community (I & We)." The American Sociologist 
18(2):146-157. 
Flood PrevMition Operations Guide 
1962 Little Sioux Project - Iowa. Des Moines, Iowa: United States Department of 
Agriculture, SoU Conservation Service. 
Fudge, Colin and Susan Barrett 
1981 "Reconstructing the Field of Analysis." 249-278 in Susan Barrett and 
Colin Fudge (eds.), Policy and Action. London: Methuen. 
Garkovich, Lorraine E. 
1989 "Local Organizations and Leadership in Community Development" Pp. 196-
218 in James K Christenson and Jerry W. Robinson (eds.), Community 
Development in Perspective. Ames, lA: Iowa State University Press. 
Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm L. Strauss 
1967 The Discovety of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. New 
York: Aldine Publishing Company. 
Gouldner, Alvin W. 
1957 "Theoretical Requiremaits of the Applied Social Sciences." American 
Sociological Review 22(1):92-102. 
1 6 0  
Guba, Egon G. 
1985 "What Can Happen as a Result of a Policy?" Policy Review Studies 5(1):11-
Gunn, Lewis A. 
1978 "Why is Implementation So Difficult" Management Services in Government 
33(4):169-176. 
Gustavsson, Sverker 
1980 "Types of Policy and Types of Politics." Scandinavian Political Studies 3-New 
Series(2): 123-143. 
Ham, Christopher and Michael Hill 
1984 The Policy Process in the Modem Capitalist State. Brighton, England: 
Wheatsh^ Books, Ltd. 
Hamlin, Alan P. 
1986 Ethics, Economic and the State. New York: St Martin's Press. 
Hargrove, Erwin G. 
1985 The Missing Link: The Study of the Implementation of Social Policy. 
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press. 
Helco, H. H. and Aaron Wildavsky 
1974 The Private Government of Public Money. London: Macmillan. 
Hill, Michael 
1981 "The Policy-Implementation Distinction: A Quest for Rational Control" Pp. 
207-223 in Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge (èds.). Policy and Action. London: 
Methuen. 
Hjem, Benny and Chris Hull 
1982 "Implementation Research as Empirical Constitutionalism." European Journal 
of Political Research 10:105-115. 
Hjem, Benny and D. O. Porter 
1981 "Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis." 
Organization Studies 2:211-227. 
Hoban, Thomas 
1986 Barriers to Interorganizational relationships: A Comparative Analysis. An 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 
Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Hogwood, Brian W. and Lewis A. Gunn 
1984 Policy Analysis for the Real World. London: Oxford University Press. 
Hood, Christopher C. 
1976 Tlie Limits of Administration. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
161 
House Document No. 268,78th Congress 
1943 "Watershed of the Little Sioux River: A Report of a Survey of the Little Sioux 
River Watershed in Iowa and Minnesota, Rirsuant to the Flood Control Act of 
June 22,1936." Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
Hughes, Arnold 
1985 "Alternative Forms and Levels of Popular Participation: A General Survey." 
Pp. 52-93 in Franklyn Lisk (ed.). Popular Participation in Planning Basic 
Needs. Hampshire, Great Britain: Blackmore Press. 
Joint Agreement 
1988 Joint Agreement between Iowa State University and the Soil Conservation 
So-vice, United States Dq)artm«it of Agriculture Relative to the Western Iowa 
Rivers Basin Study, September 22. 
Kettner, Peter, John M. Daley, and Ann Weaver Nichols 
1985 Initiating Change in Organizations and Communities. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 
Kiviniemi, Markku 
1986 "Public Policies and Their Targets: a Typology of the Concept of 
Implementation." ISSJ 108:251-265. 
Korsching, Peter F., Curtis W. Stofferahn, Peter J. Nowak, and Donald J. Wagener 
1983 "Adcgpter Characteristics and A(^tion Patterns of Minimum Tillage: 
Implications for Soil Conservation Programs." Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation 38(5):428-431. 
Krannich, Richard S. and Craig R. Humphrey 
1983 "Local Mobilization and Community Growth: Toward an Assessment of the 
'Growth Machine' Hypothesis." Rural Sociology 48(1):60-81. 
Lamp, Geoige E 
1958 "Program Report: Little Sioux River Basin Watershed and Flood Prevention 
Project" An unpublished rqport Archives, Parks Library, Iowa State 
University, Ames, lA. 
Lamp, George E 
1949 Unpublished letter to Mr. S. J. Oberhauser, October 28. Archives, Parks 
Library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Lamp, George E 
1948 "Little Sioux Flood Control Operations, Local Cooperation and Acceptance of 
the Program." Unpublished memorandum to F.H. Mendell, State 
Conservationist, March 12. Archives, Parks Library, Iowa State University, 
Ames, lA. 
Under, Stephen H. and B. Guy Peters 
1987 "A Design Perspective on Policy Implementation: The Fallacies of Misplaced 
Prescription." Policy Studies Review 6(3):459-475. 
1 6 2  
UpsW, Michael 
1980 Street-Level Bureaucracy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Little Sioux River Wateshed 
1959 "Rood Control Project." Report of the U.S.D.A. Soil Conservation Service, 
September. 
Uttrell, Donald W. 
1985 "An Introduction to Action Research in Community Development" Pp. 187-
195 in Frank A. Fear and Harry K. Schwarzweller (eds.). Research in Rural 
Sociology and Development: Focus on Community. Gr^wich, CT: JAI Press 
Inc. 
Lloyd, Christopher 
1986 Btplanadon in Social History. New York: Basil Blackwell. 
Maintoiance Agreement 
1977 Standard Operation and Maintenance Agreement form for agreemoits between 
the Soil Conservation Service and local sponsors. Soil Conservation District, 
Onawa, lA. 
Majchrzak, Ann 
1984 Methods for Policy Research. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Majone, Giandomenico and Aaron Wildavsky 
1984 "Implementation as Evolution." Pp. 163-180 in Jefftey L. Pressman and 
Aaron Wildavsky (eds.). Implementation. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Mann, Dean E 
1981 "Introduction." 1-28 in Dean E. Mann (ed.), Bivironmental Policy 
Formation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
McAlister, Alfred 
1981 "Antismoking Campaigns: Progress in Developing Effective Communications. " 
Pp. 91-103 in Ronald E. Rice and William J. Paisley (e^.), Public 
Communication Campaigns. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Moede-Lex, Louise Ann 
1986 "Community Voices: A Key Informant Approach to Needs Assessment." 
Pq)er presented at the North American Congress on Alcohol and Drug 
Problems, Boston, MA, Sq>tember 7-11. 
Montjoy, Robert S. and Laurence J. OToole, Jr. 
1979 "Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective." 
Public Administration Review 39(5):465-476. 
1 6 3  
Moon, Wilson, T 
1972 "Watershed Protection: Land Treatment Requirement, Watershed Structural 
Measures." Unpublished Watmheds Memorandum Iowa-7 (Revision 3), July 
6. Archives, Parks Library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Norby, Steven 
1986 Letter to Kirk Bennett, Chairman Monona County Soil Conservation District 
from Assistant Attorney Gener^ Environmental Law IXviâon, Iowa 
Dq)artment of Justice, Des Moines, lA. 
Onawa Smtinel 
1952 "Soil Conservation Interest Grows." May 8. Archives, Parks Library, Iowa 
State University, Ames, lA. 
Operation and Maintaiance Agreement 
1985 Standard Operation and Maintenance Agreement form for agreements between 
the Soil Consolation Service and local sponsors. Soil Conservation District, 
Ida Grove, lA. 
Opoation and Maintaiance Handbook 
1971 State of Iowa Watershed and Resource Conservation and Development 
Projects. United States Departmoit of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service. 
Archives, Parks Library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Parks, W. Robert 
1952 Soil Conservation Districts in Action. Ames, lA: The Iowa State College 
Press. 
Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Aaron Wildavsky 
1984 Implementation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Rogo-s, Everett M. 
1983 Diffusion of Innovations. New York: The Free Press. 
Rossi, Peter H., James D. Wright, and Sonia R. Wright 
1978 "TTie Theory and Practice of Applied Social Research." Evaluation Quarterly 
2(2):171-l9l. 
Ryan, Vernon D. 
1987 "The Significance of Community Development in Rural Economic 
Development Initiatives." Chapto* 16 in Rural Economic Developmoit in the 
1980's: Preparing for the Future. Agriculture and Rural Economy Division, 
ERS STaff Report No. AGE870724. Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Sabatier, Paul A. and Daniel A. Mazmanian 
1981 "The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis." Pp. 3-35 in 
Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. S^atier (eds.). Effective Policy 
Implementation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
1 6 4  
Sarason, Seymour B. 
1981 Psychology Misdirected. New York: The Free Press. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. 
1977 "Public Organization and the Waning of the Welfare State: A Research 
Perq)ective." European Journal of Political Research 5(4):339-362. 
Selznick, Philip 
1949 TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization. 
Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Shadish, William R., Jr. 
1984 "Policy Research: Lessons from the Implementation of Deinstitutionalization." 
Amaican Psychologist 39(7):725-738. 
Silverman, David 
1974 The Theory of Organizations. London: Heinemann. 
Soldier Sentinel 
1954 "Monona Flood Damage in Millions." June 17. Archives, Parks Library, 
Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Solder Sentinel 
1952 "Great Progress Made Since Congress Passed Conservation Law." June 12. 
. Archives, Parks Library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Soldier Sentinel 
1951 "Cloudburst Damage Here is Heavy." June 21. Archives, Parks Library, 
Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Steinberger, Peter J. 
1981 "Typologies of Public Policy: Meaning Construction and the Policy Process." 
Pp. 27-39 in Irving Horowitz (ed.), Policy Studies Review Annual. Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications. 
Strauss, Anselm 
1987 Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. New York: Cambridge University 
ft"ess. 
Strauss, Anselm 
1978 Negotiations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Summaty of Meeting 
1946 Summary of the initial meeting of the Little Sioux Watershed Project, January 
3. Archives, Parks Library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Summers, Gene F. and Kristi Branch 
1984 "Economic Development and Community Social Change." Annual Review of 
Sociology 10:141-166. 
1 6 5  
USDA-SCS 
N.D. "Confused About Conservation Agencies." A pamphlet describing 
conservation agencies. USDA/S(â Conservation Service, Des Moines, LA. 
Ute Independent 
1951 "Discuss Watershed Benefits; Problems." January 11. Archives, Parks 
Library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Van Meter, Donald S. and Carl E. Van Horn 
1975 "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework." 
Administration and Society 6(4):445-488. 
Wilkinson, Kenneth P. 
1986 "In Search of the Community in the Changing Countryside." Rural Sociology 
5(1):1-17. 
Williams, D. A. 
1952 "Looking Ahead in the Little Sioux Watershed." Unpublished memorandum to 
R. H. Musser, Regonal Director, SCS, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 27. 
Archives, Parks library, Iowa State University, Ames, lA. 
Winter, Gibson 
1966 Elements for a Social Ethics: The Role of Social Science in Public Policy. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Wittrock, Bjom and Peter deLeon 
1986 "Policy as a Moving Target: A Call for Conceptual Realism." Policy Studies 
Review 6(l):44-60. 
166 
APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
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Survey of Conservation Organizations 
Background Information 
PleasB Indicate your title, agency, location of agency, and years on the Job, of your present professional position. 
Years 
Title Agency Location Employed 
Present position: 
Awareness and Perceptions of Operation and Maintenance Agreements 
Now, I would like to ask you some questions about the watershed structures located In your soil conservation district. 
2. Are you familiar with the operation aixl maintenance (O&M) agreement existing between the Soil Conservation 
Service and local sponsors In your county? 1 « Ye* 0» No 
3. Who are the local sponsors In your county? 
Board of Supervisors ______ 
Conservation District 
Other 
4. Briefly describe your present duties as related to PL534/P1J566: 
5. Please give some examples of maintenance activities, who Is currently doing the activity, and who should be doing 
It 
Maintenance activities Who Is doing Who should be doing 
6. How well do you feel watershed stmctures are twlng maintained (In your county)? 
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7. Are there maintenance operations required that you consider to be beyond the expertise or financial capability of 
the local sponsors? 
If YES, what are they? 
B. In your county, how is maintenance of watershed structures financed? 
9. in what ways can funds be legally raised to finance maintenance of watershed structures? 
(pmbe: what other options exist?) 
10. How Is the inspection of watershed structures carried out in your county? is the inspector a full-time or part-time 
position and who is he/she employed by? is the inspector expected to conduct routine maintenance? 
11. What follow-up procedures are used for Inspection reports? 
12. Is maintenance training provided for landowners In your county? If YES, by whom, and what is the extent of the 
training? 
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13. How do you think maintenance of structures in your district could be Improved? 
14. Compared to ali your other ectixdtles. how high a priority do you give to watershed structure maintenance? In 
terms of your overall time and resource commitment would you say these activities receive; _________ 
5 = Very high priority; 4 = High priority; 3 = Average priority; 2 = Low priority; 1 = Very low priority 
Relationships with Other Organizations 
Now, I would like to ask you about your relationship with other organizations. These Include the SCS-State, SCS-Area, 
SCS-Dlstrlct, County Board of Supervisors, Conservation District Commissioners, Inspectors, and local land owners. 
15. a. Which agencies, including your own, do you think detemUne the priorities for watershed maintenance activities 
In your county? Please list them In onler of importance, b. Which agencies do you think should determine the 
priorities for watershed maintenance aeUvNIes? 
a. 1. 2. 3. 
b. 1. Z • 3. 
16. in 1988, dW you attend any formal meetings with _________ to spedflcally discuss watershed structure 
maintenance Issues? 
0 c No 1 = Yes 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-Oist. DCs BOS inspectors land Owners 
(If YES to question 1) Please tell me about how many times during the past 12 months did you meet formally with 
______ to discuss maintenance of structures? 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-Dist. DCs BOS Inspectors Landowners 
17. People also get together Informally, to discuss problems. How many times during the past 12 months did you 
meet or talk Informally with to discuss maintenance of watershed structures? 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-Dist. DCs BOS Inspectors Land Ovmers 
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16. How well Infonned are you about the specific responsIbDttles and objectives of as they relate to 
watershed structure maintenance and the O&M agreement? 
5 B Very well informed; 4 • QuKe well; 3 « Somewhat infonned; 2 » Utile informed; 
1 B Not at all informed 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-DlsL DCs BOS Inspectors Land Owners 
19. During the past 12 months how often has your agency worked jointly with _______ to plan any watersheds 
staictures? 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-DisL DCs BOS Inspectors l^ nd Owners 
If YES, was this planning coordinated separately with these agencies or were several involved? 
20. Within the past 12 months how often has your agency worked jointly with to Implement any watershed 
structures? 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-DisL DCs BOS Inspectors Land Owners 
PIbbsb describe these activities and the contributions of each agency. 
21. In order to achieve vour agency's objectives, relative to watershed maintenance, to what extent does it depend 
upon services, resources, or support from _? 
5 = Great extent; 4 = Considérable extent; 3 = Some extent; 2 • Little extent; l = No extent; Don't know = 8 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-DisL DCs BOS Inspectors Landowners 
22. What specific services, resources, or support does your agency depend on from this other agency? 
Money Information Staff support Equipment Other (specify) 
Specify: SCS-State __ 
SCS-Area 
SCS-DisL 
DIsL Comm. 
BOS 
Inspectors _____ 
Land Owners 
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23. In order for (other agency) to achieve its objectives, relative to watershed maintenance, to what extent 
does It depend upon services, resources, or support from your agency? 
5 • Great extent; 4 • Contiderible extent; 3 • Some extent; 2 • Little extent; 1 • No extent; 
Doni know # e 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS^DIsL DCs BOS Inspectors Land Owners 
24. What specific services, resources, or support does (other agency) recieve from your agency for 
watershed maintenance activities? 
Money Information Staff support Equipment Other (specify) 
Specify: SCS t^e 
SCS-Area 
SCS-DlsL 
DisLComm. 
BOS 
Inspectors 
Landowners 
25. To what extent do you and the person you worit with In agree on: 
State Area Diet 
ass azs £CS iza aos inspectors Land Owners 
A. The need for soU and 
water conservation 
B. The Importance of proper 
and regular maintenance 
of structures? 
C. Who should be responsible 
for routine maintenance of 
structures? 
D. Who should be responsible 
for major maintenance of 
structure? 
E. How maintenance activities 
should be financed? 
4 = Strongly agree; 3 = Somewtut agree; 2 = Somewfut disagree; 1 = Strongly disagree; 8 = Never 
discussed 
1 7 2  
26. How much cooperation do you receive from with reganl to handling the maintenance of watershed 
structures? (probe If response Is 1 or 2) 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS I^st DCs BOS Inspectors Landowners 
5 = Great amount; 4 e Considerable amount; 3 = Soma; 2 • UtUa, 1 « Nona 
27. Relative to watershed maintenance, to what extent has (the other organization) carried out the 
commitments to your agency that It Initially agreed to? 
5 e Almost always; 4 B Most of the time; 3 • Some of the time; 2 • Little of the time; l = Almost never; 
0 B No commitments made 
Comments: 
SCS-State 
SCS-Area _____ 
SCS-Dlst 
DCs 
BOS 
Inspectors 
Land Owners 
28. Overall, to what extent are you satisfied with the relationship between your agency and regarding 
watershed maintenance? 
5 = Great extent; 4 = Considerable extent; 3 = Some extent; 2 = Little extent; 1 = No extent 
Comments: (Why or why not; - how could the relationship be Improved?) 
SCS-State 
SCS-Area 
SCS-DlsL 
1 7 3  
5 B Great extent; 4 • Considerable extent; 3 « Some extent; 2 « Uttle extent; l « No extent 
Comments: (Why or why not; • how could the relationship be improved?) 
DCs 
BOS 
inspectors 
Landowners 
Now, I would like to mad you several statements regarding watershed maintenance. Please tell me II you strongly 
disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statement 
SEl B. A S£L 
29. Fulfilling watershed maintenance agreements has been dHflcult because of 
changing organizational expectations. Which organizations? 12 3 4 
30. Fulfilling watershed maintenance agreements has been difficult because of 
landowner apathy and iacltof cooperation. l 2 3 4 
31. Funding uncertainties of local sponsors makes Its difficult to cany out 
implementation of maintenance agreements? 1 2 3 4 
32. Limitations on local expertise makes It more difficult to carry out implementation 
of maintenance agreements? 1 2 3 4 
33. Other program priorities for local sponsors makes it more difficult to carry out 
implementation of maintenance agreements? 1 2 3 4 
34. Our present legal authority makes It more difficult to carry out maintenance 
agreements? 1 2 3 4 
35. Certain factors may prevent organizations from working together effectively. What do you thint; is the most serious 
barrier to proper maintenance of watershed structures? 
1 7 4  
/ am going to ask you about some factors that may affect woiklng relationships among organizations for the 
maintenance of watershed structures, 
36. Is lack of time within your agency a: 
2 - SerkNjs problem l • Somewhat of a problem, or 0 - No problem 
37. Is potential loss of Independence In your own decision making a: 
2 •' Serious problem 1 = Somewhat of a problem, or 0 - No problem 
38. Organizations have different declskxwnaking structures, such as a line organization as compared to a local 
committee system. Are these differences a; 
2 " Serious problem 1 - Somewhat of a problem, or 0 - No problem 
39. Is lack of adequate training for landowners regarding proper maintenance of watershed structures a: 
2 • Serious problem 1 • Somewhat of a problem, or 0 - No problem 
40. Is the unwillingness of others to cooperate a: 
2 " Serious problem 1 - Somewhat of a problem, or 0 - No problem 
If lor 2, which organizations: 
Perceptions of Conservation Issues and Responsibiilties 
41. a) Some describe a consenotlon ethic as assuming responsibllty for preserving the capacity of the land to renew 
It^ f. How would you describe a conservation ethic? 
b) What are some examples of activities which are consistent with your understamjing of a conservation ethic? 
1 7 5  
c) What does land mean to you? For some, land Is merely an Input of commodity production. For others, land Is a 
living organism which has meaning and function beyond mere commodity production. On a scale from 1 to 10, 
with 1 being land merely as an Input of commodity production and 10 being land as a living organism, where 
would you fall. 
living 
Input organism 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
42. What Im^ct has the 1985 Fami Bill had on the maintenance of watershed structures In you county? 
43. When farmers make management decisions about what they wHI produce and how they will produce it, what 
Importance do each of the following have for Influencing that decision? Is the factor 
1 = Irrelevant, 2 B not really Important, 3 = important, 4 * very Important, 6 = essential 
Maintaining personal Independence 
Maintaining the future viability of the farm 
Increasing Income 
Responding to market demand 
Impact on the environment 
fm going to read some examples of costs that might be Imurred ty farmers when practicing soil and water 
conservation. Please tell me how much responslt)lllty landowners (LO), local government (LG), state government 
(SG), and Federal govemmertt (FG), should have hr the costs of the following soil conservation practices? (Circle the 
one who has prime re^nslblllty.) 
LO LG SG FG 
44. Conservation land treatment (e.g., building of terraces) 
45. Building of large water and grade control structures (dams) 
46. Purchase of conservation tillage equipment 
47. Reduced profits and Increased tax ilabHlly because all land 
is not In production 
4 B Total responsibility; 3 b Some; 2 = Little; 1 = No responsibility 
1 7 6  
Now I have some examples of costs that might be Incurred because soil conservation Is not practiced. How much 
responsibility do each of the following have lor paying the costs of not practicing soil conservation? (Circle the one 
who has prime responsll^ llty.) 
LO LG SG FG 
48. The need to increase the amount of chemical fertilizer Inputs to 
compensate for reduced productivity due to top sol loss. 
49. The treatment of ground and surface water polluted by 
agricultural chemicals. 
50. The cleaning of sediment from ditches. 
51. The construction of erosion and Dood control devises. 
52. Property damage from flooding. 
4 B Total responsibility; 3 « Some; 2 = Uttle; 1 = No mponsibility 
53. To what extent does society, and to what extent do fanners/landowners have a responsibility to protect soil 
resources for future generations? On a ten point scale, where 'one* assigns total responsibility to society, five* is 
Joint sharir^  and ten* assigns total responsibility to landowner/farm operator. 
society Joint landowner 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
54. What things should society be doing to protect soli resources? 
55. What things should farmers/landowners be doing, that they are not now doing, to protect soil resources? 
1 7 7  
56. What has been the primary motivating force responsible for changes In cropping practices and livestock 
management over (he past IMS years? 
57. What lias been the result of these changes for watershed structures? 
/ have some general questions about the Interrelationships betweén agriculture, soil conservation, and society that I 
would like to talk to you atmut Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following 
statements and why? 
SEL S. A S&. 
58. Conservation is a local/landowner Issue and the federal government should 
stay out of It. 1 2 3 4 
59. Because taxpayers benefit from conventional farming practices with cheap food, 
they should bear the expense of repairing the son erosion that results from 
these practices. i 2 3 4 
60. The federal government has the responsibility to safeguard the publiais 
investment in SOU erosion control devises by ensuring that they are used 
and maintained property. 2 3 4 
61. The American farmer wortœ primarSy for himself and hence can use his land 
as he sees fit to maximize his profit 12 3 4 
1 7 8  
^ D. A £A 
62. Because agriculture is dependent upon the environment, farm operations 
should be regttoted to minimize damage to the envlroranenL 12 3 4 
63. Because agriculture provides a needed service to society-quality food at a 
cheap price • farm operations should be regulated to ensure that this service 
Is maintained In a way that benefits all of society. 12 3 4 
64. Fanners should be compensated for adopting soD conservation practices that 
are environmentally sound, but may be economically unprofitable. 12 3 4 
1 7 9  
Local Landowner Survey 
Farm Operation and Local Landowner Characteristics 
1 . 1  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  g e t  s o m e  b a c k g r o u n d  I n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  y o u r  a n d  y o u r  f a n n i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  
2. Are you now or have you ever been a Sol Conservation District Commissioner? If Yes, what years. 
3. Please Indicate your 1988 cropping areas: 
ACRES 
Row crops 
Set aside 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
Hay/Pasture 
Other 
Total Acres Owned 
Total Acres Rented 
TOTAL ACRES FARMED 
4. Total acres In conservation watershed 
structures 
5. UypgtgpMnygmprv 
Swine (# marketed In past year) head 
Beef (January 11nventory 
Stock cows head 
Feedlot steers/heifers head 
Dairy; Milking herd head 
Other head 
head 
6. Age 
30 years or less = l 
31 to 49 year# =2 
50 *0 64 years =3 
65 or older =4 
1 8 0  
7. Formal Education _____ 
Some high tchool or lew = 1 
High school graduate • 2 
Vocational training « 3 
Some college » 4 
College graduate or mora « 5 
8. How many watershed structures are on land you own or manage? 
9. How long have you been fanning this land? • 
10. Is the land on which the structures are located owned by you or rented from someone else? 
11. When were the structures buBt? 
12. Why were the structures buDt? 
13. Are these structures necessary? 
14. Whose structures are they? Yours or the government's? 
15. When the structures were bunt or when you became responsible for this land were you instructed how to perform 
the routine maintenance required to keep the structures operating effectively? (Yes/NO) 
16. If YES, by whom?  ^
17. What Instructions were you given? 
1 8 1  
Awareness and Perceptions of Operation and Maintenance Agreements 
/ hnve several general questions that I would like (o ask you about the operation and maintenance of watershed 
structures which are In your county. 
18. Are you fatnOlar with the operation and maintenance (O&M) agreement existing between the Soil Conservation 
Service and local sponsors in your county? ______ 
1 B Ym 0 • No 
19. Who are the local sponsors In your county? 
Board of Supendsors 
Conservation District 
Other 
20. Is there a signed maintenance agreement with the local sponsors for the watershed structures on your land? 
(yw/no) If YES, Who signed It? 
21. How well do you feel the watershed structures are being maintained In your county? 
22. Are there maintenance operations required that you consider to be beyond the expertise or financial capability of 
the local sponsors? 
23. If YES, what are they? 
24. In your county, how is maintenance of watershed structures financed? 
25. In your county, how may funds be raised to finance maintenance of watershed structures? (probe; what other 
options exist?) 
26. How do you thinic maintenance of structures in your county could be Improved? 
1 8 2  
I would now like to talk vrith you about the watershed structures which are on your land. 
27. How Is Information about your stoictures and responsibllty for maintaining them transferred from one generation 
or owner to another? 
26. What continued training and support have been provided to help you maintain these structures? 
29. What additional training or Infomratlon would be helpful? 
SO. Please give some examples of maintenance activities for the structures on your land. Who Is currently doing the 
activity? Who do you feel should be doing the activity? Who do you feel should pay for it? 
Maintenance activities Who Is doing Who should be doing Who should pay 
31. What have been your average annual costs to maintain these structures? 
32. Have you paid into a maintenance fund? (Yes/No) 
a. If YES, how much? 
b. Was It a one time cost paid at the time of construction or Is It paid on a regular basis? 
Onetime Regular 
c. Do you still have maintenance responsibilities? (Yes/No) 
L 
1 8 3  
d. Why/Why not? 
e. If yw, what should those responsibilities be? 
33. What prevents you from making needed repairs? 
34. Compared to all your other activities, how high a priority do you give to watershed structure maintenance? In 
terms of your overall time and resource commitment would you say these activities receive: 
5 = Very high priority 
4 B High priority 
3 = Average priority 
2 = Low priority 
1 = Very low priority 
35. Should ses fund the maintenance and repair of your watershed structures? ___________ 
Why/Why not? 
1 8 4  
36. If not, who shoidd? 
37. Haw often are yourwatershad structures Inspected by? 
BVWtlgm Frequency 
• Farmer/Landowner (you) 
The Inspector 
Other 
38. What happens during the Inspection process? 
39. Are you provided with the results of the Inspection? (Yes/Nol 
If YES, what actions are taken by you in response to the Inspection report? 
40. Has the 1985 Farm BDI had any impact on the maintenance of watershed stmctures on your land? (Yes/No) 
If so, what? 
41. How might It in the future? 
42. Should land that is talcen up by terraces and other conservation uses be taxed as agricultural land? 
1 8 5  
Interagency Coordination 
As you probably know, several agencies along with landowners are Involved with the planning, Implementation and 
maintenance of watershed structures In your county. These include: The Soli Conservation Service District 
Conservationist, the Soli ConsenmOon District Commissioners, and the County Board of Supenrtsors. I would like to 
ask you several questions t^ nut these agencies and your relationship with them. 
43. a) Which agencies do you think determine the priorities for watershed maintenance activities in your county? 
Please list them In the order of Importance, b) Which agencies do yeu thlnic shouid determine the priorities for 
watershed maintenance actlvtties? 
a) 1. 2. ; 3. 
b) 1. z 3. 
44. in your opinion, how well do these agencies work together. If they work well together, WHY. If they do not work 
well together, WHY NOT. 
45. In 1988, dW you attend any formal meetings with to specifically discuss maintenance of your 
watershed structures? 
0 B No Is Vet 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-Dlst. DCs BOS inspectors 
46. People also get together informally to discuss problems. How many times during the past 12 months did you meet 
to talk informally with to discuss maintenance of your watershed structures? 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-DlsL DCs BOS Inspectors 
47. How well Informed are you about the specific responslbSlties and objective of as they related to 
watershed structure maintenance and the O&M agreement? 
5 = Very well Informed, 4 = Quite well, 3 = Somewttat informed, 2 = Uttle informed, 
1 = Not at all Informed 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-Dlst. DCs BOS Inspectors 
1 8 6  
48. To what extent do you and the person you work wKh In ________ agree on: 
State Area DM 
ses SCS JSCS DC:» £QS Inaoector* Land Owner» 
A. The need for aol and 
water conservation 
B. The importance of proper 
and regular maintenance 
of structures? 
C. Who should be responsible 
for routine maintenance of 
structures? 
D. Who should be responsible 
for major maintenance of 
structure? 
E. How maintenance activities 
should be financed? 
4 a Strongly agree; 3 = Somewhat agree; 2 « Somewhat disagree; 1 = Strongly disagree; 8 = Never 
discussed 
49. How much cooperation do you receive from with regard to handling the maintenance of your 
watershed structures? (Probe, If response is 1 or 2) 
SCS-State SCS-Area SCS-Dist DCs BOS inspectors 
6 « Great amount, 4 « Considerable amount, 3 « Some, 2 « Uttie, l • None 
1 8 7  
50. Relative to '.votefshed maintenance, has carried out the commitments to you that it initially 
agreed to? 
5 • Almoit«lways,4 B Most of the time, 3 s Some of the time, 
2 B Little of the time, 1 » Almost never, o B NO commitments made 
Comments: 
SCS-State 
SCS-Area 
SCS-DIst 
DCs 
inspector 
BOS 
51. Overall, to what extent are you satisfied with the relationship between yourself and .regarding 
maintenance of watershed stnjctures? 
S B Great extent, 4 B Considerable extent, 3 B Some extent, 2 B uttle extent, 1 s No extent 
Comments: (Why/Why not - how could the relationship be Improved) 
SCS t^ate • 
SCS-Area . 
SCS-DisL 
DCs .  ^
inspector 
BOS 
Perceptions of Conservation Issues and Responsibilities 
52. a) Some describe a consenmtion ethic as assuming responsibility for preserving the capacity of the land to renew 
Itself. How would youtfescribe a conservation ethic? 
1 8 8  
b) What are some examples of activities which are consistent with your understanding of a conservation ethic? 
c) What does land mean to you? For some, land Is merely an Input of commodity production. For others, land is a 
living organism which has meaning and function beyond mere commodity production. On a scale from 1 to 10, 
with 1 being land merely as an Input of commodity production and 10 being land as a living organism, where 
would you fall. 
living 
input organism 
1  2 3 4 S 6 7 B 9  1 0  
53. As a landowner/farmer, which of the following conservation practices do you use? 
Maintain grassed watenways bi the fields 
Practice conservation tllage 
Useno4Bi 
Use terraces wtiere needed 
Practice contour farming 
Practice contour stripcropptng 
Use crop rotations 
Build grade stabilization structures where needed 
Maintain widllfe habitat 
Keep chemical Inputs to a minimum 
Other • 
54. When you maite management decisions about wtiat you w8i produce and how you wHI produce It, what • 
Importance do each of the following have for Influencing that decision? Is the factor 
1 B irrelevant, 2 • not really important, 3 > important, 4 « very important, 5 = essential 
Maintaining personal Independence 
Maintaining the future viability of the farm 
Increasing income 
Responding to market demand 
Impact on the environment 
1 8 9  
rm going to nad some examples o> costs that might be Incurred tiy you when practicing soil and water conservation. 
Please tell me how much responslltlllty landowners (LO), local government (LG), stale government (SG). and Federal 
government (FG), should have for the costs of the following atiU consenntlon practices? (Circle the one who has 
prime responsltilllty.) 
LO LG SG FG 
55. Conseivation land treatment (aaibuldino of terraces) _ 
56. Bulding of large water and grade control structures (dams) 
— — — — 
57. Purchase of conservation tUage equipment 
— — — 
58. Reduced profits and Increased tax liabOlty because all land 
Is not In production 
— — — — 
4 B Total mporalblllty; 3 • Some; 2 * Little; 1 > No retponslblllty 
Now I have some exanyVes of costs that might be Incurred because soil conservation Is not practiced. How much 
responslUllty do each of Ote following have for paying the costs of not practicing soil conservation? (Circle the one 
who has prime responslt)lllty.) 
LO LG SG FG 
59. The need to Increase the amount of chemical feitllzer Inputs to 
compensate for reduced productivity due to top soB loss. 
60. The treatment of ground and surface water polluted by 
agricultural chemicals. 
— — — — 
61. The cleaning of sediment from ditches. 
— — — — 
62. The construction of erosion and flood control devises. 
— — — — 
63. Property damage from flooding. 
— —— — 
4 = Total responsibility; 3 « Some; 2 = Little; 1 = No responsibility 
1 9 0  
64. To what extent does society, and to what extent do fanners/landowners have a responslbfllty to protect soil 
resources for future générations? On a ten point scale, where 'one* assigns total responsibility to society, five' is 
joint sharing and ten' assigns total responsibility to landowner/lann operator. 
society Joint landowner 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
65. What things should society be doing to protect son resources? 
66. What things should farmers/landowners be doing, that they are not now doing, to protect soD resources? 
67. What has been the primary motivating force responsible for changes in cropping practices and livestock 
management over the past 10-15 years? 
68. What has been the result of these changes for watershed structures? 
I have some general questions abotit the Interrelationships Ixtween agriculture, soil conservation, and society that I 
would like to talk to you at>out. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the ioUowing 
satements and wh/f 
£ A SL 
69. Conservation is a local/landowner issue and the federal government shotdd 
stay out ofK 12 3 4 
1 9 1  
£ A M 
70. Because taxpayers benefit from conventional fanning piBctioas with cheap food, 
they should bear the expense of repairing the son erosion that results from 
these practices. 12 3 4 
71. The federal government has the responslbllty to safeguard the puUici's 
investment h sol erosion control devises by ensuring that ttiey are used 
and maintained properly. 12 3 4 
72. The American fanner worlaprimarly for himself and hence can use his land 
as he sees fit to maximize his proftt. 12 3 4 
73. Because agriculture is dependent upon the environment, farm operations 
should be regulated to minimize damage to the environment 1 2 3 4 
74. Because agriculture provides a needed sewice to society •quality food at a 
cheap price - famn operations should be regulated to ensure that this service 
is maintained in a way that benefits all society. - 12 3 4 
75. Farmers should be compensated for adopting soD conservation practices that 
are environmentally sound, but may be economically unprofitable. 1 2 3 4 
76. Pressure from my friends and neighbors makes It difficult for me to adopt good 
soD conservation practices. 12 3 4 
